Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10CDGENEVA33
2010-02-12 17:31:00
SECRET
US Mission CD Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 001 (TELEMETRY),

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 001 (TELEMETRY),
February 12, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 31 (SFO-GVA-VIII-017)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T CD GENEVA 000033

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 001 (TELEMETRY),
February 12, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 31 (SFO-GVA-VIII-017)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-041.



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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

--------------




2. (S) The Russian Side has emphatically stated its position on
the exchange of telemetric information in the START Follow-On
Treaty, emphasizing that it is not necessary for Treaty
verification. Nevertheless, Russia has agreed to a telemetry
exchange to facilitate U.S. ratification of the Treaty. The
current Russian proposal, however, differs from the concepts
discussed during the Mullen-Makarov meetings on January 22 in
Moscow, and would provide for a non-substantive exchange of
telemetric information. The delegation seeks clarification and
guidance on how to respond to the Russian proposal (reftel).
Background and analysis are in paragraphs 3-5. Guidance request is
in paragraph 6. End summary.



--------------

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

--------------




3. (S) The Russian delegation has consistently stated that a
telemetry exchange is not necessary for verification in the START
Follow-on Treaty. The U.S. Side has clarified that a telemetry
exchange is necessary for the U.S. ratification process and the
Russian Side has reluctantly agreed to include a section on
telemetry in the protocol. The current Russian proposal differs
from the concepts discussed in Moscow and would provide for a
non-substantive exchange of telemetric information. It would deny
the U.S. Side a role in the process of determining the test flights
for which telemetric information would be received, limiting its
value for adequately understanding Russian missile developments.
The Russian delegation has indicated there is some flexibility to
modify the content of its proposal if the U.S. is willing to work
on ways to resolve Russian offense-defense relationship concerns.




4. (S) On February 9th, the U.S. Side agreed to provide a proposal
in response to the current Russian proposal prior to the next
Telemetry Working Group meeting.




5. (S) The Russian proposal differs from the discussions during
the January 2010 Mullen-Makarov meeting resulting in four major
problems:


* The annual exchange review would allow either side to
suspend the exchange on the basis of unresolved concerns.



This contradicts what the U.S. believed was the Mullen-Makarov
agreement to continue the exchange specified in the treaty if a
resolution of differences could not be achieved.



* The testing side would have the right to determine those
flight tests where telemetry would be exchanged with no role for
the receiving side in the selection process. Russia would likely
provide data only on test flights that are of least interest to the
U.S.



This contradicts Mullen-Makarov guidance to have a mutual
understanding on how flight tests would be chosen for the
telemetric exchange.



* The telemetry associated with the self-contained
dispensing mechanism or post-boost vehicle would not be exchanged.
These data contain information concerning the number of reentry
vehicles and procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles.



While not an explicit component of the Mullen-Makarov discussions,
this is a primary reason for conducting the exchange of telemetry.



* The interpretive data required for determining staging,
separation, and acceleration would not be exchanged.



While not a component of the Mullen-Makarov discussions, this
information facilitates an understanding of the exchanged
telemetric data.



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GUIDANCE REQUESTED

--------------




6. (S) Request clarification on those elements of the current
Russian proposal that are acceptable and guidance on required
changes to the remaining elements of the Russian proposal to meet
the objectives of the Mullen-Makarov discussions and to ensure
adequate transparency and a viable role for the U.S. both in the
selection of test flights for an exchange of telemetry and during

the annual exchange review.


7. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON