SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS AND TREATY ARTICLE VIII

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS AND TREATY ARTICLE VIII
MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

REF: 10 STATE 9670 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-009




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 02, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U. S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The first meeting on agreed statements of the eighth round
of the START Follow-on negotiations was held on February 2. At the
request of the Russian delegation the meeting began with discussion
of provisions in Article VIII of the treaty on public release of
data. The sides discussed the proposed agreed statements on rapid
reload, Trident I SLBMs, movements of ICBMs to and from the Leninsk
Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, basing of deployed heavy
bombers at the conversion or elimination (CorE) facility located at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB),Arizona, joint basing of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped
for non-nuclear armaments, converted B-1B heavy bombers, and U.S.
guided missile submarines (SSGNs) converted from SSBNs (Reftel).
The Russian side agreed to continue discussion on all agreed
statements with the exception of rapid reload which it felt was
unnecessary because neither side possessed this capability. They
expressed doubts about the need for the agreed statement on the
Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: To Release Data or Not to Release Data;
Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the CorE Facility Located at
Davis-Monthan AFB; SSGNs Converted from SSBNs; Joint Basing;
Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload;
Leninsk Test Range; and Missile Defense.



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To Release or Not To Release
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5. (S) Mr. Elliot opened discussion on joint draft treaty text
Article VIII regarding public release of data. Col Ilin said the
working group should focus on paragraphs 5 and 7 and noted the
primary difference between the sides was whether a Party needed
permission of the other Party in order to release data. Ilin
mentioned that the Russian side was preparing an alternate version


of Article VIII but needed some clarification on the U.S. version.
Ambassador Ries clarified that the first exchange of data would
occur 45 days after treaty signature. The exchange would include
the same data exchanged under START on July 1, 2009, with the
addition of non-deployed launchers, and would be releasable with
the exception of the classified annexes and site diagrams or
geographic coordinates. Ries added this was no different than what
was done under START.




6. (S) General Poznikhir said the Russian position was that each
Party should have the right to determine whether the other Party
should be allowed to release the data in the initial exchange
(e.g., the data provided within 45 days of treaty entry into
force),including aggregate numbers for deployed launchers,
non-deployed launchers and warheads. All other data, he said,
should be released if agreed in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC). Poznikhir said Russia was limited in its ability
to release data because of Russian legislation and that releasing
this data had the potential to provide terrorists with information
on each nation's nuclear assets.




7. (S) Dr. Warner said releasing exchanged Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) data was a precedent set in START and since
this data was already published, what was the harm of publishing
the same data under START Follow-on (SFO)? Poznikhir said he was
unaware that START data had been released. Ries confirmed that
certain START MOU data was published on the Department of State
website. Ries provided additional detail on the U.S. proposal that
aggregate data on strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs) and warheads
be published on a continuing basis, not just following the initial
exchange of data. She reassured the Russian side that more
sensitive data, such as geographic coordinates, unique identifiers,
site diagrams, and other classified information would not be
released. Ilin commented that he, too, was not aware that
publication of MOU data was allowed under START.




8. (S) Mr. Koshelev stated that Moscow Treaty data was not
published and while it was acceptable for the United States to
disclose its own data, Russian law had changed to prevent them from
releasing their data. He proposed that since SFO was a hybrid of
START and the Moscow Treaty, best practices from both treaties
should be drawn from and in this case the Moscow Treaty methodology
of not releasing the other side's data should be adopted.




9. (S) Poznikhir said Russia agreed with release of aggregate
numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMS, and heavy
bombers and release of aggregate numbers of deployed warheads on
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers following the initial
exchange of data. Subsequent data exchanges, however, should only
be released with the other Party's consent. Warner stated that
paragraph 7 proposed the release of aggregate data on a continuing
basis. Ries explained the proposal was to disclose all data,
except sensitive or classified data, following the initial release
and to subsequently disclose aggregate data, from both Parties, on
a continuing basis. Ries emphasized that to not release this data,
which was released under START, would be seen as a step backwards


in terms of transparency and would not be understood by the U.S.
public.




10. (S) Poznikhir said the Russian side would provide a draft
proposal for review and Mr. Taylor agreed to provide a link to the
Department of State's website where the START data could be found.
It was agreed to continue to discuss this matter at future
meetings.



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Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at

the c or e Facility Located at Davis-

Monthan AFB, Arizona

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11. (S) Elliott said the intent of the proposed agreed statement
on basing of deployed heavy bombers at the CorE Facility located at
Davis-Monthan AFB, was to capture heavy bombers while they were at
the facility and declare their status as deployed heavy bombers
until they were converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments or eliminated. Ilin said the Russian side noticed
several differences from the last paper provided. He said they
were still reviewing the paper and did not have final approval from
Moscow to further discuss this paper. The sides agreed to cover
this agreed statement at a future meeting.



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SSGNs Converted from SSBNs

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12. (S) Elliott said the changes to the U.S. SSGN converted from
SSBNs agreed statement were an attempt to draft acceptable wording
for both sides and that the remaining brackets were solely related
to the number of launchers to be viewed. Ilin agreed there were
still differences on the number of launchers to be viewed. He said
his staff was completing translation of the text and it could be
reviewed at a later meeting.



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Joint Basing

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13. (S) Elliott explained that in the proposed joint basing agreed
statement the U.S. side sought the right to carry out joint basing
of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers
of the same type that had been converted for non-nuclear armaments,
since this situation was not allowed in the treaty. He stated the
primary changes to this paper were editorial. The most significant
comment from the U.S. side would be a recommendation to remove the
last bracket on paragraph (c) since this agreed statement would be
approved upon signature of the treaty and required no referral to
the BCC. Admiral Kuznetzov stated the Russian view remained the
same as the last round of negotiations; that only separate basing
was allowed in the treaty and this position was approved by their
President. The Russian side would continue to review the paper and
both sides agreed to continue the discussion at a future meeting.



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Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers

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14. (S) Ilin explained that he did not intend to comment on the
editorial changes to the proposed agreed statement on converted
B-1B heavy bombers, but the Russian side noted that the number of
inspections per year had changed to "no more than one inspection
per year" compared to the previous Russian version "no more than
one such inspection on each base per year." Elliott affirmed that
it was one inspection per year. Ilin agreed to continue to review
the proposed changes and both sides agreed to discuss this agreed
statement at a later meeting.



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TRIDENT I SLBMs

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15. (S) Elliott explained that the original paper on Trident I
SLBMs was crafted as a unilateral statement and that this version
of the Trident I SLBM agreed statement was an attempt to alter the
paper to create an agreed statement. Kuznetzov replied that this
statement needed to provide clarity on the intended use of the
remaining Trident I missiles that had yet to be destroyed. Warner
stated that the real question was what were the pros and cons of an
agreed statement versus a unilateral statement. Elliott stated
that these missiles are used for testing and other purposes and we
should continue to work to provide a statement that was agreeable
to both Parties. Ilin stated that the Russian position was that
the paper should be a unilateral statement since Trident I was a
U.S. asset. He added that since unilateral statements were a part
of the treaty, this would be their tacit consent to the statement.




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Rapid Reload

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16. (S) Poznikhir asked where the idea for the rapid reload
agreed statement came from. He said the Russian side felt that
rapid reload was not a credible scenario and that the agreed
statement was unnecessary. Ries explained that A/S Gottemoeller
presented this proposed agreed statement to Amb Antonov at a
previous meeting. Ilin explained the Russian position that the
U.S. SLBMs in loading tubes could be considered the only rapid
reload capability that existed since the missiles were stored with
the front sections attached. Elliott asked whether they wanted to
include SLBMs in the agreed statement. Some discussion occurred on
where the concept of rapid reload was developed. The Russian side
asserted the concept had been the product of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty when both sides had possessed the ability to
quickly reload and redeploy their Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles following their launch. Warner concurred and added that
this capability only made logical sense for mobile ICBMs. Elliott
explained that while both sides knew that it was currently not
operationally feasible to conduct rapid reload on any units it
would be considered a serious step back by the world's arms control
community if this statement were not included. Ilin agreed to
consider whether this agreed statement was needed.



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Leninsk Test Range

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17. (S) Elliott opened the discussion on the Leninsk Test Range
agreed statement and said this statement was created to address the
unusual circumstance involving taking missiles to a test range
outside of national territory. This circumstance is not otherwise
covered in the treaty, he said. Ilin replied that the Russian side
had read the agreed statement and was concerned that mentioning
Kazakhstan in the treaty in any way, and especially the transfer of
items to Kazakhstan, was not appropriate. Ilin referred to the
U.S. "special relationship" with the United Kingdom and how there
were no limitations on transit time for the transfer of missiles to
the United Kingdom.




18. (S) Ilin explained that Russia did not own the facility in
Leninsk and therefore it could not be declared in the treaty MOU.
Koshelev added that Russia had persuaded Kazakhstan not to
participate in these negotiations on the basis that Kazakhstan
would not be mentioned in the treaty. Koshelev reiterated that
under no circumstance was Kazakhstan to be mentioned in this
treaty. Warner stated that the comparison to the U.S. pattern of
cooperation with the United Kingdom was a mischaracterization but
the point was not lost on the U.S. side. Elliott explained that
while there was no intention to bring Kazakhstan into the treaty,
the United States understood that Russia expected to continue to


use this facility, and therefore it created a situation that was
not covered by the treaty. The U.S. side was merely attempting to
address this reality, he said. Elliott also pointed out that
Russia did not identify this as a long standing "pattern of
cooperation" and without this agreed statement it would be
impossible to issue the required test launch and elimination
notifications for both the missile and the launch canister. Elliot
reiterated that the United States was attempting to accommodate an
operational practice not impose additional limits. Ilin concluded
that this was an issue of notification and should be discussed by
the Notifications Working Group. He said the Russian side did not
agree with this agreed statement. Warner asked whether the
sensitivity was based solely on the inclusion of Kazakhstan and
whether it would be possible to change the wording of the agreed
statement to remove specific reference to Kazakhstan or Leninsk.
(Begin comment: Koshelev and General Orlov appeared mildly
interested in this idea. End comment.) Ilin said they would think
about it. Elliott requested the Russian side draft proposed
changes to the statement to be reviewed at the next meeting.



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Missile Defense

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19. (S) At the end of the meeting Warner asked whether there were
any additional agreed statements that the Russian side felt would
be necessary and Ilin replied that the Russian side felt it would
be necessary to create an agreed statement on missile defense.






20. (U) Documents provided:



- UNITED STATES:



-- U.S. Proposed Part Three of the Protocol, dated February 2,

2010.




21. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Elliott

Mr. Ahlm (RO)


Mr. Connell

Mr. Dean

Dr. Dreicer

Lt Col Goodman

Amb Ries

Mr. Taylor

Dr. Warner

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Mr. Luchaninov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznikhir

Gen Venevtsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter)




22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON