Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10COLOMBO105
2010-02-09 13:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: FONSEKA DETAINED, GOVERNMENT PLANS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1287
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RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2407
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000105 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA DETAINED, GOVERNMENT PLANS
COURT MARTIAL

COLOMBO 00000105 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000105

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA DETAINED, GOVERNMENT PLANS
COURT MARTIAL

COLOMBO 00000105 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 8, former opposition presidential
candidate Fonseka was taken into custody by military police.
Several key joint opposition leaders were at the office when
the detention occurred and said the military personnel had
man-handled Fonseka and dragged him across the floor as they
took him out to waiting vehicles. The Defense Ministry
website said the military police had arrested Fonseka because
he had violated military regulations, although official
statements on February 9 still lacked clarity. Mrs. Fonseka
said that after repeated calls, including to the ICRC, for
assistance, government officials said she would be allowed to
visit her husband, who was being held at Navy headquarters,
and bring him his medications. At a February 9 meeting with
diplomatic heads of missions, opposition coalition leaders
described the detention of Fonseka as an "abduction" and
warned that the country was moving toward "fascism." They
claimed the crisis had "galvanized our solidarity" going into
parliamentary elections, which may be called later today, and
said a demonstration would take place in front of the Supreme
Court on February 10 as a symbolic gesture against the "law
of the jungle" that was spreading throughout the country
under the Rajapaksas. Under the "threat to national
security" clause of military regulations, Fonseka could be
held in custody throughout the entire court martial
proceedings. Fonseka would have no access to independent
media, and his statements would be released through the Army
Spokesman. Members of the court martial tribunal would
include tri-service commanders and senior military officers.
END SUMMARY.

FONSEKA'S DETENTION
--------------


2. (C) On February 8, retired General Sarath Fonseka was
taken into custody by military police around 9:30 PM local

time at his office. This came less than two weeks after his
defeat in Sri Lanka's first post-war presidential election,
and while the victor in that election, President Rajapaksa,
was still on an official visit to Russia. Several key joint
opposition leaders were at the office when the detention
occurred, including Mano Ganesan of the DPF, Rauff Hakeem of
the SLMC, and Somawansa Amarasinghe of the JVP party.
Fifteen to twenty military officials reportedly entered the
office, while another 100 waited outside. Mangala
Samaraweera of the SLFP(M) immediately phoned PolCouns with
the news, and Ravi Karunanayake of the UNP called Charge,
both saying the military personnel had roughed up Fonseka and
dragged him across the floor as they took him out to waiting
vehicles. Fonseka's media secretary also was detained at the
office and reportedly beaten, although it was unclear if he
was taken into separate custody by civilian authorities or by
the same military personnel.


3. (C) The Defense Ministry website said the military police
had arrested Fonseka because he had violated military
regulations, although official statements on February 9 still
lacked clarity. Post contacts in the military said that
according to Army Act 57, all military personnel were
automatically considered to be in the reserves for three
years following retirement and, therefore, were still subject
to military law. While this military code would prohibit
political activity by any former military personnel
throughout this three-year period, the rules were said to be
particularly strict for the first six months after
retirement. (NOTE: Fonseka retired from his position as Chief
of Defense on November 12, 2009. END NOTE) Lakshman
Hulugalla, Director General of the Defense Ministry's Media

COLOMBO 00000105 002.2 OF 003


Centre for National Security was quoted on the Defense
Ministry's website as saying Fonseka had been arrested "in
connection with condemnation acts and other military offences
committed by him." One contact told Post that all previous
cases of conspiracy charges pursued by the government were
carried out in the civil justice system, even when the
accused were military personnel.


4. (C) By mid-afternoon on February 9, Fonseka's wife
released a statement to the press repeating the accusation
that Fonseka was beaten by the military police as they
arrested him and that she had not been told where he was
being held despite several requests. There were also reports
that he was being denied medicine he required several times
daily ever since an LTTE suicide attack left him severely
injured. Later in the day, Mrs Fonseka said that after many
calls, including to the ICRC, for assistance, government
officials contacted her and said she would be allowed to
visit her husband, who was being held at Navy headquarters,
and to bring him his medication.

OPPOSITION: "MOVING TOWARD FASCISM"
--------------


5. (C) At a February 9 meeting with diplomatic heads of
mission, opposition coalition leaders (minus UNP leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe, who was in India),along with Mrs. Fonseka,
discussed the general's detention, its implications for
democracy in Sri Lanka, and what they saw as the way forward.
UNP deputy head Karu Jayasuriya refused to characterize the
detention as a taking into custody, insisting it was an
"abduction," because Fonseka was a civilian and not subject
to military justice. He cited opposition claims of massive
fraud in the election and saw the detention of Fonseka as a
continuation of harassment of the opposition in an effort to
cover up that fraud. Mangala Samaraweera said the full
force of the government was now put towards the general
election, which the president may call later this evening,
explaining the government hoped media attention would turn to
the election, pushing Fonseka's arrest from the front pages.
The opposition leaders said, however, that this crisis was
"galvanizing our solidarity." Several described the
Rajapaksa regime's latest moves against them, the crackdown
on the press, and the purges in the military as moves toward
"fascism" and "dictatorship." In response, the opposition
would continue with its legal challenges against the election
results, but they also now planned "direct action" in the
streets. They said a demonstration was planned for February
10 before the Supreme Court building as a symbolic gesture
against the "law of the jungle" that was spreading under the
Rajapksas. For now, such demonstrations would be peaceful
but "could escalate."

COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURES
--------------


6. (C) Based on Post discussions with persons in and close to
the military, a formal summary of evidence must be presented
to a military legal officer prior to an arrest, unless there
is a threat to national security. In the latter case, the
summary of evidence must take place within 48 hours of a
person's detention, although some contacts told Post the
summary can take as long as two months, effectively
preventing Fonseka from contesting the general elections.
Fonseka will be allowed a civilian legal counsel or can opt
for military legal counsel once the Army Commander has
reviewed the summary and given the convening order for the
court martial. The accused is also authorized a "friend of
the accused," a military person to act on his behalf. The
opposition leadership confirmed this afternoon that a lawyer

COLOMBO 00000105 003.2 OF 003


representing Fonseka would file an application with the
Supreme Court on February 9 or 10, alleging a fundamental
violation of Fonseka's human rights.


7. (C) Under the "threat to national security" clause,
Fonseka could be held in custody throughout the entire court
martial proceedings. Fonseka would have no access to
independent media, and his statements would be released
through the Army Spokesman. Members of the court martial
tribunal would include tri-service commanders and senior
military officers. A long-time Post contact with close ties
to the military thought it likely that Air Force Commander
Air Chief Marshal Goonalitilake and former Naval Commander
Karunagoda would be on the panel, along with a third recalled
commander. Judge Advocate General Major General Mohanthi
Peiris will likely preside over the case. Major General
Peiris had been serving as the Director General Legal of the
Army until last week, when she was promoted to this new
position. The woman she replaced was actually demoted from
the Judge Advocate General position Peiris now holds, to take
Peiris's prior position, and may be tapped to oversee the
summary of evidence against Fonseka. One military contact
reported that the Secretary of Defense had made these
personnel changes himself last week, and another contact told
Post the change was made in part because Peiris might have
been unlikely to allow the case to move forward to a court
martial.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) In terms of the court martial itself, the cards are
not in the general's favor. It will be difficult for him to
find a serving member of the military willing to act as his
"friend of the accused" during the proceedings or to make any
public statements on his behalf, given the current climate of
fear among any remaining Fonseka supporters in the military.
Many in the current Army, Air Force, and Navy leadership have
a disdain for Fonseka. During his tenure as the Army
Commander, Fonseka took claim for winning the war against the
LTTE, giving no credit to the Air Force and the Navy, and
many senior Army officers felt sidelined by Fonseka and
harbor a deep resentment for him. One contact told Post that
two Brigadier Generals who were known to be avowed enemies of
Fonseka, Sumith Manawaduge and Jagath Wimalasiri, were sent
with the military police to arrest him. SLMC leader Hakeem
described the arresting commanders as in "an indecent hurry,"
and JVP leader Amarasinghe said the leading general acted "as
if he had a personal vendetta against the general."
FOWLER