SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 83 (SFO-GVA-VIII-009)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-011.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 3, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG)
met on February 3 and discussed Sections I and II of Part Two, the
initial data exchange, heavy bomber categories, and the Leninsk
Test Range. During the meeting, the Russian side clarified that it
did not intend to provide any base-by-base data in the initial data
exchange, a position which came as a surprise to the U.S. side.
The sides also engaged in a lengthy discussion about Russia's use
of the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan. End summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Missile Defense the Major Remaining
Issue; Surprising Russian Position on Initial Data Exchange;
Working Through the MOU Once More; Leninsk; and Site Diagrams.



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MISSILE DEFENSE THE MAJOR REMAINING ISSUE

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5. (S) General Orlov noted most issues had been agreed and the
Russian side had several proposals for resolving the remaining
issues. Mr. Trout agreed with his assessment. Orlov commented
that the dynamic in the MOU WG differed from the discussions at the
Heads of Delegation level, where Ambassador Antonov had "very
complicated" discussions with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller.
Orlov revealed that Antonov was "worked up" after his last meeting
with Gottemoeller due to unresolved issues. He remarked that the
major remaining issue in the treaty negotiations was the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms (SOA) and
strategic defense. He stated that progress on issues in Moscow had
been clearly linked to the missile defense question. Trout
acknowledged the Russian concern with the issue.




6. (S) Trout handed over the U.S.-revised Part Two, Section I,


Paragraph 2, noting that it incorporated Russian positions and
asked that it be discussed during the meeting.



Begin text:




2. The Parties shall exchange the data according to the categories
of data contained in this Part no later than 45 days after
signature of the Treaty, based upon the data exchanged on July 1,
2009, under the START Treaty. For this initial exchange, the
Parties shall not provide any data related to:



(a) Geographic coordinates;



(b) Unique Identifiers;



(c) Warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as nuclear
warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and



[(d) Aggregate data on the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers]2



End text.



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SURPRISING RUSSIAN POSITION ON INITIAL DATA EXCHANGE

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7. (S) Colonel Pischulov began the Russian agenda with discussion
of Section I, Paragraph 3. He proposed a number of wording
changes, including the addition of the word "facilities" after
references to "site diagrams," acceptance of the U.S.-proposed "as
applicable" terminology, and removal of the Russian brackets around
the word "declared" with respect to new facilities. The sides
discussed moving elements of Paragraph 3, specifically
subparagraphs (b) and (c),to the Annex, arguing that these two
subparagraphs addressed situations that could come about after
entry-into-force (EIF) but were not pertinent to establishing the
requirements for exchanges prior to EIF. After a short discussion,
Trout stated that the proposal sounded reasonable and he would take
the matter under consideration.




8. (S) Regarding paragraph 4, Pischulov proposed a compromise of


45 days after EIF for exchange of photographs based on the
recommendation of their inspectors. Trout agreed.




9. (S) Trout raised the new text provided on the U.S.-proposed
Paragraph 2 and along with LT Lobner pressed for clarification
regarding which information would be exempted from the initial
exchange of data. The Russian side emphasized they would provide
aggregate data on total forces but would not provide any
base-by-base information. Orlov summarized the Russian position as
that the Parties would be required to provide only Part Two,
Section II data in the initial exchange; in other words, the
central and supplementary limits. Trout noted the United States
had misunderstood the Russian position and asked for confirmation
that the Russian position was that the Parties would provide only
Section II data in the initial exchange of data 45 days after
signature. Orlov confirmed that this assessment was correct.
Pischulov clarified that Russia would also provide data on Sections
VII through IX (technical data),but not Sections III through V.
(Begin comment: The old Section IX was deleted in the previous
meeting. End comment.)




10. (S) Trout responded that the U.S. side expected to exchange
all information, including Sections III through V, except for data
on warheads, unique identifiers (UIDs) and coordinates. Orlov said
the Russians would consider providing the aggregate data listed at
the beginning of Sections III through V, but not the base-by-base
data. Trout asked whether this would be data current as of
signature or current as of July 2009 START MOU data. Orlov
confirmed that it would be July 2009 MOU data, as agreed to in
December.




11. (S) Trout explained that the U.S. view was to exchange as much
data as possible, including base-by-base data, at an early stage.
This would allow the Parties to flush out differences in
interpretations of their obligations. Orlov countered that the
Russian side did not see utility in discussing this data after the
initial exchange because the Parties would be unable to modify the
document substantially at that stage.




12. (S) Pischulov asked the U.S. side to clarify its position.
Lobner confirmed that the U.S. proposal was to exchange all data
for all sections, except data related to coordinates, UIDs and
warheads. Orlov emphasized that the Russians had clearly stated
their position in their proposed Section I, Paragraph 2(b). Trout
commented that this was clearly a misunderstanding. Orlov remarked
that the U.S. side was continually relating the initial data
exchange to Senate ratification, but pointed out that the United
States would have site diagrams and aggregate data to show the
Senate. Furthermore, the Parties would exchange the full required
data within 30 days after EIF, which was the most important
information in any case. Orlov also restated that the Russian side
could consider providing aggregate data for Sections III through V.
Trout replied that he would report the Russian position back to the
U.S. Head of Delegation. Orlov confessed that he doubted he would
succeed in convincing his colleagues to agree to the U.S. proposal,
and would even have great difficulty convincing them to provide


aggregate data for Sections III through V. Trout pointed out that
when it came to providing aggregate warhead data, U.S. law mandated
that the treaty EIF before certain warhead data could be released.



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WORKING THROUGH THE MOU ONCE MORE

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13. (S) Turning to Section II, Trout asked where Orlov would like
to place the 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers and
heavy bombers ("the third limit"). Pischulov spoke about the
similarities between some of the existing categories in paragraph 2
and the third limit, stating that perhaps some categories could be
deleted or merged. He asked Trout where he would like to place the
third limit. Trout referred back to the previous meeting and
suggested matching the location of the third limit in the database
to the location of the actual limit in the treaty text. In
addition to making this suggestion, he noted he would continue to
think about the issue.




14. (S) Orlov asked about the U.S. view on counting rules for
heavy bombers, specifically the question of deployed and
non-deployed status. Trout replied that the United States would
come to a decision on the question soon. He said it was possible
that the non-deployed category would include test heavy bombers,
heavy bombers in long-term maintenance, and heavy bombers awaiting
elimination. He noted that this was the Russian position 3 months
previously, which Orlov confirmed. Trout told the Russians that
the position was not yet official, and that he expected Secretary
of Defense Representative Dr. Warner to deliver a full presentation
on the issue the following week.




15. (S) Pischulov noted there were ambiguities in the draft
Protocol on UIDs, specifically with respect to the UID category
listed for missiles in test launchers. Trout replied that the
category was necessary, but often no UID would be listed because no
missile would be deployed in a test launcher. However, if a
missile happened to be in the launcher at the time of the update,
then a UID would be required. Pischulov asked whether the United
States demanded UIDs for training facilities. Trout replied in the
negative, stating the United States only wanted coordinates.
(Begin comment: This was an error in the Russian text. End
comment.)




16. (S) Pischulov asked whether the U.S. wanted warhead
information for basing areas, and Trout replied that it did. Orlov
asked whether warhead data for individual missiles would be
required. Trout answered the United States proposed to exchange
warhead data for the base and basing area but not for individual
missiles. Orlov commented that the Russians would probably agree
to give aggregate warhead data for each basing area but that he
would consult with his delegation and respond formally at the next


session.




17. (S) For Section VI, Pischulov asked for updates on remaining
brackets regarding the language for launchers located at space
launch facilities. Trout responded that this language was still
dependent on some other issues, namely soft site launchers, which
would be discussed in the Definitions Working Group. Consequently,
they remain bracketed.




18. (S) In Section VIII, Pischulov proposed a compromise in which
the Russian side would delete some recognition features of heavy
bombers in exchange for U.S. acceptance of the remaining categories
of recognition features. The Russians proposed dropping categories
on the following: type of nuclear armaments for which a heavy
bomber is equipped; maximum number of nuclear armaments for which
any heavy bomber of this type and variant of a type is actually
equipped; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried on external
attachment joints; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried in
internal weapons bays; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried
on each pylon; distance between joints for attaching nuclear
armaments to pylon; and maximum number of nuclear armaments for
which launcher is equipped. Trout agreed to consider the proposal.





19. (S) In the new Section IX (Formerly Section X, Other Data
Required by the Treaty),Orlov asked for confirmation that the
sides would drop the category for nuclear armaments for heavy
bombers. Trout replied that the United States would probably agree
and he would check on the matter.



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LENINSK

--------------




20. (S) Trout raised the issue of Leninsk and the proposed Agreed
Statement on the test range (Reftel). He explained that the United
States needed to have the substance of the proposed statement
either in an Agreed Statement or in the Protocol. It was not
acceptable for SOA simply to disappear from the database. The
sides needed clarity as to what happened with missiles that left
Russia.




21. (S) Orlov replied that the Russians had several problems with
the proposed statement. First was the issue of singling out
Kazakhstan, since Kazakhstan had specifically stated that, unless
they were omitted from the treaty, they would insist on
participating in its deliberations. More broadly, Russia did not
understand the U.S. concern regarding Leninsk. The United States
had comparable issues, for instance with the United Kingdom and
Meck Island, he said. He added that Russia had not received a


clear answer to its questions about the proposed statement during
the Ad Hoc meeting the day before (Reftel). He said Russia would
notify the U.S. regarding the transit and launch of accountable
missiles and if the missiles had UIDs, then the United States would
have all the needed information.




22. (S) Trout responded that the United States would provide
movement notifications for treaty-accountable missiles with respect
to Meck Island. Further, the United States would declare the
facility if a treaty-accountable missile was taken there. Trout
noted that the United States was only launching Trident I C-4
missiles from Meck Island, and the C-4 would not be accountable
under this treaty. Trout said the U.S. relationship with the
United Kingdom (UK) was different from the Russian relationship
with Kazakhstan. In the U.S.-UK instance, the United States would
sell a missile to the UK, which would then take ownership of it.
Russia, on the other hand, would never relinquish control of a
missile to Kazakhstan. Trout emphasized that the United States was
not trying to restrict Russia, but was simply seeking to account
for the unique circumstances presented by Leninsk, and to identify
appropriate notifications and procedures tailored to the situation.
Orlov countered that he did not understand the U.S. concerns nor
did he accept the distinction from the UK case.




23. (S) Asking to go "off the record," Orlov queried Trout what he
envisioned for the agreed statement. Would the facility be subject
to inspection? Would there be a 30-day movement restriction?
Trout replied that the 30-day restriction would apply, just like
the 30-day movement restriction applied to all missile movements.
After Orlov pointed to the February 2 U.S.-proposed agreed
statement, Trout commented there were problems with that version,
and a final proposed version was not yet complete.




24. (S) Trout remarked that the issue of space launch facilities
(SLF) outside national territory had been an issue under START.
The U.S.-proposed agreed statement on Leninsk was developed to
account for various scenarios that could arise with missiles
located outside national territory. One such scenario addressed
how to track an expended launch canister if the missile was
launched at an SLF outside national territory. According to the
proposed agreed statement, under this scenario, the canister would
be eliminated either on-site or after it was returned to Russia.
Another scenario involved the situation if a problem arose with the
missile, in which case it would be returned to national territory
for repair. Orlov stated that it was impossible to develop
language that would capture every possible situation.




25. (S) Trout also sought to clarify that the Russian relationship
with Kazakhstan was not an existing pattern of cooperation,
specifically, that Russia retains control of its missiles. Summing
up, Trout stated that the United States did not propose to inspect
Leninsk, but sought to ensure that the treaty's provisions would
apply when items were outside of national territory. Trout
emphasized that, in any case, a missile leaving national territory
would still have to be assigned to some declared facility in
Russia.



26. (S) Orlov countered that unique identifiers (UIDs) were
central to this issue, and turned the discussion to the question of
what would happen to Trident II D-5 SLBMs turned over to the UK.
Would the United States notify Russia? Trout responded that the UK
would not be subject to this treaty but the United States would
notify Russia when the UK picked up missiles. Orlov retorted that
the United States had repeatedly underlined the importance of
tracking missiles throughout their lifecycle. In light of this, he
stated, Russia had accepted UIDs. In this case, however, Russia
would only know when the missiles had been sold. He emphasized the
deficit in information Russia would receive as opposed to what the
United States would know about missiles at Leninsk. Trout asked
which declared facility a missile would be assigned to when located
at Leninsk. Orlov replied that they would be declared at Leninsk,
but clarified that the Leninsk Test Range itself would not be a
declared facility.




27. (S) Trout pointed out that this was precisely why the U.S. was
seeking an agreement on the topic. He emphasized that this was
ultimately an accounting issue, not a test of wills. Orlov
explained that some of the leaders in Moscow were more rigid.
Orlov elaborated that, in explaining the obligations to provide
notifications and other information under START, officers such as
himself would routinely be asked why Russia needed to provide such
exhaustive information and whether Russia really needed such
information from the U.S.




28. (S) Trout replied that the nub of the problem was that the
treaty did not provide for the accountability of non-declared
facilities outside of national territory. The issue was
fundamentally about data. He further explained that the United
States was focused on tracking missiles because during the Cold War
the sides had developed wildly distorted assessments of the other's
forces and programs. Since the EIF of START, the Parties had known
with exactitude the other side's force structure and patterns so
there was no room for exaggeration. This information would
continue to be useful in the future, Trout continued, especially if
a crisis were to develop. Orlov acknowledged Trout's arguments,
and responded that these were the reasons why Russia would provide
notifications regarding Leninsk. Trout restated that the substance
of the agreement did not need to appear in an agreed statement but
did needed to be somewhere in the treaty or protocol. Nearing the
end of this discussion, Orlov admitted that he now understood the
U.S. concerns in principle, and would think the matter over to find
a solution.



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SITE DIAGRAMS

--------------




29. (S) Trout noted Gottemoeller and Antonov had discussed the



issue of site diagrams and he proposed that the MOU WG handle the
issue (formerly Annex J of START's MOU). Orlov said he had not
heard of the matter, but would consult with Antonov and his
delegation.




30. (S) Pischulov asked about topics for the next meeting. The
sides agreed to provide positions or answers, as applicable, to the
following: Section I, paragraph 2, regarding initial data exchange
requirements; Section I, paragraph 3, regarding moving two
subparagraphs to the Annex; Section II, incorporation of the third
limit; Section VIII, response to the Russian-proposal of deleting
some categories of data; and finally Section IX, deletion of types
of nuclear armaments.




31. (S) Documents provided:



- United States:



-- U.S.-Proposed Revised Part Two, Section I, Paragraph 2.





32. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES:



Mr. Trout

Mr. Colby (RO)

LT Lobner

Mr. Sobchenko (Int)



RUSSIA:



Gen Orlov

Ms. Vodopolova

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




33. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON