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10GENEVA133
2010-02-26 10:16:00
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SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) RUSSIAN AND U.S. DELEGATION RECEPTIONS,

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000133 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) RUSSIAN AND U.S. DELEGATION RECEPTIONS,
FEBRUARY 4 AND 16, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 131 (SFO-GVA-VIII-054)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000133

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) RUSSIAN AND U.S. DELEGATION RECEPTIONS,
FEBRUARY 4 AND 16, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 131 (SFO-GVA-VIII-054)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-018.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 4, 2010

Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:30 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



Meeting Date: February 16, 2010

Time: 6:30 P.M. - 8:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) The Russian delegation to the START Follow-on (SFO)
negotiations hosted a reception for the U.S. delegation on February

4. The U.S. delegation later hosted a reception for the Russian
delegation on February 16. Discussions at these receptions
covered Duma ratification, U.S. missile defense interceptors at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB),the Leninsk and Svobodnyy
facilities, future Russian conversion or elimination (CorE)
procedures, release of information from data exchanges under SFO,
heavy bombers, the utility of small group negotiating sessions, the
status of the SFO negotiations, and biographical information. End
summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Duma Will Do What It's Told; Regarding
Missile Defense; Details on Leninsk and Svobodnyy Facilities;
Russian CorE Procedures; Release of Information from Data
Exchanges; Questions on Heavy Bombers; The Utility of Small Group
Sessions; The Status of Negotiations; and Miscellaneous
Biographical Data.



--------------

DUMA WILL DO WHAT IT'S TOLD

--------------




5. (S) In a discussion with Mr. Colby and Dr. Fraley at the
Russian Mission on February 4, ADM (ret) Kuznetsov dismissed any
potential problems with Duma ratification, stating that the Duma



would "do what it's told."




6. (S) At the U.S.-hosted reception on February 16, Amb Ries
discussed with Mr. Koshelev the interaction with members of
Congress and the State Duma with respect to SFO. Koshelev relayed
that Senator Feinstein had written to Ambassador Antonov to thank
him for hosting a lunch during the last session. (Begin comment:
Feinstein visited the negotiations in Geneva in November 2009. End
comment.) This letter had also included a number of substantive
questions, and Antonov was now reflecting carefully on how to
respond. According to Koshelev, Antonov had also received a letter
a week earlier from members of the Communist Party in the lower
house of the Duma. It was an unpleasant missive as it was
accusatory and suggested that Russian negotiators were "not being
tough enough" in the talks with the United States. The Communist
Party wanted the delegation to come to a closed-door session and
"explain itself." Koshelev said that so far the Russian delegation
members had been able to avoid responding to this unwanted
invitation, but he feared they might be unable to dodge it
entirely.



--------------

REGARDING MISSILE DEFENSE

--------------




7. (S) At the Russian reception, Mr. Luchaninov told Mr. Brown
that the Russian side could not understand why the U.S. side could
not accept the Russian statement concerning the existing level of
development and deployment of missile defense capabilities as the
basis on which Russia was agreeing to the treaty. Brown said that
as he understood the Russian position, a qualitative and
quantitative change in the missile defense capabilities of the
United States would serve as a rationale for Russian withdrawal
from the treaty, and this statement could be seen by some as a
Russian attempt to impose, indirectly, a limit on missile defense
within the context of the SFO treaty. Luchaninov said that the
Russian Federation had no problem with U.S. development of missile
defense capabilities as now envisaged.




8. (S) Luchaninov said that future cooperation with the United
States on missile defense might be possible, noting there were some
in Russia who were in favor of this cooperation, but he cautioned
that the U.S. side needed to recognize the two sides had different
views of the threats posed that would be countered by missile
defense. He stressed it would not be acceptable to Russia to
simply accept the threats as described by the United States; the
identification of threats would have to be part of missile defense
cooperation.




9. (S) In relation to the missile defense interceptor silos at
Vandenberg, Gen Venevtsev asked Mr. Couch at the Russian reception
why the U.S. side was introducing a new term, "modified," into the


treaty text and suggested that it should be a defined term. (Begin
comment: The term "modified" was introduced by the U.S. side to
ensure the former ICBM silos at Vandenberg, now used for
ground-based interceptors, were properly described and
grandfathered by the treaty. Since the date of the reception, that
term has been deleted from the draft treaty text. End comment.)
Couch briefly recounted the history of the missile defense sites at
Vandenberg AFB and reminded Venevtsev of START's requirements for
"conversion" of launchers and that, when the modifications were
completed, the United States had offered a transparency visit to
the sites. Venevtsev replied that "this was the least the United
States could do."




10. (S) During the February 16 reception, General Poznikhir told
Ms. Purcell the Russian delegation would provide a Russian text on
telemetry the next day, after they finished writing it that
evening. Purcell asked whether the Russian delegation would tell
the U.S. delegation what it was willing to offer on telemetry if
agreement was reached on the offense-defense issue. Poznikhir
denied such a tight linkage between telemetry and missile defense,
saying they would be able to clarify some telemetry issues but
would not change their fundamental positions.




11. (S) Poznikhir asserted that, while missile defense was just a
ratification issue for the United States, it was a security issue
for Russia. Purcell countered that U.S. missile defense was not
directed against Russia, and Russia was only imagining the threat.
Poznikhir asserted that the threat was not imaginary and since he
worked professionally on the issue, including with the Director of
the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, he knew whereof he spoke.
Poznikhir acknowledged the United States was justified in defending
itself against North Korean missiles, but he said that missile
defense in Europe was another matter. He asserted that Iran did
not have missiles that could reach Europe and would not have them
for a long time. Purcell countered that U.S. assessments were very
different. Poznikhir went on to say that Russia did not threaten
the United States.



--------------

DETAILS ON LENINSK AND SVOBODNYY FACILITIES

--------------




12. (S) During the Russian-hosted reception on February 4, Purcell
asked Mr. Smirnov, whom Antonov had described as the Russian
delegation expert on the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan, for his
views on the draft agreed statement on Leninsk that the United
States had tabled at the beginning of this session. Smirnov said
he considered the agreed statement unnecessary. He added that
Russia would provide notifications on its missiles with or without
an agreed statement and indicated the Russian delegation would be
willing to discuss such notifications. He argued further that an
agreed statement on Leninsk would require Kazakhstan's signature.



13. (S) Also that evening, Purcell queried Mr. S. Shevchenko about
progress toward converting the former Svobodnyy ICBM base into a
space launch facility. He replied that work was ongoing to develop
it into a completely modern launch facility that would replace
Baikonur (Leninsk) in Kazakhstan. It would be renamed the
Vostochnyy Cosmodrome. All the work was still on paper, however,
and it would take a long time to complete. The first space
launches were planned for 2015. S. Shevchenko said the intention
was for the facility to be used solely for civilian space launches;
only Plesetsk would be used for missile test launches. Asked about
space launch vehicles (SLVs) based on ICBMs, S. Shevchenko said
that all such SLVs, such as the Dnepr (SS-18) and Rokot (SS-19),
would be phased out by 2015 and not launched from Svobodnyy. After
that time, SS-18s and SS-19s would simply be eliminated and not
launched.



--------------

RUSSIAN C OR E PROCEDURES

--------------




14. (S) On February 4, S. Shevchenko told Purcell that he once
visited Utah to witness a Trident SLBM elimination by explosion.
The Russian side thereafter began developing an analogous
elimination facility to dispose of defective rocket motors by means
of explosion. Such a site was being developed by Roskosmos at an
Air Force training range in the Chita Oblast'. (Begin comment:
During the Fall 2009 negotiation session, the Russian delegation
referred to this facility as Telemba. End comment.) S. Shevchenko
said that Roskosmos was working on infrastructure improvements,
such as strengthening the roads and constructing some buildings,
but expected to finish the work this year and to declare the site
as a CorE facility under the SFO treaty. He added that Ministry of
Defense approval was required for this, but Roskosmos had completed
all the paperwork which was currently awaiting signature by Chief
of General Staff Makarov. He also noted that defective rocket
motors could not be eliminated safely at Perm' or Krasnoarmeysk, so
a new facility was needed.



--------------

RELEASE OF INFORMATION FROM DATA EXCHANGES

--------------




15. (S) On February 4, Luchaninov told Brown he was surprised the
U.S. side did not appear to appreciate the dangers inherent in
releasing to the public detailed information about the locations of
strategic offensive arms, referring to ongoing discussions on
Article VIII. Brown responded that he did not believe the United
States would be releasing any more to the public than had been
released under START. Luchaninov responded that these were
different times, and he focused specifically on information about
the storage and movement of nuclear weapons, noting that there had


been close contacts between Russian and U.S. security experts on
ensuring the physical security of nuclear weapons, but the release
of information about the location, storage and movement of
information could undercut those joint efforts. Brown said that,
with respect to many notifications, including transits, those
notifications were provided after the fact, so even if such
information were released it should not pose a current problem.
Luchaninov said that the problem was that any information about
nuclear weapons and their locations and movements could be used by
terrorists to plan attacks because it is likely that established
security protocols used in past movements between facilities would
be the same as those used in the future, and the terrorists could
then make accurate predictions as to where the weapons were headed
or located at any given time. Luchaninov said that both he and
Venevtsev were experts on counter-terrorism issues related to the
protection of information and were following these issues very
carefully both here in Geneva as well in their jobs in Moscow. In
terms of current threats facing both Russia and the United States,
Luchaninov mentioned religious fundamentalism/ extremism as the
source of such threats as bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism, and
"dirty bombs," noting that it was not necessarily just Islamic
fundamentalism and extremism that constituted the threat.




16. (S) On February 16, Mr. Taylor questioned Kuznetsov as to why
Russia was unwilling to release July 2009 START Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) information, which was releasable to the public
in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty. Taylor
explained to Kuznetsov that the United States had proposed using
that data to populate the new treaty database as a compromise since
the data was already in the public domain. Kuznetsov offered that
there were major problems with using the data from the START MOU
exchange. Specifically, the counting rules in the new treaty were
much different, and it would be very difficult if not impossible to
match the numbers with the categories in the new database.
Additionally, the circumstances were much different today than in
the early 1990s when the sides negotiated the START Treaty. At
that time, the two nations were concerned about protecting
information from each other. Today, Russia was primarily concerned
with protecting its information from third parties like terrorists.
Russia was not saying that the United States could not release its
own information, but Russia would not be a party to releasing its
own information.



--------------

REGARDING HEAVY BOMBERS

--------------




17. (S) Conversing with Taylor on February 16, Kuznetsov explained
his concerns with non-deployed heavy bombers, picking up on the
conversation from earlier in the day at the Definitions Working
Group meeting (Reftel). Kuznetsov said that the Russian
delegation's concerns were with B-1B heavy bombers and when the
United States would be removing them from the treaty. Until all
the B-1B heavy bombers were converted they must be considered
deployed heavy bombers. Taylor assured Kuznetsov that upon entry
into force of the treaty, should there be any B-1B heavy bombers


equipped for nuclear armaments, they would be declared as deployed
heavy bombers. However, when any single B-1B heavy bomber
completed its conversion, it would become a heavy bomber equipped
for non-nuclear armaments. Furthermore, that bomber would not be
considered a non-deployed heavy bomber. The only way a heavy
bomber was considered to be non-deployed was if that heavy bomber
was a test heavy bomber or if it was a heavy bomber that was based
at a repair facility for maintenance. The key attribute for a
non-deployed heavy bomber was that it was equipped for nuclear
armaments. Kuznetsov agreed, saying this was his view of what
constituted a non-deployed heavy bomber. However, there were some
on the Russian delegation that wanted to capture all B-1B heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments as non-deployed. They
used subparagraph 6(c) of Article III as their justification.
Taylor said that this was not the case. Subparagraph 6(c) defined
when the death certificate for the type of heavy bomber would be
issued. Until the last heavy bomber of a type was eliminated or
converted in accordance with the CorE Part to the Protocol, the
converted heavy bombers would continue to be subject to the treaty,
but as heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Kuznetsov
agreed, saying that he would discuss this with his delegation.
Kuznetsov offered that he did not believe there needed to be any
limitation on the number of non-deployed heavy bombers with the
exception of the limit of 10 test heavy bombers. If a Party needed
to have a heavy bomber in maintenance, it should be permitted to be
in maintenance. The Parties could see from national technical
means (NTM) that a bomber was undergoing maintenance.




18. (S) Also that evening, LT Lobner spoke with Col Pischulov
regarding heavy bomber technical characteristics. Pischulov asked
whether the U.S. side had considered including any numerical
technical characteristics for Section VIII of Part Two of the
Protocol. Lobner replied that he had indeed spoken with some of
the U.S. inspectors on numerous occasions and they had consistently
asked why any of this data was required. Pischulov admitted he was
asking the same question to his delegation, stating there was one
individual who was insisting this information be retained. He
added that the United States was doing a "good job" making his case
for him by insisting the START-like information was not required
for the new treaty.



--------------

THE UTILITY OF SMALL GROUP SESSIONS

--------------




19. (S) Col Petrov told Mr. Buttrick the Russian delegation
believed the small group meetings between the sides on the
technical conforming of Part Five of the Protocol on Inspection
Activities were extremely useful in facilitating the work for the
Inspection Protocol Working Group. (Begin comment: These
two-on-two "pre-conforming" meetings provided additional insights
beyond the discourse during formal meetings. For example, on one
occasion Petrov informed Buttrick that the recently deployed RS-24
road-mobile ICBM would present "challenges" for the proposed
inspection regime. End comment.) Buttrick agreed with Pischulov's
observation about these small meetings, and suggested that a


similar process could be instituted for the detailed procedures
contained in the nine Parts of the Annex on Inspection Activities.
Petrov confirmed it was a good idea and stated that he thought Col
Ilin and others on the Russian delegation might be receptive to
this approach. Petrov stated he believed the drafts of the Annex
provided by the U.S. delegation were very good, but there were some
more detailed procedures related to inspections that would be
useful to discuss at the technical inspector level.




20. (S) Buttrick asked whether it would be possible for Petrov to
remain in Geneva at the end of the month when the Russian
delegation planned to return to Moscow to continue technical
discussions. Petrov said that in the past, Antonov had been
reluctant to leave anyone in Geneva when the Russian delegation had
returned to Moscow. However, he suggested that if Buttrick could
mention this idea to A/S Gottemoeller, perhaps she could raise this
approach with Antonov. He expressed optimism that Antonov might
agree to it.



--------------

THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

--------------




21. (S) On February 4, Luchaninov told Brown that many on the
Russian side believed the U.S. side was not living up to the
Mullen-Makarov agreements and that the U.S. side did not appear to
be in a hurry to finish up work on the treaty. Brown responded
that this was not the case and that there were a number of reasons
why both sides wanted to conclude in the near future, including the
NPT Review Conference in early May and the interest in submitting
the treaty to their respective legislative bodies this summer.




22. (S) Mr. Leontiev commented to Mr. McConnell at the reception
on February 16 that "some" on the Russian delegation in Geneva felt
the United States was not telling the truth about the agreements
reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow, but Leontiev
admitted that had Russia held a final plenary to discuss the
results, this perception might have been avoided.




23. (S) During the U.S.-hosted reception on February 16, Koshelev
mentioned to Ries that it had been difficult to assemble the
Russian delegation. To get Generals Orlov and Pozhikhir, who were
the best authorities in their respective areas, Presidential
permission had been required to take them away from their regular
duties. Koshelev shared the view that it was important to secure
this treaty now because if the opportunity slipped by there would
not be another chance.




24. (S) Mr. Rudenko, commenting on Antonov's remark during the
February 16 toasts that he hoped the treaty would be done by


February 28 said to Ries that this was "the word" now in his
delegation.




25. (S) On February 16, Leontiev told McConnell that, depending
upon the progress of negotiations at the end of February, the
Russian delegation might remain in Geneva "for another week" rather
than returning to Moscow for a scheduled break.




26. (S) On February 16, Mr. Lyasovskiy complained to a U.S.
translator about the slow pace of work in Geneva over the previous
week caused by weather in Washington. Lyasovskiy claimed Moscow
had a large number of people working "24 hours a day" to support
the negotiating team in Geneva.



--------------

MISCELLANEOUS BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

--------------




27. (S) S. Shevchenko's wife was at the Russia-hosted reception
and stated that this was her first time in Geneva. They said they
have been married 32 years, with a son aged 30 and a daughter in
her late 20s. They stated that both their children remain
unmarried. Their daughter has been working at a medical facility
in Atlanta but has rejected their offer to stay permanently because
she wants to return home.




28. (S) S. Shevchenko said he is in charge of implementing the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in Russia. He has met
frequently with Senators Nunn and Lugar, and once hosted a Senate
delegation visit to Russian CTR sites that included then-Senator
Obama. He stated there were six divisions subordinate to him, and
Smirnov was in charge of the division responsible for elimination
of strategic offensive arms. S. Shevchenko also said he once
briefed the U.S. House of Representatives on the CTR Program. He
supported continuation of the program and believed it was helpful
to both countries, but he perceived most of the U.S. Congressmen
were negative about it and believed that Russia, as a great power,
should pay for such measures. He added that Russia's plans for CTR
also require approval by the Russian legislature.




29. (S) Venevtsev noted that his youngest daughter was graduating
from law school this year and that she was concerned about finding
a job.




30. (S) When asked by Couch on February 4 who was running the
Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in his absence, Col Ryzhkov
replied that he was returning to Moscow for a week beginning
February 5, citing the reason that his "inbox" was overflowing.



31. (S) Ms. Polyntseva was from Tyumen. She studied at Tyumen
State University and then went to St. Petersburg for her graduate
work. She related that she studied English, French, and German and
that this was her first time working arms control issues.




32. (S) Ms. Shustova mentioned that this was her first time
working arms control issues. She stated that she recently
celebrated turning 24 and had a close relationship with another
Russian interpreter, Violetta Evarovskaya.




33. (S) Ms. Fuzhenkova stated on February 4 that she has an older
brother and was serving as the Executive Secretary of the Russian
delegation until their full-time Executive Secretary returned to
Geneva from Moscow.




34. (S) In his discussion with Mr. Elliott, Koshelev mentioned
that he was an avid photographer and photography buff.




35. (S) Mr. Kamenskiy stated that he had two daughters, one was 19
and the other 26.




36. (S) Poznikhir told Ries that prior to joining the Soviet
military he wanted to become an artist. He started art school but
quit when he was 18 to attend military school. While there, he met
his wife, a well-known painter. He mentioned she was in an
artists' league and had sold her works in Germany and France.
Asked about her style, he said she painted a lot of flowers and the
whole house was her studio. Poznikhir also confirmed that he still
painted as well.




37. (S) In his discussion with Purcell at the U.S.-hosted
reception, Lyasovskiy said he was a Navy Commander (Captain 2nd
Rank). He was born in Gadzhiyevo, adjacent to the Yagelnaya
Submarine Base, and spent his childhood there. His father also
served in the Navy, but no longer lived near Yagelnaya. Lyasovskiy
said he served on submarines for part of his career. He also was
an escort at the last U.S. START inspection in Russia, and
participated on the last Russian inspection in the United States in
early December 2009. He speaks English.




38. (S) During one of his meetings with A/S Gottemoeller, Antonov
mentioned that he was born in Omsk. He also mentioned that he had
a brother who had taught him how to play chess and that he enjoys
playing chess with that brother.



39. (S) Mr. Ivanov told Couch that he planned to be in Washington
for the April Nuclear Summit.




40. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING