SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) COMBINED INSPECTION PROTOCOL AND

S E C R E T GENEVA 000109

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/23
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) COMBINED INSPECTION PROTOCOL AND
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-008.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 2, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the combined Inspection Protocol (IP) Working Group and
Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting chaired by
Dr. Warner, Mr. Elliott, Colonel Ilin, and Colonel Ryzhkov, the
sides discussed the issues that needed to be resolved concerning
elimination inspections. The discussion focused primarily on
reaching agreement regarding the conduct of Type-2 elimination
inspections. The U.S. side utilized a chart to describe the basic
process and problems or loopholes associated with conducting
elimination inspections for eliminated ICBM silo launchers and
individually converted SLBM launchers on SSBNs. The Russian side
agreed that the U.S. side raised valid issues and said they were
prepared to develop solutions for these matters.




4. (S) The Russian side proposed allowing the inspection of no
more than 50 percent of the total eliminated solid-fueled ICBM or
SLBM motors in a given year. The U.S. side countered that an
agreement had been reached in Moscow during the meeting between
General Makarov and Admiral Mullen that the inspecting side would
have the opportunity to inspect up to 100 percent of the
solid-fueled rocket motors and mobile launchers of ICBMs eliminated
in a given year. Ryzhkov asserted that no such agreement was made
and argued that only 50 percent of the items eliminated would be
made available for inspection. The Russian side shared their
reasoning in detail. Both sides agreed to study the issue and
address it again during the next IPWG meeting. End summary.




5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Which Type?; Text Changes; How Many is
Enough?.



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WHICH TYPE?

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6. (S) Ilin stated the Heads of Delegation had agreed that batch
inspections for solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs eliminated by methods
other than explosion, in addition to eliminated mobile launchers of
ICBMs, would be accomplished as Type-2 inspections. He noted this
required the concentration of eliminated missile first stages at
one location and asked what would be considered a sufficiently
significant concentration and how notifications of such
concentrations should occur.




7. (S) Warner responded that using a Type-2 inspection for all


elimination inspections would change the fundamental understanding
of where such inspections could occur. In the wake of eliminations
of ICBM silo launchers or the conversion of individual SLBM
launchers on an SSBN, such inspections would be conducted at
silo-based ICBM bases and submarine bases. Following the
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBM and mobile launchers of
ICBMs, the Type-2 inspections would be conducted at designated CorE
facilities. Warner also noted an alternative for the inspection of
the elimination of silo launchers and the conversion of SLBM
launchers would be to conduct such inspections in conjunction with
a Type-1 inspection. After some discussion, Ilin and Warner
indicated they preferred to use Type-2 inspections to confirm the
results of elimination rather than appending them to Type-1
inspections.



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TEXT CHANGES

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8. (S) Warner noted that changes would be required in Section VII
of Part Five of the protocol. He proposed adding a new subsection
in this section that would set forth the right to confirm the
results of the elimination using a Type-2 inspection and provide
specific provisions regarding the general approach for conducting
these inspections. It would be linked to Part Three (Conversion or
Elimination) and Part Four (Notifications) of the Protocol, and
appropriate additions would need to be made in the Annex to provide
the detailed procedures for these inspections. Warner noted this
could be treated as a scheduled inspection that would be different
than a standard, short-notice, Type-2 inspection. The eliminating
party would provide a window for inspection and the inspecting
party would notify their intention to inspect. He said some
matters such as which side bears the cost for the inspection, the
duration of these inspections, and the number of inspectors
involved would likely be the same as other Type-2 inspections and
thus covered in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. Batch
accumulation details should probably be covered in Part Three, but
it is an issue for our collective discussion, he said.




9. (S) Ilin responded that merging this new inspection into
existing text was the better way to incorporate the new concept.
He suggested that the General Provisions section could be used to
provide details of batch-specific portions of this inspection. All
other details would be covered text in Part Five. He opined that
the U.S. approach would require a separate section for all possible
Type-2 inspections. Warner replied that there would likely be some
combination of both approaches.



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HOW MANY IS ENOUGH?

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10. (S) Ilin explained the "basics" of the Russian proposal.
First, he noted that to ensure reliability of these inspections,
the concentration of a certain percentage of annual eliminated
missiles would be needed. He then proposed 50 percent be used as
this percentage, which would be split roughly equally between two
batches each year. Therefore, if the inspecting Party conducted
these two inspections, confirmation of the elimination results for
at least 50 percent of the eliminated missiles for that year would
be achieved. Ilin indicated there would be no additional


inspection opportunities in a given year beyond the chance to
inspect the two 25 percent batches. He stated the same approach
would be applied for the inspection of the eliminated mobile
launchers of ICBMs and that the limit of no more than two Type-2
inspections per year for each CorE facility would apply.




11. (S) Warner replied that determining the percentage of the
annual output of eliminated items to be inspected would be the most
difficult aspect of this topic. He noted that, in the U.S. view,
the Russian side had agreed in Moscow to provide the opportunity to
inspect 100 percent of the eliminated solid-fueled missiles that
were eliminated by means other than explosion. Ryzhkov replied
that was incorrect and that the Russian side had made no such
agreement. Ilin reiterated that the absolute number of eliminated
missiles or mobile launchers of ICBMs would vary year to year since
it would depend on the total number eliminated during that year,
but it would involve no more than 50 percent of the annual output
of eliminated missiles.




12. (S) Ryzhkov and Smirnov then attempted to explain why it would
not be possible to batch 100 percent of the eliminated items in a
given year. They indicated that a limited number of missiles could
be processed at Votkinsk at any given time. Storage of too many
eliminated motor casings to support batch inspections could cause
"traffic jams" due to space limitations. These traffic jams would
cause the Russian side to fail to meet the quota set forth in their
annual plan for elimination.




13. (S) Warner requested additional clarification regarding the
Russian proposed elimination inspection approach. Smirnov briefly
described the Russian solid-fueled missile elimination process, and
it was agreed that some overlap in display of eliminated motor
casings for observation by National Technical Means (NTM) would
likely occur. The actual time of overlap could not be accurately
predicted. It was noted that perhaps the 30-day inspection window
set forth in Part Three of the Protocol would have to be extended
for some items. That time extension would allow for overlap of
eliminated missiles on display and allow for observation of
unplanned mini-batches of eliminated items by NTM and by
inspectors. Some details remained unanswered, but both sides
agreed to discuss these issues during the next IPWG meeting.




14. (S) Warner asked if the duration of such Type-2 elimination
inspections should be discussed. Ilin replied that the allowable
duration should be sufficient to provide for confirmation of
numbers and types of items eliminated in addition to reading the
unique identifiers on the eliminated missiles, but that it would
depend on the number of items. He also stated that he was flexible
in allowing enough time to complete the activities required during
the inspection. Ilin inquired what would occur in the case of
elimination by explosion, and Warner replied batch inspections
would not be applicable since nothing would remain to be inspected
after the explosion. Ilin noted that only notifications paperwork
had been seen with regard to U.S. solid-fueled missile eliminations
in the past.




15. (S) Ilin raised concerns regarding parity in missile
elimination inspections several times during the meeting. He noted
the U.S. side had not provided a list of conversion or elimination
facilities for its solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs while the Russian
side had and that batch elimination inspections would only apply to
the Russian side.



16. (U) Documents provided:



- United States:



-- Chart slide, "Conversion or Elimination Inspections As Type Two
Inspections," dated February 2, 2010.




17. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Elliott

Mr. Brown

Mr. Buttrick

Lt Col Goodman

LTC Leyde

LTC Litterini

Mr. Rust

LT Sicks (RO)

Mr. Smith

Mr. Taylor

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Vodolopova

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS