SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000157

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 17, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-060.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 17, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Notifications Working Group meeting chaired by Mr.
Siemon and Mr. Smirnov, the Russian side provided an unofficial
translation of the Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) Version
1.8, Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty on Notifications,
dated February 17, 2010. The Russian side provided clarification
of its proposed changes and the U.S. side provided counter
proposals. The two sides discussed in detail the notifications
that describe the transfer of SLBMs under the U.S.-United Kingdom
(UK) existing pattern of cooperation and "notification of the
development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm (SOA)." The
two sides briefly discussed the time and date for the provision of
a notification, notification of the visit of a deployed heavy
bomber beyond 24 hours, a notification that provides the planned
schedule for conversions and eliminations during the calendar year,
and a notification concerning the list of inspectors and aircrew
members. End Summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section I: General Provisions; Section
II: Notifications Concerning the Database; Section III:
Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms;
Section V: Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination; and
Section VI: Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions.



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Section I: General Provisions

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5. (S) Mr. Smirnov provided Mr. Siemon with two copies of the
unofficial translation of the Russian-proposed JDT Part Four of the
Protocol to the Treaty, dated February 17, 2010. Smirnov had made
additional changes to the text since a pre-conforming meeting held
the previous day. He suggested the group use the Russian version
for discussion. Siemon reminded Smirnov the sides should provide
text for discussion factoring in sufficient time for the other side
to review. Siemon added the Russian text should include not only
the recommended changes but also the text that had been changed.
In this way, discussion could be more productive. Although the


Russian side had not, in this instance, operated per normal
procedures in delivering the text, Siemon agreed to continue
discussion so the group could move forward.




6. (S) Smirnov recommended the sides delete paragraph 2, which
related to the database, since Article VIII had for the most part
been agreed. Siemon agreed. Smirnov also recommended the sides
modify the START language in the paragraph related to using
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) for the time and date of a notification.
The current language had confused individuals in the Russian
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). First, simply changing the
date of the notification to the date the respective NRRC received
the notification corrected one problem. He also proposed to
specify all times and dates in the notifications be given in GMT.
After consulting with Mr. Stickney from the U.S. NRRC, Siemon
agreed to Smirnov's approach on GMT time; however, he questioned
the proposal for the date of the notification. Several of the
proposed notifications signaled the commencement of monitoring or
inspection activities using the date provided in the notification.
Using the date of receipt for the date of provision of the
notification confused this concept. Smirnov offered a remark
within the notification could specify that the commencement of the
event was based on the receipt of the notification. Siemon agreed
to take the proposal back for study.



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Section II: Notifications

Concerning the database

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7. (S) Siemon noted that both sides in the Definitions Working
Group had agreed on the definition of variant; therefore, the U.S.
side could accept the Russian-bracketed term "variants" in
paragraph 3(b),and paragraph 3. The agreed text of paragraph 3(b)
was as follows:



Begin text.



(b) New facilities, new types, variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new
versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs.



End text.




8. (S) The Russian side believed the U.S. term "items" was too
broad for use in paragraph 4 and recommended using the formulation
"ICBMs and SLBMs." Smirnov further noted this notification was not
needed since existing patterns of cooperation were addressed in the
treaty. The Russian side proposed a new formulation of the


paragraph to describe a notification to be used for the movement of
an ICBM to the territory of a third State and its subsequent launch
or return from the territory of a third State. Siemon noted
paragraph 4 was intended to notify Russia of the transfer of SLBMs
to the UK pursuant to the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation (POC).
Siemon further noted, as in START, the U.S. could also include a
statement that addressed the U.S.-UK POC. The U.S.-bracketed text
"in accordance with an established pattern of cooperation" exactly
described this POC. Smirnov noted the Russian-proposed text was
intended to describe Russia's technical cooperation with Kazakhstan
and specifically the movement of ICBMs to the Leninsk Test Range.
Siemon reminded Smirnov while the notification itself might be
acceptable as written, the bigger issue of how the Leninsk Test
Range would be covered under the treaty had yet to be decided.




9. (S) Mr. Dean added that the U.S. transfer of SLBMs to the UK
and the movement of Russian ICBMs to Leninsk were two distinct and
different actions, with different legal ramifications under the
treaty. In the case of the transfers of Trident II SLBMs, the
legal framework for such transfers was provided in Article XV of
the treaty. However, when Russia moved an ICBM to Kazakhstan for a
test launch, Russia still retained possession of the ICBM.
Accordingly, the transfer ban in Article XV (as well as the
language dealing with "patterns of cooperation") did not apply.
After a lengthy discussion on the subtleties of the words
"movement" and "transfer," Smirnov recommended using two
paragraphs. The first would relate to the transfers under the
U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation. The second would relate to a
situation in which Russia moved an ICBM to Kazakhstan for testing
at the Leninsk Test Range. Siemon acknowledged the need for two
paragraphs, for which he would present proposed text at the next
meeting.




10. (S) Smirnov stated there was a fundamental difference in the
approaches of the two sides for notifying the emergence of a new
kind of SOA. The Russian side believed a Party could request
discussion of the development of a new kind of SOA in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). This discussion would be triggered
by a notification. The Parties would decide within the BCC if the
new kind of offensive arm was a "strategic offensive arm." If the
Parties determined it was indeed a SOA to which the treaty applied,
the Parties also decided within the BCC, either then or in a future
meeting of the BCC, which, if any, provisions of the treaty applied
to this new kind of SOA. Therefore, the U.S.-proposed notification
would not be needed since the official BCC record would serve as
such. The Parties could also decide in the BCC if the new kind of
offensive arm was not an SOA and therefore not subject to the
treaty. The fundamental difference of the U.S. position from the
RF position was that the Parties together decided if the offensive
arm was a SOA; the Party which developed the item did not decide
this alone. The Parties together made this decision prior to
deploying the item.




11. (S) Siemon believed the sides could draft two notifications to
assuage Russian concerns; one to notify the other Party of the
development of a new kind of SOA that triggered discussion in the
BCC if either Party had concerns about a potential new kind of SOA,
and a second notification to signal the deployment of a new kind of
SOA. Smirnov believed paragraph 2 of Article V supported the


Russian-proposed notification process: 1) One Party noticed the
other Party developing a new kind of SOA; 2) this Party then sent a
notification to the other party requesting discussion within the
BCC; the BCC decided what provisions of the Treaty, if any, applied
to the new kind.




12. (S) Dean said the U.S. concept included three steps. The
first step, per Article V, entailed a discussion in the BCC if a
Party believed that a new kind of strategic offensive arm was
emerging. There would be a notification to request such BCC
discussions. The second step required the developing Party to
submit a notification that acknowledged the development of a new
kind of SOA. The third step, as provided for within Article XIV,
subparagraph (c),was that the BCC may then resolve questions
concerning the applicability of provisions of the treaty to the new
kind.




13. (S) Siemon reiterated the U.S. position that Article V could
be used by either Party to trigger discussions within the BCC. The
Party with concerns could use the Article V provisions or the Party
that developed the new kind of SOA could use Article V to trigger
BCC discussions in order to alleviate a concern of the other Party.
Siemon believed the Russian-proposed notification only solved half
the problem. He offered to draft two notifications for discussion
at the next meeting; one for step one and the other for step two.
Siemon reemphasized only the Party that developed the item could
determine if it was a new kind of SOA. Smirnov disagreed. Smirnov
also disagreed with the U.S.-proposed notification related to new
SOA including language specifying a "flight test." He opined some
new SOA might not be flight tested.
"Some new SOA might not fly but crawl," he said. The text remained
bracketed.



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Section III: Notifications Concerning

Movement of Strategic offensive arms

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14. (S) The sides agreed to defer discussion of time periods
captured in this section to the next meeting. Siemon noted since
the definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber had not been fully
resolved, the bracketed text in paragraphs 3 and 4 should remain.
With respect to text for providing the location in the notification
of a visiting bomber, Siemon indicated with regard to heavy bomber
movements outside U.S. national territory, the notification would
only provide the general geographical area of the visit as was done
in START. This was done to protect information related to
operational missions. Smirnov recommended replacing the
Russian-bracketed text "the location during" with "area." Siemon
agreed to take this back for discussion. Text in Section III
remained bracketed.


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Section V: Notifications

Concerning Conversion or Elimination

--------------




15. (S) Smirnov indicated the title of the section "Notifications
Concerning Conversion or Elimination" showed agreement that
resulted from the previous pre-conforming meeting. Both sides
agreed to delete "of ((Items and Facilities Subject to the
Treaty))1 ((Strategic Offensive Arms))2". He noted the text
included two variants of the paragraph which addressed conversion
or elimination schedules. The Russian-proposed text provided only
calendar-year scheduled eliminations. The Russian side could not
provide a calendar-year plan for scheduled conversions since they
did not draft these schedules. Smirnov stated the schedule was not
needed since a Party was required to notify the other Party 30 days
in advance of the intent to initiate a conversion or elimination.
Siemon recommended adding the number and types of SOA to the
Russian-proposed text and indicated he would discuss the text of
the notification with Mr. Elliott, the Chair of the Conversion or
Elimination Working Group.



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Section VI: Notifications

Concerning inspections and exhibitions

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16. (S) Smirnov reiterated the Russian side had accepted the
U.S.-proposed 45-day period for the notification of amendments to
the list of inspectors and aircrew members. Siemon asked how the
Russians proposed to handle notifications when a Party wanted to
immediately remove an individual from either list because of
criminal behavior. Smirnov acknowledged the Russian-proposed
notifications did not capture this situation.




17. (S) Siemon asked Smirnov to clarify the purpose of the
proposed notification containing the agreed list of inspectors and
aircrew members. Smirnov told Siemon, in the Russian view, the
agreed list would be shared one time shortly after entry into force
of the treaty. Siemon opined this process was confusing as it did
not take into account further updates to the agreed list over the
life of the treaty. Siemon ultimately agreed to consider Smirnov's
proposal.




18. (S) Each side reiterated its position with respect to the
timing for notification of the intent to conduct an inspection.
Smirnov stated the 72-hour time period was needed so the Russian
NRRC could arrange logistics for the arrival of the inspection
team. Siemon indicated the notification should reflect the time


period agreed upon by the Inspection Protocol Working Group.
(Begin comment: The United States has proposed 16 hours for this
activity in the Inspection Protocol Working Group. End comment.)
Both sides agreed to keep the proposed time periods bracketed.




19. (S) Smirnov indicated the Russian side had refined the
language that referenced the exchange of geographic coordinates to
focus on those geographic coordinates related to reference points.
This was required since the Treaty included several situations
where coordinates were exchanged; the Russian side simply wanted to
refer to the coordinates of a reference point in this notification.
Siemon noted the difficulty of using the text provided by Smirnov
at the beginning of the meeting since it did not indicate what text
had been changed or deleted. He reiterated that in the future, the
Russian side should provide its proposed JDT well in advance of a
meeting so that an effective discussion could take place.




20. (S) Before concluding the meeting, Smirnov wished to discuss
the time period related to a change in site diagrams. He
reiterated that no time period for transmitting a notification with
the changes was necessary since he believed the changes would be
documented in the BCC. The documentation would reference the date
of change. The sides agreed to continue this discussion at the
next meeting.




21. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Unofficial English translation and Russian language of Russian
Proposed JDT Rev 1.8, Part Four of the Protocol to the
Treaty-Notifications, dated February 17, 2010.




22. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Albertson

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Mr. Dwyer

Dr. Fraley


Mr. Hanchett (RO)

LT Sicks

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Ivanov

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




23. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING