SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000155

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 12, 2010

REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007); 10 GENEVA 153 (SFO-GVA-VIII-034)
10 GENEVA 148 (SFO-GVA-VIII-038); 10 GENEVA 147 (SFO-GVA-VIII-037)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-043.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 12, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on
February 12 chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed
an unofficial U.S. delegation proposal regarding a new approach to
batching and the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled missile
motor cases and mobile ICBM launchers. The sides also discussed
unique identifiers (UIDs),conduct of Type-2 inspections at
operational bases, and a new Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text
(JDT) for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol.




4. (S) The Russian-proposed JDT introduced inspection of ICBM
silos converted to launch missile defense interceptors and added a
provision to restrict the purpose of Type-2 inspections at
conversion or elimination (CorE) facilities to only the
confirmation of the results of eliminations. It also included a
provision to allow inspectors to read UIDs, but only on eliminated
ICBMs and SLBMs at CorE facilities during an inspection. End
Summary.




5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S. Unofficial Proposal;
Russian-proposed JDT; Inspecting ICBM Silos Converted to Launch
Missile Defense Interceptors; Conduct of Type-2 Inspections at
Type-1 Facilities; Concepts for Batching; and Unique Identifiers.



--------------

U.S. UNOFFICIAL PROPOSAL FOR SECTION VII

--------------




6. (S) Ilin handed over a Russian-proposed draft JDT for Section
VII of Part Five of the Protocol, but suggested the group work on
the U.S. text first. Warner noted the United States did not have
an official proposal, as the text could not be cleared by
Washington because of the recent weather-related closures. He also
highlighted the fact that Washington was virtually unaware that the
delegations in Geneva had much different understandings of the
agreements on solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher
elimination reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow in
January (Ref A),but that the U.S. delegation was actively seeking
guidance on these issues. Warner recommended the working group
explore each others' proposals for common ground and potential
compromises.



7. (S) After giving the Russian side a copy of an unofficial
U.S.-proposed Section VII, Warner again outlined the broader U.S.
view of Type-2 inspections for all conversion or elimination
activities discussed in the IPWG meeting on February 10, (Ref B),
as well as the basic structure for a revised batching and
inspection concept for the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled
rocket motor cases at Votkinsk and mobile ICBM launchers at
Piban'shur.




8. (S) Warner noted that U.S. proposals sought to address all
conversion or elimination activity within the Type-2 inspection
regime. While the primary focus of discussions had been on
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM
launchers, both sides also needed to look at procedures for Type-2
inspections of eliminated silo launchers, as well as conversions of
SLBM launchers, and conversion of heavy bombers (HB) from nuclear
to non-nuclear armaments. Warner recommended withholding
discussion of the controversial issue of the conversion of
individual SLBM launchers aboard SSBNs for another meeting.




9. (S) For inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs,
Warner explained the new, unofficial U.S. proposal under which the
United States would only inspect the Votkinsk CorE facility twice
per year, but could choose either to inspect the semi-annual 25
percent batches of burned-out motor cases accumulated by the
Russians, or inspect the facility, including the eliminated items
on display, during periods not associated with the two
accumulations. If the United States chose to inspect outside one
of the accumulation windows, he emphasized that inspection teams
must be able to inspect all items subject to inspection within the
boundaries of the inspectable area and not just the eliminated
missiles or mobile ICBM launchers. Ilin disagreed on the scope of
the inspection, insisting that the eliminated items were the only
inspectable items at these CorE facilities. (Begin comment: Col
Petrov was overheard telling Ilin that everything within the
boundaries of such facilities was inspectable under START, but this
seemed to make no difference to Ilin. End comment.)



--------------

DISCUSSION ON RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JDT

--------------




10. (S) Discussion moved to the Russian-proposed JDT, which added
several sub-paragraphs to paragraph 2 of Section VII for specific
facilities: sub-para (b) to allow Type-2 inspections of eliminated
silo launchers at ICBM bases and inspections at submarine bases for
SSBNs converted to SSGNs; sub-para (c) to state the purpose of
inspections at CorE facilities for solid-fueled missiles or mobile
ICBM launchers was only to confirm the elimination of these items;
sub-para (d) for inspection of heavy bombers (HBs) converted to
non-nuclear armaments at their basing locations; sub-para (e) to
inspect silo launchers of ICBMs converted to launch missile defense
interceptors at Vandenberg AFB (VAFB); and an additional clause
that would exempt from inspection and prohibit access to any other
facilities at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and CorE facilities when
conducting Type-2 elimination inspections at these sites.




11. (S) In response to a question from Warner, Ilin clarified that
sub-para (b) for inspections of SSGNs dealt strictly with the full
conversion of an SSBN into an SSGN and would be conducted under two


situations: to confirm completion of the conversion; and to confirm
the cruise missile launchers had not been reconverted. Warner
noted that Ilin had discussed this topic during the previous day's
Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref C),and requested that Ilin
provide his talking points in writing. Ilin demurred, claiming he
did not yet have authorization from the Russian Head of Delegation
(HOD).




12. (S) Warner noted the Russian proposal was that inspection of
converted HBs would only take place at air bases and asked if
Russia would inspect HBs at CorE facilities where the conversion
process actually occurred. Warner indicated that the United States
planned to continue to carry out conversions of HBs at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (DMAFB),probably through the life of
the treaty. Ilin claimed Russia had based its language on HBs on
U.S. language in a draft agreed statement discussed on February 11
(Ref D),but the lack of a definition for non-deployed HBs had
created a problem.




13. (S) Warner said the individual HBs at DMAFB would remain
deployed HBs equipped for nuclear armaments until the conversion
process on each was completed. As all provisions for inspection of
converted HBs were contained in paragraph 1 of Section VII, the
United States had not considered it necessary to include a special
provision in paragraph 2. Both sides agreed to consider whether a
separate provision for inspection of HBs undergoing conversion at
DMAFB was needed in paragraph 2.



--------------

INSPECTING ICBM SILOS CONVERTED TO LAUNCH

MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS

--------------




14. (S) Ilin raised the issue of inspection of the former ICBM
silo launchers located at VAFB, which had been converted to launch
missile defense interceptors (MDI). Citing discussion on
these(MDI)during the February 11 Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref
C),Ilin proposed that converted silo launchers be subject to
inspection to ensure against reconversion in the same manner as HBs
converted to carry non-nuclear armaments.




15. (S) Warner reminded Ilin that Article V of the draft treaty
banned conversion of ICBM silo launchers to launch MDI, with the
exception that the ban did not apply to former ICBM silo launchers
located at VAFB that had been converted prior to signature of this
treaty. Warner stated that this issue was being discussed at the
HOD level, and might possibly develop into an agreed statement.
Ilin claimed that the Russian HOD understood that "technical
elements" for the development of such an agreed statement could be
discussed in the IPWG. Warner reemphasized that the sensitivity of
including missile defense issues in the SFO Treaty was so great
that this matter required special handling. He recommended both
sides note this issue and report to their respective HODs.




16. (S) When Ilin clarified that the Russian provision in sub-para
(e) was intended to focus on silos at VAFB and not at ICBM bases;
Warner reminded him that those launchers were located at the VAFB
Space Launch Facility, which was not and would not be subject to
inspection. Ilin asked why the United States was ready to resolve
Russian concerns about reconversion of HBs and SLBM launchers, but


was not willing to discuss the converted silos at VAFB. Ilin
proposed to introduce such inspections of MDI at VAFB into Section
VII as a Type-2 inspection. Warner replied that any discussion on
this topic should be at the Expanded Ad Hoc Group level.



--------------

CONDUCT OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS

AT ICBM, SUBMARINE, and AIR BASES

--------------




17. (S) Ilin noted both the U.S. and Russian proposals included
provisions that would exclude other items or portions of facilities
from access during a Type-2 inspection to confirm an elimination or
conversion. Warner stated the United States agreed with a portion
of this understanding - if an inspection team were at an ICBM base
to see an eliminated silo or at a submarine base to see a converted
SLBM launcher, only those items would be inspected. However, the
United States had a different view on CorE facilities.




18. (S) Warner noted both sides had agreed early on to include
CorE facilities within the list of facilities subject to Type-2
inspections, and the general rules for these inspections in
paragraph 1 of Section VII stated that their purpose was to confirm
the accuracy of declared data specified for such facilities on the
number and types of non-deployed items. If a team conducted a
Type-2 inspection at a CorE facility, it had the right to inspect
the facility for non-deployed items declared for that facility.




19. (S) Ilin claimed the purpose for inspection of a CorE facility
should be to confirm the results of elimination, not to confirm the
presence of non-deployed items of inspection. According to Ilin,
Russia did not store any other non-deployed items at its CorE
facilities, only eliminated items. He stated that the only purpose
for coming to a CorE facility was to confirm the fact of
elimination, which consisted of three elements: 1) confirm the
number of items eliminated that was declared in the notification
and pre-inspection brief; 2) view the eliminated items; and 3)
record the UIDs for these eliminated items.




20. (S) Warner countered that there could be some other
non-deployed items at such facilities which were still in the
process of elimination, but their elimination was not yet
completed. Even if the purpose of the inspection was to confirm
the results of elimination, a side would still have the opportunity
to inspect the area within the site diagram to confirm data on
inspectable items - mobile launchers at Piban'shur or first stages
of ICBMs and SLBMs at Votkinsk at whatever stage they might be
within the elimination process. Warner noted the same would apply
to HBs undergoing conversion at DMAFB, where such bombers could be
seen in all stages of the process.




21. (S) Ilin recognized that views on inspections at CorE
facilities differed, and claimed to be surprised at this U.S.
"addition." He requested the United States provide in writing its
reasons for wanting to verify the numbers of non-deployed missiles
located at a CorE facility at the time of an inspection.




22. (S) Warner pointed out this was not an addition; it had been a


component of jointly-agreed text on the conduct of Type-2
inspections from the beginning of the negotiations. Russia had
proposed to include CorE inspections under Type-2 long before the
United States agreed to include the inspection of eliminated items
as part of a Type-2 inspection during the Mullen-Makarov talks in
Moscow in January (Ref A). Warner asked Ilin what the Russian
delegation had in mind regarding the conduct of Type-2 inspections
at CorE facilities when it had initially agreed that Type-2
inspections would be carried out at CorE facilities.




23. (S) Ilin reiterated Russia's position that the basic purpose
of inspections at CorE inspections was to confirm the results of
elimination and claimed that the United States was now seeking to
broaden access at such sites, which would increase inspection time.
Warner commented that, at Votkinsk and Piban'shur, inspecting the
entire site would not be a time-consuming activity and recommended
the group explore the provisions for batching and inspection of
eliminated items at these two facilities.



--------------

CONCEPTS FOR BATCHING

--------------




24. (S) Ilin claimed he could not talk about inspection of
non-deployed items at CorE facilities, but outlined the two
situations Russia envisioned for elimination inspections at these
facilities: Situation 1 under the general rules for a short notice
Type-2 inspection; Situation 2 after notification by the inspected
Party of the accumulation of the agreed-upon number of eliminated
items for that batching period. Ilin explained that the
concentration (accumulation or batching) of eliminated items would
not apply to inspections conducted by the inspecting Party in
Situation 1.




25. (S) Warner stated the United States may need a notification of
the start of the accumulation period so that an inspection team did
not arrive accidently during the period of accumulation activity.
The timing for a second notification, opening the window for
inspection or national technical means (NTM) observation would be
provided in Part Four of the Protocol.




26. (S) Smirnov asked Warner to confirm his understanding of the
U.S. proposal which was that if the United States inspected the
first batch of 25 percent of eliminated items, then inspected the
facility at some other time prior to the concentration of the
second batch, the second concentration period would not be
required. Warner replied that this was a correct understanding.




27. (S) Ilin noted that if that were the case, the United States
would see less than 50 percent of the items planned for elimination
in that year. Warner agreed that if the United States inspected
during one concentration period and one non-concentration period,
it would get less than 50 percent and if the United States chose to
inspect twice, both times during non-concentration periods, the
United States might see significantly less than 50 percent. It was
important for the United States to have the chance to conduct a
short notice inspection of those items that had not yet been
concentrated or to see items that the Russians had not chosen to be
part of a particular batch, but which may or may not be going
through their NTM display period.


--------------

UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS

--------------




28. (S) Ilin asked how the United States envisioned viewing and
recording of UIDs during inspections at CorE facilities. Warner
stated that the broad application of the use of UIDs on strategic
offensive arms (SOA) was one of the agreements from the
Mullen-Makarov talks (Ref A),and recording of UIDs was relevant to
all Type-1 and Type-2 inspections. Through the use of UIDs in
notifications and in pre-inspection briefings, the inspecting Party
could confirm the numbers and UIDs for items at all facilities, to
include those where non-deployed SOA were located.




29. (S) Ilin agreed that Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had
talked about broadly applying UIDs, but, as Ilin recalled, Russian
agreement to the broad application of UIDs was made in return for
the United States dropping all remaining demands on mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their missiles. Now that situation might not
be as clear.




30. (S) Warner summarized the results of the day's discussion,
noting that both sides had good drafts and similar approaches to
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM
launchers, with one exception - that being the element of
inspecting non-deployed missiles and mobile ICBM launchers at CorE
facilities. When Ilin interjected that this was a new element that
deviated from the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov
talks, Warner corrected him stating that it may be a new issue to
Ilin, but not to the two delegations.




31. (U) Documents provided:



- United States:



-- Unofficial Proposal for Section VII of Part Five of the
Protocol, dated February 12, 2010



- Russia:



-- Russian Proposal, Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol,
dated February 12, 2010




32. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner


Mr. Albertson

Mr. Buttrick

MAJ Johnson

LTC Litterini

Mr. McConnell (RO)

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust

LT Sicks

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Mr. Lyasovskiy

Col Petrov

Mr. G. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Venevtsev

Ms. Vodopolova

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




33. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING