SIERRA LEONE STABILITY IV: CONCLUSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 FREETOWN 000008

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PINS PINR SL
SUBJECT: SIERRA LEONE STABILITY IV: CONCLUSIONS

REF: A. 09 FREETOWN 465

B. 09 FREETOWN 466

C. 09 FREETOWN 471

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Amy LeMar for reasons 1.4 (b/
d)


1. (C) As reftels have shown Sierra Leone is faced with
challenges and threats to short- and long-term stability.
Perhaps the greatest hallmark of Sierra Leonean governance at
the moment is that it is driven and supported by individuals,
rather than institutions or ideologies. Reminiscent of the
country's cultural heritage, in which communities' fortunes
rested in the hands of the Paramount Chief, government and
party structures focus power in the hands of very few, who
either refuse or fear to delegate. There are few checks and
balances that cannot be bought or sold, and resources are
insufficient to combat cultural acceptance of corruption or
fully equip the untrained and unmotivated civil service.


2. (C) Without checks and balances or the expectation of
impartiality and reason, the system is bound to be fraught
with the same foibles and frailties as the people who embody
it: fatigue, irrationality, and greed set against an opaque
backdrop of internal tension and cohesion created by family
dramas, history, personal slights, ethnicity, regionalism,
etc. As observers, members of the international community can
clearly see the results of this system. Promoting
development becomes a constant battle, to be fought again and
again over time, with changing weapons and players but
consistent outcomes. Our inability to attack root problems
means that even strategies that take these issues into
account are limited in their effectiveness, and programs that
do not are doomed from the start.


3. (C) The UK attempted a multi-pronged approach by
investing in institutions and also supporting individuals
they deem appropriate, but even some British interlocutors
have conceded that the short-term results are mixed and the
long-term results uncertain. Some believe that they
underestimated the role self-interest plays in local
decision-making, and they see the tendency for even the most
educated and informed government officials to rely on their
personal connections and obligations rather than pragmatism,
logic, or a sense of national duty.


4. (C) This plays out not only in government ministries, but
between parties. Sierra Leonean political strategy sometimes
seems to be a "race to the bottom," wherein opposition
parties (regardless of who is in power) would rather
undermine development efforts and spotlight the e ruling
party's failures than support positive change and rightfully
assume part of the credit. This holds true even within
parties, where it appears rivals will cut each other off at
the knees behind closed doors regardless of the collateral
damage, and only marginally close ranks in public. This has a
deleterious impact on governance decisions, since no one has
national best interests at heart, and in fact deliberately
creating new hardships is seen as an opportunity to praise or
criticize. In short, Sierra Leone's political leaders are
generally a hindrance to economic and social development,
rather than a help.


5. (C) The capacity for Sierra Leone to absorb any kind of
shock is therefore low: tension in Guinea, external economic
pressures, and even the 2012 elections represent potential
damage to this under-performing system. Sierra Leone is
ill-equipped to handle the potential spill-over of Guinean
violence and refugees: indeed, the country has insufficient
financial and operational resources to handle its own
poverty, floundering economy, and potential for crisis in the
build-up to 2012.


6. (C) Comment: Sierra Leonean stability exists because of a
delicate equilibrium between a variety of issues and
interests. Public will for peaceful development along with
donor support created this balance in the aftermath of the
war, but development and support are not mutually exclusive:
without national will, there would be no donor support, and
without donor support, national will is likely to evaporate.
But forces are converging on both elements that put Sierra
Leonean stability at risk: donors have less funds to provide
for the numerous needs, and political connivance and
self-interest, as well as economic desperation, undermines
the collective will for peace. In the short-term, any factor
or combination of factors could bring about a devolution, and
the international community needs to be prepared to provide a
targeted reaction that will at least address the catalytic
problems, if not the underlying ones. In the long-term,
though, endemic corruption will likely be the country's
greatest destabilizing factor, as it prevents tangible,

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universal development. The reliance of development partners
on a few key people with integrity and vision (such as
President Koroma, Anti-Corruption Commissioner Abdul
Tejan-Cole, and Chief Justice Umu Hawa Tejan-Jalloh) may not
be enough to counter-balance the challenges Sierra Leone now
faces.


7. (C) Comment continued: Sierra Leone's development
partners are left with few options, but the presence of a
handful of senior leaders dedicated to their nation's future,
while sadly an historic anomaly, is an opportunity that
points a way forward. While democracy and governance
programs will continue to struggle to affect overarching
change, and the resources to expand agricultural productivity
remain limited, programs that focus on the provision of
services -- health, education, and infrastructure -- may
provide better opportunities for long-term impact.
Educational programs such as the Ambassador's Girl's
Scholarship Program (AGSP),Fulbright scholarships, and
others should be expanded, to create the critical mass of
future leaders needed to ensure a stable Sierra Leone that is
part of the solution, rather than a part of the problem, in
West Africa. END COMMENT.
FEDZER