Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA129
2010-02-26 10:02:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 05, 2010

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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SIPDIS
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CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 05, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 65 (SFO-GVA-VIII-009)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000129

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 05, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 65 (SFO-GVA-VIII-009)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-019.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 05, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin met on February 5 to discuss the
proposed agreed statements (Reftel). The Russian side agreed to
continue discussions on all statements except for the rapid reload
statement which they continued to claim was unnecessary since
neither side possessed this capability, and the statement on the
Leninsk Test Range which they argued was superfluous as the United
States would receive adequate notifications about movement of
missiles to the facility in Kazakhstan. The Russian side provided
a copy of its proposed agreed statement on missile defense and
proposed creating an agreed statement to ban the use of telemetry
data exchanged under the START Follow-on (SFO) treaty to enhance
the effectiveness of missile defense systems. End summary.




4. (U) Subject Summary: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs;
Joint Basing; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; Leninsk Test Range;
Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination
Facility, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; and Telemetry Data
and Missile Defense.



--------------

Converted B-1B heavy bomber

--------------




5. (S) Ilin stated the Russian side noticed changes from the
previously provided agreed statement on converted B-1B heavy
bombers and recommended the text be changed to include clear
reference to which facilities the agreed statement applied. He

continued that the agreed statement should be amended to include a
detailed list of which heavy bombers and facilities would be
included under this statement and a list of the excepted
facilities, and that the included bombers and facilities are not
only subject to the agreed statement but also the full scope of the
treaty, its Protocols and Annexes. Ilin stated this was a legal
issue and should be discussed by the delegation lawyers. Elliott
said the U.S. side would consider the recommendation.


6. (S) Ilin stated the last sentence of paragraph (C) of the
agreed statement should be altered to read "Each year no more than
one such inspection shall be conducted at both bases," and that
paragraph (D),subparagraph (i) duplicated procedures from the
inspection protocol. Elliott responded that the initial version of
the agreed statement was drafted prior to the development of the
Type-2 inspection concept for eliminated facilities. The U.S. side
would review the inspection protocol and revise the statement as
necessary. Ilin stated previously discussed changes and several
others had been incorporated into a draft Russian proposal that he
provided to the U.S. side. Elliott said he would review the
Russian proposal.



--------------

U.S. SSGN

--------------




7. (S) Ilin reiterated his earlier comment on the proposed SSGN
agreed statement that all items subject to agreed statements are
also subject to the provisions of the treaty, its protocols and
annexes, as applicable. He requested clarification on the
definition of "SSGN" and Elliott agreed to provide it. Ilin
recommended paragraph (A) of the proposed agreed statement be
modified to include details of what would be demonstrated during
the exhibition and asked where the SSGN would need to be located in
order to be inspected. Elliott clarified that the agreed statement
was drafted to utilize the coastlines and waters diagram for a
submarine base and any SSGN located at a berth depicted on a
coastlines and waters diagram or within five kilometers of the
submarine base where the SSGN is based would be subject to
inspection. Lt Col Goodman explained how coastlines and waters
diagrams had been used during inspections under START. Ilin
responded that that particular practice was well known and the
Russian side understood this approach.




8. (S) Ilin raised the issue of installation of additional
temporary shelters on SSGNs following pre-inspection restrictions.
Elliott explained that following the initiation of pre-inspection
restrictions, the United States would not be allowed to install
additional temporary shelters. Additionally, he said the maximum
number of temporary shelters that could be installed on an SSGN
would be two. Ilin questioned the number of launchers to be
inspected and stated he believed that Dr. Warner had almost agreed
to allow inspection of two SSGN launchers. Elliot said the number
of launchers to be inspected on the SSGN was not yet resolved.




9. (S) Ilin said the Russian side had drafted changes to the
agreed statement to clarify their position on SSGNs and had
provided it to the U.S. side. Elliott agreed to review the draft.

Begin text:



Agreed Statement



U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs



The Parties agree that the U.S. guided missile submarines, known to
the United States of America as "SSGNs" and to the Russian
Federation as "PLARK", shall be subject to the provisions contained
in this Agreed Statement((.))1 ((, as well as to provisions of the
Treaty and Protocol, with the exception of Article II, Paragraphs
1-4 of Article III, Article IX of the Treaty, and related
provisions of the Protocol.))2




1. In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the
United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs, the
following provisions shall apply to such submarines:



(A) No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty,
the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time
exhibition of each of the four SSGNs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such
submarines are incapable of launching an SLBM. ((The procedures for
such an exhibition shall be identical to those implemented during a
conversion of an SLBM launcher conducted pursuant to paragraph 5
and of Section IV, Part Three of this Protocol.))2



(B) Subsequent to the completion of the initial exhibitions, the
United States of America shall also provide periodic opportunities
for the Russian Federation to confirm that none of the launchers on
the four SSGNs have been reconverted to make them capable of
launching SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that the launchers
on such a submarine have not been re-converted and are incapable of
launching an SLBM, the Russian Federation shall have the right,
while conducting a Type One inspection at a submarine base, to
inspect the designated launcher((s))2 of an SSGN if such a
submarine is located ((within the area depicted on the coastlines
and waters diagram))1 ((the submarine bases))2 of the submarine
base during the period of inspection. The number of such
inspections shall not exceed a total of six, during the duration of
the Treaty, for all four SSGNs existing at the time of entry into
force of the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections for each
SSGN.



(C) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be consistent with
the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher
that does not contain a deployed SLBM, in accordance with Section
VI of Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modifications:

(i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be subject to
pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI
of Part Five of this Protocol and shall be subject to inspection.
After pre-inspection restrictions have been implemented, no
temporary shelters((, each of which obstructs the viewing of four
SSGN launchers,))1 shall be installed. If ((such))1 ((no more than
two))2 temporary shelters were installed prior to the
implementation of pre-inspection restrictions, the SSGN launchers
under these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The total
of SSGN launchers obstructed from viewing because they are under
such shelters on a single SSGN shall not exceed eight launchers.



(ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base,
and in addition to the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the
in-country escort shall provide written information on the number
of SSGNs subject to inspection under the terms of this Agreed
Statement and the number of launchers on those submarines;



(iii) The location of each SSGN subject to pre-inspection
restrictions shall be annotated on the coastline and waters
diagram;



(iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate
((one))1 ((two))2 launcher((s))2 on an SSGN for inspection, if such
launchers are on a submarine located at that base, instead of ((one
non-deployed SLBM launcher or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one
non-deployed SLBM launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 7(b) of
Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol;



(v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the
inspectors that the designated launcher is incapable of launching
an SLBM; and



(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an
official inspection report prepared in accordance with the
procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol.




2. If the United States of America converts other SSBNs into
SSGNs, such SSGNs shall be subject to the measures specified in
this Agreed Statement, and an additional number of inspections will
be agreed between the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.



End text.



--------------

Joint Basing OF HEAVY BOMBERS

--------------




10. (S) Ilin expressed concern about the agreed statement on joint
basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. He noted the U.S. side
had removed the provision regarding visiting bomber information
from the proposed text. The Russian side felt it had been agreed
in a meeting with Dr. Warner that this information would be
provided and therefore needed to be included in the joint
statement. Ilin explained that while it was agreed that visiting
heavy bombers were not eligible for inspection, the Russian side
felt the information on them must still be provided. Elliott
agreed to review the matter with Warner and ensure that the agreed
statement was consistent with the inspection protocol. He added
that the addition of unique identifiers on deployed heavy bombers
would aid the inspecting Party in knowing which heavy bombers were
visiting and which were based at the airbase. The Russian side
provided a draft response on joint basing.



Begin text:



Agreed Statement



Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments

and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments



The Parties agree that, notwithstanding paragraph 8/9 of Article IV
of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right at an air base to
carry out joint basing of heavy bombers of a type equipped for
nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have been
converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of this
Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
until the last heavy bomber of such a type is converted into a
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.




1. All heavy bombers of such a type located at an air base shall
be subject to inspection until the last such heavy bomber of a type
equipped for nuclear armaments has been converted into a heavy
bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In
this connection, inspections of heavy bombers declared during
pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments
shall be conducted within the established annual inspection quota
in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of Part Five of
this Protocol (Type One inspections). During the same inspection
heavy bombers of the same type declared to be equipped for
non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have
not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments.

(a) The inspection of an air base where heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers of the same type
equipped for non-nuclear armaments are jointly based, shall be
conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the
following modified Type One inspection procedures:



(i) If the inspection team has designated such an air base for
inspection, in addition to the provisions specified in paragraph 6
of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol, which apply to
deployed heavy bombers, the inspection team shall also be informed
of the number of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for
non-nuclear armaments currently located at that base.



(ii) Both the heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and the
heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments
located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection
restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of
this Protocol;



(iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the
provisions specified in subparagraph 6(c) of Section VI of Part
Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort ((shall
annotate on the site diagram provided to the inspection team
leader, the locations of each such declared heavy bomber of the
same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments;))1 ((shall provide in
writing information on the number and type of the heavy bomber,
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, located at the air base at the
time pre-inspection restriction were implemented. Furthermore, a
site diagram of the airbase, annotated with the location of each
such heavy bomber, equipped for non-nuclear armaments, shall be
provided.))2



(iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the
inspection team leader shall designate, in accordance with
subparagraph 7(c) of Section VI of Part V of this Protocol, no more
than three deployed heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear
armaments))2 depicted on the site diagram for inspection in
accordance with paragraph ((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five
of this Protocol;



(v) In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to
inspect, if so designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy
bomber((s))2 of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments to
confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing
nuclear armaments; and



(vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an
official inspection report prepared in accordance with the
procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol.

((2. The application of this Agreed Statement with respect to each
specific type of heavy bomber shall be agreed within the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.))2



End text.



--------------

Trident i SLBMs

--------------




11. (S) Ilin said the Trident I agreed statement must be a
unilateral statement since Trident I SLBMs were U.S. items and
their usage would be determined by the United States. Ilin
continued that their intended purpose must be indicated in the
unilateral statement. Elliott countered that the proposed agreed
statement clearly indicated that the SLBMs shall not be used for
purposes inconsistent with the treaty and this language covered any
usage other than use as an SLBM. Ilin provided a draft Russian
proposal and Elliott agreed to review it.



Begin text:



((Agreed Statement))1((Unilateral Statement of the United States of
America))2



Trident I SLBMs



((Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,))1 ((The United States
of America declares that))2 Trident I SLBMs, which were contained
in Ohio-class submarines, ((are no longer existing types))1 ((have
been retired))2 and their launchers have been converted((.))1 ((to
launch sea-based cruise missiles.))2 The remaining Trident I SLBMs
shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.
((These SLBMs will be launched from land-based launchers.))2




End text.



--------------

Rapid Reload

--------------


12. (S) Gen Poznikhir stated the only conclusion the Russian side
could draw from the proposed agreed statement on rapid reload was
that the United States still considered the Russian Federation an
enemy and the United States did not rule out the possibility of
nuclear war with Russia. Poznikhir argued that if only one state
had the capability to rapidly reload its ICBMS or SLBMs then that
state would have an advantage. It was the Russian position that
the concept of rapid reload was a hold-over from the Cold War.
Additionally, he said, it would be impossible to imagine rapid
reload of ICBMs or SLBMs actually occurring following a nuclear
exchange. Poznikhir added that Russia did not possess, nor did
they plan to develop, the capability to conduct rapid reload of its
strategic nuclear forces and that the only side which possessed
this ability was the United States with its SLBMs stored in loading
tubes at its submarine bases. Elliott countered that both
Secretary Clinton and President Obama had stated that the United
States did not consider the Russian Federation an enemy, and did
not think that nuclear war was likely. Ilin concluded that the
Russian side thought this should be a unilateral statement, rather
than an agreed statement, but had, nevertheless, provided proposed
changes to the agreed statement.



--------------

Leninsk Test range

--------------




13. (S) Regarding the proposed agreed statement on the Leninsk
Test Range in Kazakhstan, Gen Orlov explained that the range was
not a Russian facility and it was not located within the territory
of the Russian Federation. He continued that the United States
fully understood that the facility was used for peaceful purposes
and that the United States would be able to track the transfer of
missiles to this facility through notifications for movements and
notifications of flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs. Orlov compared
this transfer to that of the United States transferring SLBMs to
the United Kingdom. He said the Russian side would never know if a
missile that was transferred to the United Kingdom by the United
States had been launched. He argued that since the proposed
Leninsk agreed statement required that this information be provided
by Russia, there was a lack of parity. Orlov suggested ending the
discussion on this agreed statement.




14. (S) Mr. Trout countered that in accordance with Article IV,
paragraph 11, "Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty
shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party,"
and that according to this provision the Russian Federation could
not send ICBMs to Leninsk unless there was an agreement to allow
it. Trout continued that the proposed agreed statement was an
attempt to allow the Russian side to continue its established
pattern of operation. Ilin concluded this discussion and stated
that the U.S. side would receive notifications when ICBMs are
transferred to Leninsk. He added there was considerable
sensitivity on the Russian side with regard to this issue.



-------------- --------------

Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination
Facility, Davis-Monthan air force base

-------------- --------------




15. (S) Elliott stated that the discussion of definitions for
"deployed" and "non-deployed" heavy bombers was still in progress
and the result of that discussion could possibly eliminate the need
for the proposed agreed statement on the basing of deployed heavy
bombers at the conversion or elimination facility located at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. The sides deferred discussion on the
statement pending resolution of the definition of "deployed heavy
bomber."



--------------

Telemetry data AND missile defense

--------------




16. (S) Ilin noted the Russian side had twice, on December 15 and
31, 2009, presented the U.S. side with a proposed agreed statement
on banning the use of telemetry data to improve missile defense
capabilities and the U.S. side had yet to respond. Ilin provided
another copy to Elliott for the U.S. side to review. Ilin said it
would benefit both sides to create an agreed statement declaring
that both sides could not use telemetry data exchanged under the
SFO treaty to upgrade their missile defense capabilities. He said
the Russian side would draft and provide this statement.




17. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Movements of ICBMs
to and from the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, dated
February 5, 2010;



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Trident I SLBMs,
dated February 5, 2010;



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Joint Basing of
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers
Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, dated February 5, 2010;



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - U.S. Guided Missile

Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated February 5, 2010;



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Converted B-1B Heavy
Bombers, dated February 5, 2010;



-- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Rapid Reload, dated
February 5, 2010; and



-- Russian Proposal on Joint Statement of the United States of
America and the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense,
dated December 15, 2009.




18. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Elliott

Mr. Ahlm (RO)

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

LT Lobner

Mr. Trout

Ms. C. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Mr. Luchaninov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznikhir

Col Ryzhkov

Gen Venevtsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)



19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING