SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 3, ELIMINATION

S E C R E T CD GENEVA 000081

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/15
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 3, ELIMINATION
MONITORING, FEBRUARY 15, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 49 (SFO-GVA-VIII-004)
10 CD GENEVA 75 (SFO-GVA-VIII-015); 10 CD GENEVA 73 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-051.



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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

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2. (S) Summary: The U.S. and Russian sides came away from the
Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow with sharply differing impressions
of the deal reached on the conduct of inspections to confirm the
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile
launchers for ICBMs. The United States believed that as part of a
deal involving U.S. acceptance of the annual quotas of ten Type-1
and eight Type-2 inspections, and the fact that confirmation of
elimination would fall under Type-2 inspections, the Russians
agreed that the United States would have the right to directly
inspect all items eliminated each treaty year by having accumulated
the entire output of the elimination process over the course of the
year into large batches at 6-month intervals. In contrast, the
Russian delegation in Geneva asserts that the sides agreed to
create two batches of such eliminated items each year that would be
subject to Type-2 inspections at the conversion or elimination
(CorE) facilities for solid-fueled strategic missiles and mobile
ICBM launchers respectively, but that these batches would include
only a total of approximately 50 percent of the annual output of
eliminated items.




3. (S) In our talks in Geneva, the Russians steadfastly refuse to
agree to provide us with the opportunity to inspect semi-annual or
quarterly batches of the eliminated items that encompass the full
year's output of eliminations. Given this development, we have
tentatively explored with the Russians a compromise approach that
would build upon the Russian proposal to have them accumulate two
batches per year, each of which contains approximately 25 percent
of the annual elimination output, by adding the right to conduct
Type-2 elimination inspections between announced batches when
portions of the remaining items eliminated each year are on display
in the open for national technical means (NTM) observation and
subject to inspection. The Russians have clearly indicated a
willingness to agree to such an approach. Some on the U.S.
delegation request guidance to drop the U.S. demand that all of the
eliminated items be available for Type-2 inspections in batches and
seek to agree instead on this hybrid approach, called Option 1 that
combines periodic batching with the right to conduct inspections on
the unbatched output of eliminated items as well.




4. (S) Others on the U.S. delegation would prefer to stay with
current guidance for the time being. However, if Washington
decides to pursue a new approach, these members recommend dropping
the batching concept altogether and would rely instead upon the
right to conduct up to two Type-2 inspections each year to confirm




the data of the items located at both the solid-fueled missile and
mobile ICBM launcher CorE facilities, to include those items
undergoing elimination. In both options, the sides have agreed
that the eliminated items would be displayed in the open for an
agreed period to facilitate NTM observation of the eliminated
items.




5. (S) The delegation requests Washington either reconfirm
current guidance, or examine Options 1 and 2 and provide new
guidance based on one of the approaches. Background and analysis
are in paragraphs 6-15. The guidance request is in paragraph
16-17. End summary.



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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

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6. (S) Background: Throughout the START Follow-on (SFO)
negotiations, the U.S. and Russian sides have disagreed on the
modalities of inspection activity to be used to confirm the results
of the CorE of strategic offensive arms and other declared data at
CorE facilities. During the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow in
January, the sides agreed that conversion or elimination
inspections would be conducted as Type-2 inspections within an
annual quota of eight such inspections, and appeared to agree on
the availability for inspection of 100 percent of the annual output
of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM
launchers. Unfortunately, no session was held at the end of the
day of negotiations to sum up and record the results of the
bargaining on the conduct of elimination inspections.




7. (S) The U.S. side left Moscow with the belief that the Russians
had agreed to accumulate or "batch" half of their annual output of
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs twice each year at the
Votkinsk CorE facility, for a total availability of 100 percent of
the output of the elimination process. In the view of the U.S.
side, the Russians would openly display the batch of eliminated
first stage motor casings for 60 days for observation by NTM and
provide a 30-day window within which the United States would have
the right to conduct a Type-2 inspection with a team of up to five
inspectors. A similar process was to be applied to the inspection
of eliminated mobile ICBM launchers at the Piban'shur CorE
facility. The U.S. delegation came to Geneva under instructions to
incorporate this agreed approach into the Inspection Activities
portion of the Protocol.




8. (S) The Russian delegation claims to have come away from the
Mullen-Makarov talks with a very different understanding of what
was agreed. They too assert that the sides agreed on periodic
accumulation or batching of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and
SLBM first stages at Votkinsk, but, in their view, this would apply
to only a total of 50 percent, as opposed to 100 percent, of the


annual output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers.
Consequently, they have developed draft language for the Inspection
Activities Protocol that reflects the more limited approach to the
Type-2 inspections used for confirmation of eliminations of
solid-fueled missiles and mobile ICBM launchers.




9. (S) During our current round in Geneva, the starkly differing
perceptions of the two sides very quickly became apparent.
Following our guidance, the U.S. side initially argued for
implementation of the semi-annual batching of 50 percent of the
eliminated items and having the right to conduct a Type-2
inspection of the facility for each batch, or 100 percent of the
annual output, by using up to two inspections at each CorE
facility. The Russians, in contrast, said they were prepared to
pull together two batches each year, for both the eliminated
solid-fueled missiles and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers, but
each batch would contain only 25 percent of the annual output of
eliminated items. The United States would have the right to expend
a Type-2 inspection for each of these batches. The remaining 50
percent of the Russian missiles and mobile ICBM launchers
eliminated annually would be displayed in the open for NTM
observation at the CorE facilities as they emerged incrementally
from the elimination process, but would not be subject to on-site
inspection. Thus, the United States would have the right to
inspect up to 50 percent of the items eliminated each year, but
Russia, not the United States, would select which 50 percent of the
missiles and mobile ICBM launchers were available for on-site
confirmation of elimination.




10. (S) The U.S. Inspection Protocol Working Group, in the course
of discussions with its Russian counterparts, has explored some
informal ideas to resolve this issue. These discussions are
described below. At this point, these explorations have produced a
significant amount of agreement between the sides on an approach
labeled Option 1. In addition, an alternative view has been
developed more recently within the U.S. delegation. It is
described below as Option 2.




11. (S) The initial U.S. delegation response to the Russian
post-Moscow position was to discuss the possibility that the
Russians would accumulate their annual solid-fueled missile and
mobile launcher eliminations into four roughly equal batches,
noting that this method was more in keeping with Russian historical
practice and still consistent with the agreement reached in Moscow.
Under this approach, the United States would have the right to
inspect each of the four batches, but with the already agreed limit
of no more than two Type-2 inspections at the same facility in a
given year, would be limited to inspecting no more than two of
these 25 percent batches or 50 percent of the annual eliminations.
The Russian delegation refused to consider this approach.




12. (S) In our internal discussions and exchanges with the Russian
delegation over the past week, we have mutually explored an
alternative approach, Option 1, that builds off of and expands the
Russian proposal. It falls well short of guaranteeing the right to
directly inspect 100 percent of the annual output of eliminated


items. Under this alternative, each year the Russians would create
two batches of eliminated items for possible Type-2 inspection by
the United States at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM
launcher CorE facilities, with each batch containing approximately
25 percent of the year's output of eliminated items. If the United
States elects not to inspect either (or both) of these 25 percent
batches, the eliminated items would still be displayed in the open
for 60 days for NTM viewing (the Russians propose this display
period should be only 30 days) and then be shredded.




13. (S) In addition, if the United States chose not to conduct one
of the announced "batch" inspections under this alternative the
U.S. would have the right to conduct full Type-2 elimination
inspections during the periods of the treaty year when portions of
the remaining 50 percent of the solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs as
well as mobile ICBM launchers were incrementally being eliminated,
notified as available for inspection, and displayed in the open in
small groups. During this period of incremental elimination, a
certain amount of "unplanned" batching would likely occur. That
is, there would likely be overlaps among small groups of 2-4
eliminated items during the course of the 30-day periods when each
increment is subject to inspection. Given the U.S. offer to limit
the inspection team to five members, this approach would restrict
the flexibility for the United States to conduct sequential
inspections. A Type-2 elimination inspection at the CorE facility
would have to be the second of the two sequential inspections and
an agreement would have to be reached to accommodate the additional
five members of a normal Type-2 inspection that could not be part
of the Type-2 elimination inspection.




14. (S) The most critical point under this option is that the
United States would have the right and the opportunity to exercise
that right at a time of its choosing to inspect all of the annual
output of eliminated items. If the United States were to withhold
one of its two annual inspections at the relevant CorE facility
until the very end of the treaty year, the Russian side would be
vulnerable to a U.S. Type-2 elimination inspection of the entire
output of eliminated items during the course of the year, or until
the U.S. side had expended the two inspections at each of the CorE
facilities. As a practical matter, the United States could, at
most, actually inspect no more than 50 percent of the annual
eliminated output were it to choose to inspect the two planned
batches. If the United States were to choose to combine the
inspection of one announced batch with one "unbatched" inspection,
we would likely see no more than 35-40 percent of the annual
elimination total. In the case of both the two 25 percent batches
as well as the incremental elimination of the remainder of the
yearly output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers, all
of these items would be displayed in the open for an agreed period
for viewing by NTM or until they were inspected. That, combined
with the total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection
throughout the year, will create a powerful deterrent to cheating
in the elimination process.




15. (S) Other delegation members propose to develop and negotiate
a different approach to inspecting eliminations, Option 2, which
drops the batching concept. This option would call for the conduct
of Type-2 inspections, with full Type-2 inspection rights to


inspect the entire CorE facilities, at both the Votkinsk and
Piban'shur up to two times each year, at times chosen by the
inspecting Party. This approach is predicated on Russia providing
site diagrams for the Votkinsk and Piban'shur facilities that were
the same as those provided under the START Treaty and on their
willingness to make available all items subject to inspection
within the inspectable area during such an inspection. This
proposal would allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of
all the data declared for the facilities and to confirm the
elimination of all items being displayed in the open in accordance
with a 60-day display window using a team of up to 10 inspectors.
The benefit of this approach would be to permit the United States
randomly to sample all missiles and launchers undergoing
elimination. It would also retain the flexibility for the United
States to conduct sequential inspections as needed. Consequently,
two such inspections at one of the two CorE facilities in a given
year would likely inspect at most 20-30 percent of the year's
output of eliminated items. It should be noted that this option
also provides total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection
throughout the year, thus creating a powerful deterrent to cheating
in the elimination process.



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GUIDANCE REQUESTED

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16. (S) The record of the delegation's exchanges with the Russian
side during round VIII to date, on the percentage of items to be
inspected during a Type-2 inspection of eliminated solid-fueled
ICBMs and their launchers (Reftels),clearly indicates differing
U.S. and Russian views of the outcome on this issue during the
January 22 Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow. In this context,
delegation requests that Washington either reconfirm existing
guidance, or authorize deployment of an alternative approach.
(Begin comment: HOD notes that the majority of agencies
represented on the delegation support deploying an alternative
approach at this time. One agency supports a reconfirmation of
existing guidance for the time being. End comment.)




17. (S) If the decision is made to proceed with an alternative
approach at this time, then delegation requests that Washington
examine Option 1 and Option 2 and provide guidance based on one of
the two. It should be noted that informal discussions with the
Russian side have indicated that Option 1 would be readily
negotiable. The negotiability of Option 2 is unknown, but it falls
within the concept of a normal Type-2 inspection. If that approach
is chosen, the biggest issues to resolve are likely to be the
location of the inspections for the eliminated solid-fueled
missiles (the two burn-out facilities at Krasnoarmeisk and Perm vs.
the CorE facility at Votkinsk) and the size of the inspection
teams, as noted above.




18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON