Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA153
2010-02-26 14:48:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000153
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 10, 2010
REF: 10 GENEVA 85 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
S E C R E T GENEVA 000153
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 10, 2010
REF: 10 GENEVA 85 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-034.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 10, 2010
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting
chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed the
proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or
eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA),located either at
operational bases or at CorE facilities. The U.S.-proposed text
contained uniform Type-2 inspection parameters for confirming
converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, converted
SLBM launchers, eliminated silo ICBM launchers, eliminated
solid-fuel ICBMs and SLBMs, and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers.
The Russian side disagreed with this approach, but said it would
study the U.S. proposal. End Summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Parity for All; The Haymaker Right: SSBN
Launcher Conversion; The Golden Middle: and Solid-Fueled ICBM
Elimination Inspections.
--------------
PARITY FOR ALL
--------------
5. (S) Warner requested the Russian response to the U.S.
counter-proposals in Sections V and VII of Part Five of the
Protocol, provided at the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin, clearly
pressed for time, given the Russian mission's pending "Day of the
Diplomat" reception that evening, expressed hesitation with the
U.S. approach of handling all conversion or elimination inspections
as consistently as possible with other Type-2 inspections. Under
the U.S. approach, inspection procedures, duration, and team
composition provisions would be broadly applied to all Type-2
conversion or elimination inspections, save for a limited scope of
verification of eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs or converted
SLBM launchers located at operational bases.
6. (S) Ilin noted that separate language may be required for each
specific kind of conversion or elimination inspection, vice the
one-size-fits-all proposals the United States had tabled. Ilin
even opened the possibility that silo eliminations and SLBM
launcher conversions could be handled as a piggyback to a Type-1
inspection at these types of operational bases; Warner pointed out
that this was the original U.S. proposal for confirming silo
elimination and SLBM launcher conversion, which the Russian side
had rejected.
7. (S) After a lengthy discussion on the conversion of a very
small number of launchers on SSBNs, Ilin returned to the general
theory of conversion or elimination inspections, stating that
Russia was still holding to limits of only five inspectors, a
12-hour duration, and no time extensions for solid-fueled ICBM or
SLBM missile or mobile ICBM launcher elimination inspections.
Furthermore, he said sequential inspections should not be conducted
in association with conversion or elimination inspections, refuting
U.S. arguments that these limits would interfere with the conduct
of sequential inspections, either before or after the conversion or
elimination inspection. Warner offered several options that would
employ subgroups of a 10-inspector team, providing flexibility to
the inspecting party, but it was clear the Russian side had no
desire to seek solutions that would facilitate sequential
inspections associated with solid-fueled missile elimination
inspections.
--------------
THE HAYMAKER RIGHT: SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION
--------------
8. (S) During the discussion on conversion or elimination
inspections, Warner reminded Ilin that all rights afforded to U.S.
teams during solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM elimination inspections
would be afforded to Russian teams during silo elimination and SLBM
launcher conversion inspections at U.S. operational bases. Ilin
and Petrov attempted to correct Warner, saying that SLBM launchers
could not be converted unless all were converted and the submarine
subsequently became an SSGN, for which there were already specific
and agreed procedures in an agreed statement. Warner explained
that the Treaty and Protocol language provided for the conversion
of individual launchers onboard an SSBN to non-SLBM-capable status,
a process the United States fully intended to utilize in order to
meet both the 700 strategic deployed delivery vehicle and 800
aggregate deployed and non-deployed "launcher" limits.
9. (S) The entire Russian contingent was visibly stunned
regarding the U.S. assertion that procedures for the conversion of
individual SLBM launchers were already agreed. This included Mr.
Smirnov, a regular participant in discussions on this issue which
occurred between Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov in the Conversion or
Elimination Working Group. Warner reminded the Russian side of the
extensive discussions which occurred on this matter between those
two principals. He made clear that such launch tubes would be
rendered incapable of launching an SLBM and therefore would no
longer be accountable as SLBM launchers. The Russian side would be
allowed to confirm this in a Type-2 inspection. Ilin argued that
they should also be inspectable during Type-1 inspections as
launchers not containing an SLBM as a means to ensure these
launchers were not reconverted into launchers capable of launching
an SLBM. Petrov argued that the launchers must be eliminated in
order to remove them from accountability, but Warner corrected him
that conversion was also a means of removal from accountability.
Ilin concluded that this was a serious change, which the Russian
side must consider carefully.
-------------- --------------
THE GOLDEN MIDDLE: SOLID-FUELED ICBM ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS
-------------- --------------
10. (S) Ilin reiterated the Russian position that only 50 percent
of the annual eliminated total would be batched and that no more
than two inspections per year could be conducted at each CorE
facility. Warner pointed out the inconsistencies in the Russian
arguments requiring steady-state inflows and outflows of ICBMS for
elimination, and also cited safety concerns, which limited the
number of ICBMS simultaneously permitted within the Votkinsk Final
Assembly Facility, as Mr. Smirnov had briefed previously. If the
process flow was, in fact, the way Smirnov had briefed, Warner
pointed out, then the U.S. batching proposal (100 percent) and
frequency of inspections (four times annually) was not a difficult
proposition, particularly given the requirement for a 60-day
display of eliminated first stages for national technical means
(NTM) viewing.
11. (S) Smirnov sought to refute Warner's argument by saying the
Russian side had not agreed to a 60-day NTM display window for
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs, but was proposing 30
days. Warner countered with the fact that the 60-day NTM window
had been agreed by the Russian side in December 2009 in Part Three
of the Protocol, but the Russian side was now again bracketing that
text in an effort to secure a smaller 30-day NTM window. The
60-day NTM window requirement lowered the amount of additional
dwell time eliminated first stages would remain on display at
Votkinsk as part of the batching process, and would still ensure
the same sustained rate of outflows to downstream disposition of
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs.
12. (S) Warner suggested the sides consider a combined inspection
alternative: that Russia would batch solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs
and mobile ICBM launchers twice annually, with each batch equaling
25 percent of the annual elimination output. What would be new was
that the United States would also have the right to conduct Type-2
inspections at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher
CorE facilities during the time periods between the two batched
accumulations. Furthermore, the U.S. inspection team could inspect
all items of inspection within the CorE facility, not only those
eliminated items that were displayed in the open. Under this
arrangement, while the Russian side would only need to batch 50
percent of the annual eliminated items, 100 percent of the
eliminated items would be potentially subject to inspection each
year. The United States would have the right to inspect not only
the 50 percent of items that were batched, but could inspect as
well, portions of the remaining 50 percent of eliminated items not
subject to batching. The Votkinsk and Piban'shur CorE facilities
would each be subject to up to two Type-2 inspections each year.
Warner underscored that this was not an official proposal, but
rather a concept for discussion by the sides.
13. (S) Ilin appeared interested in the prospect of such a
compromise solution. He reiterated that batching no more than 50
percent of the eliminated items was a red line for the Russian
side, and that another major concern was maintaining an
uninterrupted, steady-state downstream flow of eliminated ICBM
motor casings. With Ilin, Zaitsev, S. Shevchenko, Smirnov, and
Petrov all nodding in unison, the Russian contingent did not seem
at all alarmed at the prospect of being subject to short-notice
Type-2 inspections during the non-batching periods of the
elimination year. Ilin promised that the Russian side would begin
discussing this concept internally. He reiterated, however, that
the Russian side did not see a "great future" for sequential
inspections in conjunction with conversion or elimination
inspections.
14. Ilin proposed removing several minor brackets in Section VIII
of Part Five which deals with the conduct of exhibitions. The
sides proved unable to clear the brackets on the exhibitions of new
conversion or elimination processes that have been applied for the
first time. Following the discussion on exhibitions, Warner
proposed beginning work on the selected portions of the Annex to
Part Five of the Protocol as soon as possible during upcoming IPWG
sessions. Ilin cautioned that the Russian side was convinced that
the sides needed to complete work on "more global" issues of the
Protocol before turning to the Annex.
15. (U) Documents provided:
None.
16. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Dr. Warner
Mr. Ahlm
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
MAJ Johnson
LTC Litterini (RO)
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gesse (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Col Petrov
Mr. S. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 10, 2010
REF: 10 GENEVA 85 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-034.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 10, 2010
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting
chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed the
proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or
eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA),located either at
operational bases or at CorE facilities. The U.S.-proposed text
contained uniform Type-2 inspection parameters for confirming
converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, converted
SLBM launchers, eliminated silo ICBM launchers, eliminated
solid-fuel ICBMs and SLBMs, and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers.
The Russian side disagreed with this approach, but said it would
study the U.S. proposal. End Summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Parity for All; The Haymaker Right: SSBN
Launcher Conversion; The Golden Middle: and Solid-Fueled ICBM
Elimination Inspections.
--------------
PARITY FOR ALL
--------------
5. (S) Warner requested the Russian response to the U.S.
counter-proposals in Sections V and VII of Part Five of the
Protocol, provided at the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin, clearly
pressed for time, given the Russian mission's pending "Day of the
Diplomat" reception that evening, expressed hesitation with the
U.S. approach of handling all conversion or elimination inspections
as consistently as possible with other Type-2 inspections. Under
the U.S. approach, inspection procedures, duration, and team
composition provisions would be broadly applied to all Type-2
conversion or elimination inspections, save for a limited scope of
verification of eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs or converted
SLBM launchers located at operational bases.
6. (S) Ilin noted that separate language may be required for each
specific kind of conversion or elimination inspection, vice the
one-size-fits-all proposals the United States had tabled. Ilin
even opened the possibility that silo eliminations and SLBM
launcher conversions could be handled as a piggyback to a Type-1
inspection at these types of operational bases; Warner pointed out
that this was the original U.S. proposal for confirming silo
elimination and SLBM launcher conversion, which the Russian side
had rejected.
7. (S) After a lengthy discussion on the conversion of a very
small number of launchers on SSBNs, Ilin returned to the general
theory of conversion or elimination inspections, stating that
Russia was still holding to limits of only five inspectors, a
12-hour duration, and no time extensions for solid-fueled ICBM or
SLBM missile or mobile ICBM launcher elimination inspections.
Furthermore, he said sequential inspections should not be conducted
in association with conversion or elimination inspections, refuting
U.S. arguments that these limits would interfere with the conduct
of sequential inspections, either before or after the conversion or
elimination inspection. Warner offered several options that would
employ subgroups of a 10-inspector team, providing flexibility to
the inspecting party, but it was clear the Russian side had no
desire to seek solutions that would facilitate sequential
inspections associated with solid-fueled missile elimination
inspections.
--------------
THE HAYMAKER RIGHT: SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION
--------------
8. (S) During the discussion on conversion or elimination
inspections, Warner reminded Ilin that all rights afforded to U.S.
teams during solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM elimination inspections
would be afforded to Russian teams during silo elimination and SLBM
launcher conversion inspections at U.S. operational bases. Ilin
and Petrov attempted to correct Warner, saying that SLBM launchers
could not be converted unless all were converted and the submarine
subsequently became an SSGN, for which there were already specific
and agreed procedures in an agreed statement. Warner explained
that the Treaty and Protocol language provided for the conversion
of individual launchers onboard an SSBN to non-SLBM-capable status,
a process the United States fully intended to utilize in order to
meet both the 700 strategic deployed delivery vehicle and 800
aggregate deployed and non-deployed "launcher" limits.
9. (S) The entire Russian contingent was visibly stunned
regarding the U.S. assertion that procedures for the conversion of
individual SLBM launchers were already agreed. This included Mr.
Smirnov, a regular participant in discussions on this issue which
occurred between Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov in the Conversion or
Elimination Working Group. Warner reminded the Russian side of the
extensive discussions which occurred on this matter between those
two principals. He made clear that such launch tubes would be
rendered incapable of launching an SLBM and therefore would no
longer be accountable as SLBM launchers. The Russian side would be
allowed to confirm this in a Type-2 inspection. Ilin argued that
they should also be inspectable during Type-1 inspections as
launchers not containing an SLBM as a means to ensure these
launchers were not reconverted into launchers capable of launching
an SLBM. Petrov argued that the launchers must be eliminated in
order to remove them from accountability, but Warner corrected him
that conversion was also a means of removal from accountability.
Ilin concluded that this was a serious change, which the Russian
side must consider carefully.
-------------- --------------
THE GOLDEN MIDDLE: SOLID-FUELED ICBM ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS
-------------- --------------
10. (S) Ilin reiterated the Russian position that only 50 percent
of the annual eliminated total would be batched and that no more
than two inspections per year could be conducted at each CorE
facility. Warner pointed out the inconsistencies in the Russian
arguments requiring steady-state inflows and outflows of ICBMS for
elimination, and also cited safety concerns, which limited the
number of ICBMS simultaneously permitted within the Votkinsk Final
Assembly Facility, as Mr. Smirnov had briefed previously. If the
process flow was, in fact, the way Smirnov had briefed, Warner
pointed out, then the U.S. batching proposal (100 percent) and
frequency of inspections (four times annually) was not a difficult
proposition, particularly given the requirement for a 60-day
display of eliminated first stages for national technical means
(NTM) viewing.
11. (S) Smirnov sought to refute Warner's argument by saying the
Russian side had not agreed to a 60-day NTM display window for
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs, but was proposing 30
days. Warner countered with the fact that the 60-day NTM window
had been agreed by the Russian side in December 2009 in Part Three
of the Protocol, but the Russian side was now again bracketing that
text in an effort to secure a smaller 30-day NTM window. The
60-day NTM window requirement lowered the amount of additional
dwell time eliminated first stages would remain on display at
Votkinsk as part of the batching process, and would still ensure
the same sustained rate of outflows to downstream disposition of
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs.
12. (S) Warner suggested the sides consider a combined inspection
alternative: that Russia would batch solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs
and mobile ICBM launchers twice annually, with each batch equaling
25 percent of the annual elimination output. What would be new was
that the United States would also have the right to conduct Type-2
inspections at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher
CorE facilities during the time periods between the two batched
accumulations. Furthermore, the U.S. inspection team could inspect
all items of inspection within the CorE facility, not only those
eliminated items that were displayed in the open. Under this
arrangement, while the Russian side would only need to batch 50
percent of the annual eliminated items, 100 percent of the
eliminated items would be potentially subject to inspection each
year. The United States would have the right to inspect not only
the 50 percent of items that were batched, but could inspect as
well, portions of the remaining 50 percent of eliminated items not
subject to batching. The Votkinsk and Piban'shur CorE facilities
would each be subject to up to two Type-2 inspections each year.
Warner underscored that this was not an official proposal, but
rather a concept for discussion by the sides.
13. (S) Ilin appeared interested in the prospect of such a
compromise solution. He reiterated that batching no more than 50
percent of the eliminated items was a red line for the Russian
side, and that another major concern was maintaining an
uninterrupted, steady-state downstream flow of eliminated ICBM
motor casings. With Ilin, Zaitsev, S. Shevchenko, Smirnov, and
Petrov all nodding in unison, the Russian contingent did not seem
at all alarmed at the prospect of being subject to short-notice
Type-2 inspections during the non-batching periods of the
elimination year. Ilin promised that the Russian side would begin
discussing this concept internally. He reiterated, however, that
the Russian side did not see a "great future" for sequential
inspections in conjunction with conversion or elimination
inspections.
14. Ilin proposed removing several minor brackets in Section VIII
of Part Five which deals with the conduct of exhibitions. The
sides proved unable to clear the brackets on the exhibitions of new
conversion or elimination processes that have been applied for the
first time. Following the discussion on exhibitions, Warner
proposed beginning work on the selected portions of the Annex to
Part Five of the Protocol as soon as possible during upcoming IPWG
sessions. Ilin cautioned that the Russian side was convinced that
the sides needed to complete work on "more global" issues of the
Protocol before turning to the Annex.
15. (U) Documents provided:
None.
16. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Dr. Warner
Mr. Ahlm
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
MAJ Johnson
LTC Litterini (RO)
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gesse (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Col Petrov
Mr. S. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING