SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000143

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
18, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-065.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 18, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side gave the Russian side
the U.S. official translation of the Russian-proposed Part Seven of
the Protocol to the Treaty, Telemetric Information, dated February
18, 2010. The Russian side presented its proposal for three
sections of Part Seven which included: Section I. General
Provisions; Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; and
Section III. Guidance for the Exchange of Telemetric Exchange.
The Russian side indicated its Protocol required five new
definitions: launch, telemetric information, recording media,
encryption and payload. The Russian side envisioned four Annexes
to its Protocol: Annex 1 on the Provisions for the Use and
Exchange of Media and Interpretive Data; Annex 2 on the
Organization and Conduct of Exhibitions of Recording Media and
Playback Equipment; Annex 3 on Procedures for the Provision of
Telemetric Information, Playback Equipment and Spare Parts; and
Annex 4 on Training of Technical Personnel on the Operation and
Maintenance of Playback Equipment. Six notifications would be
required to implement the Russian proposal: (1) notification of
the need to change the amount and volume of telemetric information
exchanged or to notify the other Party of the date of suspension of
the exchange of telemetric information; (2) notification for the
acquisition and provision of playback equipment and spare parts;
(3) notification of the intent to conduct an exhibition of playback
equipment; (4) notification containing the arrangement and
organization of training of technical personnel; (5) notification
of incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete
interpretive data; and (6) notification providing clarification
regarding incomplete or low quality recording media or incomplete
interpretive data.




4. (S) The tone of the discussion was substantially different from
previous telemetry meetings and the text offered promise for the
future negotiation of telemetry provisions. However, the
provisions in the Russian proposal still contained three
fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian positions.
The first was the retention of the Russian position that the
exchange would be suspended if the Parties could not agree on the
need to change the terms of the exchange during the annual
telemetry review. The Russian side indicated there might be
flexibility on this issue if the United States agreed to the
Russian-proposed joint statement on not using telemetry to enhance
missile defense. The second involved a minimal role for the


receiving side in determining the flight tests in which telemetry
would be exchanged. The current Russian position would provide for
an expanded discussion in the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC)--a change from its previous position. The third difference
was the exclusion from the exchange of telemetric information and
interpretative data for the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
End summary.




5. (U) Subject Summary: U.S. Official Translation; Sections
Within Part Seven; Four Annexes; Proposed Notifications; Terms and
Definitions; Initial Reaction; Section I. General Provisions;
Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; Section III.
Guidance for the Exchange of Telemetric Information.



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u.s. official translation

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6. (S) Siemon provided Poznikhir the U.S. official translation of
the Russian-proposed Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty,
Telemetric Information, dated February 18, 2010, and turned the
meeting over to Poznikhir to discuss the Russian proposal for Part
Seven.



Begin text:



OFFICIAL TRANSLATION



February 18, 2010



SFO-VIII

Confidential

Document of the Russian side



February 18, 2010



Part Seven - Telemetric Information



Section 1. General Provisions



1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal
number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per calendar year.




2. The launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, on which telemetric information
is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party.




3. Telemetric information shall be exchanged on the launches of
ICBMs and SLBMs conducted in the previous calendar year. The number
of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, about which telemetric information
is exchanged, shall be agreed upon at the first annual session of
the BCC of the current year.




4. Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the other
Party via diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after a
decision regarding this issue has been made by the BCC.




5. The conditions and guideline for the exchange of telemetric
information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be considered
within the framework of the BCC.



In the event that one of the Parties raises a question concerning
the need to change the quantity and amount of telemetric
information transferred, the exchange of telemetric information
shall be suspended until the Parties reach an agreement on the
given change.




6. Telemetric information shall not be exchanged during the
calendar year in which the Treaty expires.



Section II. Access to telemetric information




1. The Party conducting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which
telemetric information is provided, shall not take any measures to
deny access to telemetric information broadcast, including
encryption, jamming, encapsulation, and use of directional beaming.




2. In relation to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetric
information is not exchanged, each Party shall have the right to
use any method of denying access to telemetric information which
originates on board the missile and is broadcast. The Party
conducting the launch shall notify the other Party, in accordance
with Part Four of this Protocol, of the intention to take measures
to deny access to telemetric information.


Section III. Guideline for the exchange of telemetric information




1. In the exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall
provide the recording media containing the recording of telemetric
information broadcast during the launch, until the propulsion unit
of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as
the interpretive data for the telemetric information provided, in
accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this
Protocol.




2. The Parties shall not exchange telemetric information broadcast
after the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs
ceases to function, as well as telemetric information that
originated in (a) re-entry vehicle (s) or in other equipment,
installed in the missile as payload.




3. During each launch of ICBMs or SLBMs the Party, conducting the
launch, shall not broadcast telemetric information via a re-entry
vehicle pertaining to the function of stages of ICBMs or SLBMs.




4. The Party conducting a launch shall independently determine the
method for recording telemetric information on recording media.




5. Each Party, in order to make it possible for the other Party to
play back the recording of the telemetric information provided,
shall:



a) use those types of modulation, methods, modes and formats
for recording, as well as methods for encoding telemetric
information on recording media that will enable the conversion of
the telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board
the missile before broadcast, using telemetry playback equipment
for which a demonstration has been conducted;



b) conduct an initial demonstration of the applicable
recording media and telemetry playback equipment to be used, in
accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this
Protocol;



c) conduct demonstrations of the recording media and (or)
telemetry playback equipment that are different from those for
which a demonstration has been previously conducted, in accordance
with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;



d) provide the other Party with the opportunity to acquire the
telemetry playback equipment and spare parts for such equipment, in


accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information to this
Protocol;



e) provide timely training in the operation and maintenance
of the telemetry playback equipment to technical personnel of the
other Party, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information
to this Protocol;




6. If a Party that has received the media containing the recording
of telemetric information, determines that the media does not
contain the recording of the telemetric information in the amount
specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Part, or that the
quality of the telemetric information recorded on the media is
insufficient to convert it to the form (format) originated on board
the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification
in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol. No later than 30
days after receiving such notification, the Party that has provided
the media containing the recording of the telemetric information,
shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four of this
Protocol explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or
insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information, or
shall provide via diplomatic channels new media containing the
recording of telemetric information.




7. If a Party that has received the interpretative data for the
telemetric information provided, determines that such data does not
meet the requirements set forth in the Annex on Telemetric
Information to this Protocol, or that the data received is
insufficient to convert the recorded telemetric information to the
form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast,
that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four
of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such
notification, the Party that has provided the interpretative data
for the telemetric information shall provide notification in
accordance with Part Four of this Protocol specifying the procedure
for using the interpretative data for telemetric information
previously provided, or shall provide via diplomatic channels the
revised interpretative data for telemetric information.



End text.




7. (S) Poznikhir remarked that after four sessions he believed the
sides were at the same place where they began negotiations on
telemetry. Since the U.S. side had not provided a proposal on
telemetry, the Russian side took the initiative to draft a
proposal. The Russian side believed its proposal was fully based
on the fundamentals agreed by President Medvedev and President
Obama as well as the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov
meetings in Moscow. The Russian side believed telemetry should be
reflected in the Treaty, Protocol and Annexes. Russia believed the
two sides agreed on this approach, and since the text of Article X
was agreed with the exception of one bracket, the sides could
discuss the Protocol and Annexes.


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Sections within part seven

--------------




8. (S) Poznikhir stated that the Russian-proposed Part Seven to
the Protocol included three sections: Section I. General
Provisions; Section II. Access to Telemetric Information; and
Section III. Guideline for the Exchange of Telemetric Information.
Section I contained information on the number of launches on which
telemetric information would be exchanged as well as the selection
process. Section II contained the right of the Parties to limit
access to telemetric information. Section III contained the
procedures for the exchange of recording media, exhibitions and
purchase of playback equipment and spare parts. He asked Siemon if
he had an objection to this structure to which Siemon replied that
he had considered a similar structure for Part Seven and the
subordinate Annexes.



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Four Annexes

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9. (S) Poznikhir indicated that the Russian side envisioned four
Annexes to Part Seven. Annex 1 contained provisions for the use
and exchange of recording media and interpretive data. He believed
this Annex could contain a description of recording media, its
format and procedures for its exchange. The Annex could also
include procedures for the provision and structure of interpretive
data describing the telemetric information on the recording media.
Annex 2 contained arrangements for the demonstration of recording
media and playback equipment, including an initial demonstration.
Procedures for subsequent demonstrations would be included for the
situation where a Party changed the recording media or playback
equipment it used. Poznikhir believed the sides would discuss the
procedures for the initial demonstrations in the BCC and the
demonstrations could be conducted 180 days after the discussions.
Annex 3 contained the procedures for acquisition of playback
equipment and spare parts. The Annex would also contain cost
settlement procedures. Annex 4 contained procedures for training
of personnel on the operation and maintenance of the playback
equipment. This annex could also contain procedures for cost
settlement for such training. Poznikhir said that the sides might
determine the need for other annexes while working with these
documents.



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proposed notifications

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10. (S) The Russian side envisioned six notifications in Part IV
of the Protocol used to implement the provisions of Part Seven and
its Annexes: (1) notification of the need to change the amount and
volume of telemetric information exchanged or to notify the other
Party of the date of suspension of the exchange of telemetric
information; (2) notification for the acquisition and provision of
playback equipment and spare parts; (3) notification of the intent
to conduct a demonstration of playback equipment, including an
initial demonstration; (4) notification containing the arrangement
and organization of training of technical personnel; (5)
notification of incomplete or low quality recording media or
incomplete interpretive data; and (6) notification providing
clarification regarding incomplete or low quality recording media
or incomplete interpretive data. Poznikhir believed there was no
need for a notification on the intent to use encryption for a
particular launch since this could be included as remarks in the
launch notification for ICBMs and SLBMs.



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terms and definitions

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11. (S) Poznikhir indicated that five new terms and definitions
were required to implement the Russian proposal. The five terms
were: launch, telemetric information, recording media, encryption
and payload.



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initial reaction

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12. (S) Siemon stated his initial reaction to the Russian proposal
was positive. He was impressed with the comprehensiveness of the
Russian approach and also with the short time that it had taken to
draft the proposal. The proposal paralleled what he believed the
U.S. proposal would be and also the concepts that existed in START;
specifically the proposed Annexes. Siemon noted the Russian
proposal continued to differ from the U.S. position in the same
areas that were previously discussed in the Working Group. There
were three fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russian
positions. The first was the retention of a Russian position that
would suspend the exchange of telemetry if the Parties could not
agree on changes during the annual telemetry review. Poznikhir
indicated there might be flexibility on this issue if the United
States could agree to the Russian-proposed joint statement
prohibiting the use of telemetry to enhance missile defense.
Siemon continued that the second difference involved a minimal role
for the receiving side in determining the flight tests for which
telemetry would be exchanged; however, he noted the Russian
position did provide for an expansion of BCC discussions. The
third difference was the exclusion of telemetric information and
interpretative data for the self-contained dispensing mechanism.



13. (S) Poznikhir called attention to the fact that the structure
of the Russian proposed Annexes and notifications was similar to
the structure in START. He said the Russian side recognized the
need to incorporate experience gained in START and believed details
from the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC)
Agreements should be reflected in the Annexes.



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section I. general provisions

--------------




14. (S) Poznikhir continued with a paragraph-by-paragraph review
of the proposed Part Seven. Paragraph 1 of Section I contained the
words "equal number" to reflect the Russian fundamental concept of
parity. Paragraph 2 contained the right of the conducting Party to
determine on which launches telemetric information would be
exchanged. Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that simply exchanging
telemetry was a compromise as the result of a President Medvedev
decision, and this condition for the exchange was a redline. In
Paragraph 3, the Russian side had added text referencing agreement
within the BCC to resolve a concern of the U.S. side on the use of
"treaty year" versus "calendar year." Poznikhir emphasized that
using treaty year was not acceptable to the Russian side.
Paragraph 5 reflected agreements made during the Mullen-Makarov
meetings and the concept of suspension in the case of suspected use
of telemetry for building missile defense systems. This text
heavily depended on the outcome of the Russian-proposed Joint
Statement on Missile Defense.



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section II. Access to telemetric information

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15. (S) Poznikhir noted that Paragraph 1 of Section II provided
for transparency in that it prohibited data denial measures for
launches on which telemetric information was exchanged to ensure
transparency for those launches. He also noted that national
technical means (NTM) could be used to confirm if data denial
measures had been used on a launch and to confirm that the
telemetric information was accurate. Paragraph 2 permitted the use
of data denial measures on all launches except for the "no more
than five launches" on which telemetric information would be
exchanged. In those cases where encryption was used, the Party
conducting the launch would notify the other Party. Siemon said
that this was helpful.




16. (S) Mr. Dean asked a question about how Section I and Section
II interacted. In Section I, the Russian proposal stated that


Parties met in January to discuss which of the previous year's
launches telemetry would be exchanged. However, in Section II, the
Russian proposal stated that on a launch-by-launch basis, Russia
would or would not encrypt a particular launch depending on whether
that launch was one for which telemetry would be provided.
Essentially, Section I made it look like the Parties decided on the
previous year's launches, but Section II made it look like the
Parties decided for each launch whether it would be exchanged.




17. (S) Poznikhir explained that Russia would indeed make a
decision on each particular launch. In the following January the
sides would meet and discuss which of those launches were to be
exchanged. This meant that the sides would know, as launches were
being conducted, which launches the other side intended to discuss
in the BCC the following January as candidate launches for
telemetry exchange.



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section III. Guidance for the

exchange of Telemetric Information

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18. (S) Poznikhir stated that Paragraphs 1 and 2 reflected the
Russian position that telemetry and interpretive data would not be
provided for the self-contained dispensing mechanism or for a
reentry vehicle or other payload. Paragraphs 3 and 4 contained
provisions that were used in START. Paragraph 5 required that
playback provide telemetry in the same format as was originated on
board the missile before it was broadcast. Paragraph 6 provided
for situations where incomplete telemetric information or
telemetric information of insufficient quality had been provided.
Paragraph 7 provided similar provisions for interpretive data.




19. (S) Siemon and Dean asked questions to clarify whether
Paragraph 6 of Section I meant that telemetry would not be
exchanged during the last year of the treaty for launches in the
previous year or, rather, if the text just meant that there would
not be a telemetry exchange in the January after the treaty went
out of force. Poznikhir confirmed that if the Treaty went into
force in 2010, then in 2020, the sides would exchange telemetry for
launches in 2019, but not for launches in 2020.




20. (S) Lt Col Goodman gave an example that demonstrated that the
Russian proposal on "no more than five launches" could be
interpreted in such a way that the Parties could avoid providing
telemetry entirely. He asked what language prevented a Party from
encrypting all of its launches. Poznikhir acknowledged this and
stated that further discussion of this issue was required. Ms.
Pura provided an example in which the use of encryption and
cancellation of scheduled launches due to force majeure could
result in a situation where only encrypted launches occurred during
the year. She asked if the Russian Side was prepared to exchange


encrypted telemetry and the required interpretive data. Poznikhir
indicated this was a possibility, but after consulting with his
side he withdrew his response and stated that this would have to be
discussed in the BCC. Dr. Ringenberg commented that telemetry
existed in several locations and in several formats on board the
missile; in the transducers, computer, and in the telemetry system.
Did the provisions contained in paragraph 5 of Section III require
that a Party provide the formats for telemetry as it existed prior
to broadcast in the format used to transmit the telemetry to the
ground station? CAPT Second Rank Lyzsovskiy answered that a Party
must provide all frame formats for telemetry as they existed in the
transmitter on board the missile before broadcast. The Russian
side required this information to avoid playback problems
encountered in START. He provided an example where the United
States used a modulation technique called FQPSK (Feher's-patented
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) in order to get high rate,
telemetric information to the ground.




21. (S) Siemon noted the meeting had been the most productive thus
far. He reiterated the three fundamental differences between the
U.S. and Russian positions. He stated that while there was a
difference about which text the sides believed should be in Part
Seven and in the Annexes, he agreed in concept that the provisions
the Russian side proposed to put in Part Seven and in the Annexes
reflected concepts that needed to be covered. Poznikhir reminded
Siemon that Russia's fundamental points had not changed. The
Russian delegation would still follow its guidance on Russia's
redlines.




22. (U) Documents provided:



- United States:



-- U.S. Official Translation of the Russian-Proposed Part Seven of
the Protocol to the Treaty - Telemetric Information, dated February
18, 2010.




23. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura


Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

CAPT (2nd rank) Lyzsovskiy

Col Kamenskiy

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING