Identifier
Created
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10GENEVA119
2010-02-23 17:47:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-III: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/23
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-III: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 13, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 115 (SFO-GVA-VIII-033)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000119

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/23
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-III: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 13, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 115 (SFO-GVA-VIII-033)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-046.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 13, 2010

Time: 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) During a meeting of the Notifications Working Group held at
the U.S. Mission on February 13, the Russian side provided
additional comments on Sections VI, Notifications Concerning
Inspections and Exhibitions, and VII, Notifications Concerning
Additional Messages and ((Activities of))2 the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC)(Reftel). The Russian side requested
clarification of U.S.-proposed changes and provided counter
proposals. The two sides discussed in detail the notifications
that would not be provided to or received from the respective
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NNRCs) but would instead be
provided in writing by the inspection team leader during an on-site
inspection. The two sides briefly discussed the status of the
notification concerning new kinds of strategic offensive arms (SOA)
and notifications concerning the exchange of telemetric
information. End summary.



4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Notifications Concerning
Inspections and Exhibitions; Section VII: Notifications Concerning
Additional Messages and ((Activities of))2 the BCC.



-------------- --------------

SECTION VI: NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS AND EXHIBITIONS

-------------- --------------




5. (S) Col Petrov stated the two sides differed in small detail
about the notification regarding the geographic coordinates of a

reference point. He noted geographic reference points were
established by the inspected Party; the notification occurred
within an agreed upon timeframe following entry-into-force of the
treaty and also after subsequent changes or additions to the
initial information provided. The U.S. side proposed using a
specified time period during which notifications of changes to the
reference points would be sent. Both sides agreed to reconsider
their respective proposed text.



6. (S) Regarding the notification of a change to the boundary of a
facility specified on a site diagram, the sides disagreed on
whether the time period for transmission of such notification
should be stipulated. The U.S. side proposed including a time
period for transmission, thus ensuring the change was provided to
the inspecting Party in a reasonable time period. The Russian side
argued that the notification could be provided anytime after
agreement was reached. Mr. Smirnov opined that both sides should
already be aware of this as the change would have been agreed
within the BCC. Both he and Petrov recommended a process similar
to the START Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC)
S-Series Joint Agreement be used. Additionally, Petrov referenced
the JCIC Agreement concerning changes to the boundaries of site
diagrams. Mr. Siemon acknowledged this fact, but reminded Petrov
that JCIC Agreements did not carry forward in the new treaty. Both
sides agreed to study the issue further.




7. (S) Both sides agreed in principle to a 30-day advance
notification of an exhibition. Siemon indicated agreement by the
U.S. side was predicated on agreement within the Inspections
Protocol Working Group (IPWG). Smirnov acknowledged this and
replied that sufficient lead time was necessary to put into place
logistical support for the visiting inspection team.




8. (S) Significant discussion focused on the section referencing
written notifications provided by the inspection team leader during
on-site inspections. Siemon maintained clarity was necessary to
ensure these notifications were not confused with notifications
transmitted through the respective NRRCs. Additionally, the two
sides agreed to reference these notifications as subparagraphs to a
new paragraph.



Begin Text:



"The following notifications shall not be transmitted through the
respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers but shall be provided by
the inspection team leader in writing during on-site inspections."




End Text.




9. (S) The sides agreed this formulation satisfied the obligation
in treaty Article VIII requiring each Party to use the NRRC to
transmit and receive notifications unless otherwise provided for in
the treaty. Notifications concerning site designation, intent to
conduct a sequential inspection, cancellation of an inspection, and
designation of an item of inspection, would now be subparagraphs.
The specific format for these notifications would be determined
during treaty annex, i.e., Tier III, discussions.



10. (S) LT Sicks stated the U.S.-proposed annex to the Inspection
Protocol required site designation to occur no later than 4 hours
after arrival at the point of entry (POE). This was the case for
the initial inspection in addition to sequential inspections when
the inspection team chose to return to the POE. In cases when the
inspection team chose to conduct a sequential inspection without
returning to the POE, the site designation would occur prior to the
completion of the post-inspection activities. Under this concept,
notification of a date and time for a declaration of the next
inspection site would not be needed. Such a notification could be
deleted. The Russian text requiring a site designation no later
than 12 hours after return of the inspection team to the POE would
also be removed. Petrov and Smirnov agreed to the U.S.-proposed
text.




11. (S) No significant changes were made to the notification
regarding cancellation of an inspection or to the notification
concerning the designation of an item intended for inspection. The
U.S. proposed removing "Type 1" from the notification to ensure it
captured both Type 1 and Type 2 inspections. Initially, Smirnov
stated that was not required. However, after further discussion
between Maj Johnson and Petrov, both sides agreed to bracket the
text for further study.



-------------- --------------

SECTION VII: NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING ADDITIONAL MESSAGES

AND ((ACTIVITIES OF))2 THE BCC

-------------- --------------




12. (S) The Russian side agreed to the U.S.-proposed text calling
for a notification of a request for clarification of a
notification, paragraph six. Both sides then agreed paragraphs 1-6
in this section were ready to be referred to the Conforming Group.
The remaining notifications covering new types and kinds, mobile
launchers, throw weight, cooperative measures, and telemetric data
remained in U.S. brackets. The Russian side proposed creating a
new section with a placeholder title on telemetry notifications,
entitled: "Section VIII: Notifications Concerning Exchange of
Telemetric Data." Smirnov suggested moving the notification
concerning the development of a new kind of SOA to Section II,
Notifications Concerning Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms as
U.S.-proposed text. Siemon responded Smirnov should first review
the notification and provide comments.




13. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side would provide a new version of
the joint draft text at the next meeting. Siemon proposed sending
the text to the Conforming Group following a final review by both
sides in the very near future as many brackets throughout the text
had been resolved. Smirnov agreed and proposed conducting a small
group, pre-conforming meeting early the following week. Siemon
agreed.



14. (U) Documents provided: None.




15. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Mr. Dwyer

Dr. Fraley

Mr. Hanchett

Maj Johnson

LT Sicks (RO)

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Ivanov

Lt Col Lyzsovskiy

Col Petrov

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS