SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
4, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-017.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 4, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:10 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side gave an opening
statement on the U.S.-Russian agreement on the relationship between
missile defense and strategic offensive arms (SOA) as it related to
Russia's compromise on telemetry and the use of unique identifiers
(UIDs). Poznikhir stated that the United States had backed away
from its previous position on other issues as well. After the
statement the U.S. side asked questions to clarify the Russian
position on the most contentious points of its proposal, entitled
Basic Approaches of the Russian Side to the Exchange of Telemetric
Information, dated February 2. These points included: the
launching side determination of telemetry files for exchange; the
concept of parity; the elimination of self-contained dispensing
mechanism (SCDM) telemetry; the delay in implementation of
telemetry exchange; and the suspension of the exchange in the event
of a disagreement. The most enlightening clarification was in
response to questions about suspending the exchange in the case of
disagreement. The Russian side asserted that if it had concerns
about the development of a U.S. missile defense system or the use
of telemetric data to support missile defense system development,
then Russia would be forced to suspend the exchange of telemetric
data. The other Russian verbal responses confirmed what was in
Russia's written proposal: parity would not be determined by type
of flight test, either ICBM or SLBM; the initial exchange of
telemetric information would occur after a complete calendar year
had expired; choice of which flight tests to be exchanged would be
determined solely by the conducting Party; and a Party could not
request the exchange of telemetric data for a specific flight test
of the other Party. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Poznikhir Opening Statement; Siemon
Responds to Statement; U.S. Questions on Russian Approach to
Telemetry; Flight Test Versus Launch; What Parity Means.



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POZNIKHIR OPENING STATEMENT

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5. (S) Poznikhir began the meeting with a strong statement on what
he described as "the U.S.-Russian agreement on strategic offensive
forces and missile defense" as it related to the Russian position
on telemetry and the use of UIDs. Poznikhir emphasized that the
agreement by the Russian side to include provisions for the
exchange of telemetry was only possible if the United States
honored its agreement to include provisions in the treaty text on
the relationship between strategic offensive forces and missile
defense. Acceptance by the Russian side of the use of UIDs was
also only possible if the United States honored its commitment to
delete specific treaty provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of
ICBMs. The Russian side believed that the United States was now
moving away from the agreements reached during the meetings between
Admiral Mullen-General Makarov in January in Moscow on the
interrelationship between missile defense and SOA and on the
requirement to delete treaty provisions that were specific only to
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. If the United States did not
honor its commitments in these two areas, the Russian side would be
forced to move away from the inclusion of telemetry and UIDs in the
treaty.




6. (S) The Russian side noted that it expected to receive a
proposal from the U.S. side on Saturday, February 6, updating its
position on the relationship between missile defense and SOA.
After a review of this proposal the Russian side would determine
either that it was ready to move forward or whether it would step
back as Russia believed the United States had done. The Russian
side emphasized that it would not accept any one-sided provisions
or obligations within the new treaty.



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SIEMON RESPONDS TO STATEMENT

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7. (S) Siemon noted that the relationship between missile defense
and SOA was important to discuss, but not within the Telemetry
Working Group. It was natural for each side to review its
positions and sometimes view the other side as walking back. Each
side had ideas on what it had given up. He believed that no one
from the U.S. side who had attended the recent Mullen-Makarov
Moscow meetings came away with this understanding of the Russian
position on either the relationship between telemetry and missile
defense or the relationship between UIDs and mobile ICBMs. Siemon
commented that there had been no mention of missile defense
concerns during the portions of the Mullen-Makarov meetings when he
was in the main conference room. Ending the discussion on
Poznikhir's statement, Siemon noted that neither side should enter
into an agreement if it believed it was placed at a disadvantage.



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U.S. QUESTIONS ON RUSSIAN

APPROACH TO TELEMETRY


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8. (S) After this preliminary discussion, Siemon asked questions
related to the Russian proposal on Basic Approaches of the Russian
Side to the Exchange of Telemetric Information, dated February 2,

2010.



Begin text.



Proposal by the Russian Federation



2 February 2010



Basic approaches of the Russian side to the exchange of telemetric
information




1. Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity
basis, on no more than five ICBM and SLBM launches per year.

The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an
equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches conducted by the Parties,
and in an agreed amount.




2. The launches, for which telemetric information will be
provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party.




3. As part of the annual exchange of telemetric information, the
Parties shall provide the recording media and interpretive data of
the telemetric information provided.

The recording media should contain the recording of all telemetric
information, broadcast during the launch, until the upper stage
propulsion unit of the ICBM and SLBM ceases to function.



Telemetric information relating to the functionality of the
self-contained dispensing mechanism, and produced within the
re-entry vehicle and broadcast from it, shall not be exchanged.




4. Parties shall not broadcast telemetric information related to
the functioning of ICBM and SLBM stages from a re-entry vehicle.




5. Each Party shall carry out an initial demonstration of the


recording media and playback equipment to be used, and shall
provide to the other Party all associated equipment.




6. The Party conducting the launch of ICBMs or SLBMs shall
independently determine the method for recording telemetric
information on the recording media. In connection with this, it
shall provide to the other Party the method to playback the
telemetric information from the recording media, enabling
conversion of the telemetric information contained on the recording
media to the format produced on board the missile before it is
broadcast.



Types of modulation, methods, modes and formats of recording, as
well as methods of telemetric information encryption on recording
media used by the Parties shall not impede the processing of the
telemetric information provided by the other Party.




7. Considering that the new agreement does not contain
limitations which could be verified with the help of telemetric
information, the names of parameters, necessary for determining
acceleration and separation times of ICBM and SLBM stages, as well
as the times of reentry vehicle separation commands and their
location in the telemetry frame shall not be specified in the
annual data exchange on ICBM and SLBM launches.




8. During ICBM and SLBM launches, the telemetric information of
which will not be exchanged, each Party shall have the right to use
any method to prevent access to all data as well as to any part of
the telemetric information that originates on board the missile and
is broadcast or encapsulated.




9. The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out
within the first 65 days after the beginning of the calendar year
for launches that were conducted in the previous year.




10. The provisions on the exchange of telemetric information shall
take effect on the first calendar day of the year following the
year in which the Treaty entered into force.




11. On an annual basis, the Parties shall review the conditions
and procedures for future exchange of telemetric information on
ICBM and SLBM launches within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission. In the event that one of the Parties
raises a question as to the need for changing the amount and volume
of the telemetric information provided, the exchange of telemetric
information shall be suspended until an agreement on this change
can be reached.




12. The basic provisions that govern the conditions and method for


the exchange of telemetric information shall be set forth within
the Protocol to the Treaty. Additional details of telemetric
information exchange shall be specified in the Annex on procedures
for the exchange of telemetric information.



End text.




9. (S) Siemon asked what the status was of the three telemetry
paragraphs for the Protocol that the sides had agreed on at the
last meeting in Moscow. Poznikhir believed the paragraphs in the
Protocol needed to be broader. He believed the sides together
should decide what belonged in the Protocol and what should be put
into the Tier III Annex. In START, the main ideas were placed in
the Protocols and the details were placed in the Annexes. He
believed the sides should follow this example; however, the Russian
side was waiting for the U.S. position on this question. Siemon
used START's treatment of the initial demonstration of playback
equipment as an example of the U.S. position. The START Telemetry
Protocol included the broader concept of the demonstration and the
Annexes included the many details.




10. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side would take the agreed language
of the three paragraphs and work it into a draft Protocol. The
sides could use this draft to determine what should be included in
the Protocol and what could be placed into the Tier III Annex. A
decision could also be made about which provisions would be
recorded in the annex and which would be better resolved through
discussion within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).




11. (S) While on the subject of the initial demonstration of
playback equipment, Siemon asked whether it was sufficient to
provide information for purchase of commercially-available
equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration. Poznikhir
replied that a Party should have the ability to procure both the
equipment used in START and newly demonstrated equipment. He did
not clarify who would be responsible for the purchase. When asked
whether it was necessary to conduct demonstrations if the equipment
purchased during START was still functioning, Col Ryzhkov indicated
that he believed that demonstrations would still be necessary.



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FLIGHT TEST VERSUS LAUNCH

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12. (S) In reference to the text in the Russian proposal on
telemetry language, Siemon asked why the Russian side had changed
the agreed language to use the term "launch" versus the term
"flight test." Ryzhkov replied that under START the Parties had
exchanged telemetry on both test launches and space launches that
incorporated a first stage of an accountable item. However, the
example that the Russian delegation preferred to follow was the


Agreement Between the United States of America and the Soviet
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles, dated May 31, 1988. This agreement used the
term "launch" which was considered broader language and covered all
types of launches. Poznikhir noted that with the expiration of
START, the 1988 agreement was the only existing agreement outlining
launch notification obligations--it had no expiration date and it
unambiguously described information related to launches.




13. (S) Siemon stated that most launches in START were test
launches that used ICBMs or SLBMs that were accountable under the
treaty. There also were space launches to place objects into the
upper atmosphere or space and these typically used the first stage
of accountable ICBMs and SLBMs. These two types of launches were
the only test launches that were subject to the START Treaty.
Siemon indicated that there were other launches that used
accountable first stages that were not test launches--for example,
the launch to destruct 40 SS-N-20 SLBMs in the late 1990s. These
launches were exempted from the exchange of telemetry since they
did not have telemetry packages. Siemon asked whether the Russian
side believed this type of launch would also be exempt from
telemetry exchange under the new treaty. Poznikhir responded that
he believed this would be the case, but added they could add
telemetry packages if the U.S. side thought they should. Siemon
responded that the United States would prefer that Russia not add a
telemetry package and that launches to destruct be excluded from
the telemetry exchange.



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WHAT PARITY MEANS

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14. (S) In reference to the exchange of telemetry, Siemon asked
whether "on a parity basis" meant a "one-for-one exchange" for each
ICBM and SLBM flight. Poznikhir indicated that parity was based on
quantity: an equal number of launches shared; no more than five.
Parity would not be determined by type of flight test, either ICBM
or SLBM. The Party that conducted the flight test would determine
on which test flights telemetric information would be exchanged.
The group collectively then went through several hypothetical,
numeric examples to describe parity. The Russian side believed
neither side should be forced to conduct a flight test if its
numbers were disparate. He indicated the receiving Party would
have no part in this selection. Poznikhir said this language was a
clear and purposeful Russian choice. Following this line of
questioning, Siemon asked when a flight test of a prototype was
conducted could the receiving Party request that the telemetry from
this specific flight test be part of the exchange. Poznikhir
responded negatively; the conducting Party solely selected the
launches to be exchanged. Ms. Pura asked whether discussions would
be conducted throughout a year to determine on which flight tests
telemetry would be exchanged. Poznikhir responded that as the
Russian text proposed, the exchange of telemetric information would
be carried out within the first 65 days after the beginning of the
calendar year for launches that were conducted in the previous
year. No other discussions were necessary. After being

questioned, Poznikhir also indicated that telemetry would be
exchanged through Diplomatic Channels. The details of implementing
the exchange could be located in the Annex.




15. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side needed to clearly understand
the entire process of the selection and exchange of telemetric
information prior to the treaty and protocol being sent for
signature. This was especially important since the annex would be
part of the ratification package.




16. (S) Siemon asked about the Russian-proposed provision for the
exchange of telemetric information to take effect on the first
calendar year following the year when the treaty entered into
force. When would the first exchange occur if the treaty entered
into force in 2010? Poznikhir responded that the first exchange
would be in January 2012. Siemon replied that basing the exchange
on the calendar year would result in a time period where the
implementation of a treaty requirement would be denied. This would
mean that for the START Follow-on Treaty, which was to have a
duration of 10 years, there would only be 9 years of
implementation. For past treaties, the concept of a treaty year
had been used rather than a calendar year chosen by one of the
Parties. Poznikhir stated he would take this issue back to his
lawyers for discussion.




17. (S) Referencing the text on the annual review for further
exchange of telemetric information to be held within the framework
of the BCC, Siemon stated he was confused by the Russian use of the
word "suspended." He understood that after the last Mullen-Makarov
meeting that Parties would meet annually to agree on the exchange
of telemetric information and if agreement did not occur, the
Parties would continue the existing practice. He had expected to
see the word "continued" and was surprised to see "suspended" in
the Russian-proposed text. Was the Russian use of "suspended" a
mistake? Poznikhir replied to this well-developed question with a
very short answer: "No, there was no mistake in the Russian
proposal." If telemetry was being used to enhance missile defense,
this raised a question with regard to Russian national security.




18. (S) During this discussion of annual reviews of the proposed
exchange of telemetric data, General Venevtsev reiterated that if
Russia had concerns about the development of a U.S. missile defense
system or the use of telemetric data to support missile defense
system development, then Russia would be forced to suspend the
exchange of telemetric data.




19. (U) Documents provided: None.




20. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Ahlm

Mr. Dean

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. LaPointe

Ms. Pura

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Mr. Luchaninov

Mr. Malyugin

Col Pischulov

Col Ryzhkov

Gen Venevtsev

Col Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON