SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION FORUM (SDCF)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 000053

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2020
TAGS: PREL MRRR PARM PINS AS JA
SUBJECT: SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION FORUM (SDCF)
READOUT

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Edgard D. Kagan for reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Delegations from the United States,
Australia, and Japan met in Sydney on November 23, 2009 for
the third Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF). The
U.S. delegation was co-chaired by Assistant Secretary of
State for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs Wallace "Chip" Gregson. Over two days, the
conference tackled a wide-ranging agenda. There was general
agreement on most issues, but the conference continued to
highlight the need for greater coordination among the three
countries on many security-related issues. Some of the key
outcomes included:

--Continued importance of building a viable trilateral
information sharing mechanism among the three countries.

--An agreement to conduct a desktop exercise featuring a
disaster relief scenario early next year.

--Australia will prepare a paper detailing opportunities for
further partnership among the three countries in maritime
security.

--An agreement to better coordinate the schedule of military
exercises. An open invitation was also offered for Japan to
observe the U.S.-Australia Talisman Sabre exercises, and
Australia asked to observe the U.S.-Japan KEEN SWORD/EDGE
exercises.

--Australia will prepare a paper on maritime security
cooperation for presentation at the next intercessional
meeting of the SDCF.

--Australia will host the next director-level intercessional
meeting in May or June 2010.

END SUMMARY.

Information Sharing and Security
--------------


2. (C) Information sharing has continued to improve, but all
agreed that establishment of a formal information sharing
mechanism between Australia and Japan remains a top priority.
Japan and Australia are currently in the midst of
negotiations on a legally binding information sharing
agreement and hope to have it finalized by late 2010.
According to Nobushige Takamizawa, Director General of the
Defense Policy Bureau for the Japanese Ministry of Defense,
the new Japanese government is looking to create a unified,
government-wide regime for handling classified information.
The United States and Japan recently traded visits to observe
one another's procedures for handling classified information,
as called for in the bilateral General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
--------------


3. (C) Australia, Japan, and the United States agreed that
it is important for the three countries to better coordinate
future responses to disasters and humanitarian crises. The
three delegations viewed the joint responses to the
earthquake in Indonesia and the tsunami in Samoa as
successes, but said that those efforts also highlighted the
need and opportunity for greater coordination. Australian
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence for Strategy Peter
Jennings called on the three sides to hold a meeting of key
HA/DR planners, and suggested that the Australian draft
tabletop exercise currently scheduled for February might be
the right opportunity. As directed in the 2006 Pacific
Global Air Mobility Seminar terms of reference, the three
countries plan to develop SOPs for airlifts and air
refueling. The Japanese delegation pushed hard for a mutual
Qrefueling. The Japanese delegation pushed hard for a mutual
logistics support agreement between Japan and Australia, like
the U.S.-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
(ACSA),which would allow more seamless cooperation between
Australian and Japanese forces in HA/DR operations.

Joint/Combined Training Opportunities
--------------


4. (C) The SDCF explored opportunities to expand and enhance

CANBERRA 00000053 002 OF 003


joint/combined training opportunities; however budgetary
constraints and real-world demands on forces may limit what
is possible. Australia issued an open invitation to Japan to
observe Talisman Sabre, a major joint U.S.-Australia
exercise, and expressed interest in observing KEEN SWORD and
KEEN EDGE, major U.S.-Japan joint exercises. Australian
officials asserted that lack of access to Japanese airfields
limits their ability to participate in training exercises,
and all sides agreed to investigate this problem further.
The group also discussed expanding P-3 training
opportunities, possibly conducting a trilateral ground
exercise, and conducting a trilateral exercise based in Guam,
but all will require further discussion before any future
plans are finalized. Assistant Secretary Gregson also raised
the possibility of conducting training in the Freely
Associated States in the Western Pacific at some point in the
future.

Basing of Australian Aircraft
--------------


5. (C) Jennings pressed the United States and Japan to find
a way to extend the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to
cover Australian personnel embedded with U.S. forces and to
allow the basing of Australian aircraft for trilateral
exercises in Japan. This issue was referred to the
directors' meeting the following day, but no agreement was
reached, as Japan is unwilling to apply the U.S. SOFA to
Australians and Australia is reluctant to cede sovereignty of
its forces to the U.S. UCMJ. After a lengthy discussion, the
best Japan would offer was to examine this on a case-by-case
basis. Discussions will continue in the future.

Perspectives on China's Goals in the Region
--------------


6. (C) The SDCF agreed that China's short-term intentions
are peaceful, but questioned its long-term goals. Colonel
Frank Miller of the U.S. Joint Staff said that China's
ultimate goal is to perpetuate Communist Party rule. China
is seeking to ensure stability through economic growth and
has determined that peace is the best way to accomplish this.
Jennings noted that while China claims its intentions are
benign, its acquisition of force projection and asymmetrical
capabilities raises concerns about China's long-term intent.

Bilateral Military Engagement with China
--------------


7. (C) The three countries each outlined their bilateral
military engagement with the PRC. Both Japan and Australia
reported that they feel their bilateral engagement with China
has been productive. Australia has a major bilateral
exchange in 2010, along with a seminar on peacekeeping and a
military artistic exchange (i.e. military bands). Japan
expected that the Chinese defense minister will visit Japan
in late November. During the visit, Japan will propose
formalizing regular ministerial visits, bilateral ship
visits, and a trilateral China-Japan-South Korea forum. In
the next year, Japan also expects that its defense minister
will visit China. In closing, Australia stressed the need to
push for more substantive military engagement with China,
rather than just a formulaic exchange of visits.

North Korea
--------------


8. (C) The three delegations agreed that it is important to
persuade North Korea to return to the negotiating table, but
that they are not willing to offer concessions for promises
Qthat they are not willing to offer concessions for promises
the DPRK has already undertaken in previous rounds of
negotiations. All parties agreed that is was important that
China take a more active role with regard to North Korea.

Contributions to Afghanistan and Pakistan
--------------


9. (C) The three sides all summarized their current
commitments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and what future
contributions are under consideration. Australia reiterated
its stance that it will not assume Lead Nation Status in
Oruzgan Province after the Dutch withdraw in August 2010 and
that their current troop levels are "about right." Australia
plans to reassess the composition of its forces in
Afghanistan and significantly increase its civilian presence

CANBERRA 00000053 003 OF 003


there. Takamizawa said that the new Japanese government
wants to make a unique contribution to Afghanistan, but has
ruled out sending military forces. Japan is unlikely to make
any decision about involvement in Afghanistan in the near
future beyond its November 2009 pledge of $5 billion for
disarmament, reintegration, and civilian security sector
assistance. In Pakistan, Australia highlighted expanded
training of Pakistani police forces and Japan its civilian
aid program.

Missile Defense Cooperation
--------------


10. (C) The three countries expressed optimism for future
cooperation on bilateral missile defense. Takamizawa and
Deputy ASD Robert Scher both hoped that the U.S. and Japan
would be able to broaden their cooperation on missile
defense. Takamizawa said that in the near future missiles
based in Japan may help keep the U.S. safe due to the
increasing range of North Korean missiles, and that it may be
time to debate changing Japan's interpretation of its
constitution to allow this. Australia was more cautious on
missile defense, stating that it supports it so long as it
does not upset the regional balance of power. Australia will
host the Trilateral Missile Defense Forum in the first half
of 2010.

Maritime Security
--------------


11. (C) The conference acknowledged the great successes that
the three countries have had working together on maritime
security and called for improved coordination. The three
delegations praised the success of anti-piracy efforts in the
Gulf of Aden, where all three countries are engaged. Each
country outlined its current maritime security efforts in the
Asia-Pacific and stressed the need for improved coordination
of these efforts. There was a consensus that building the
capacity of Asia-Pacific nations to deal with their own
maritime security concerns is key to this effort.

Counter-Proliferation
--------------


12. (C) The group praised the success of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and discussed proliferation
concerns in North Korea and Burma. DAS Tony Foley of the
Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation
complimented both Japan and Australia for their strong
leadership role in the PSI and stressed the need for them to
continue in that regard. He highlighted President Obama's
call to make PSI an enduring international institution and
emphasized that this did not mean the PSI would evolve to a
traditional international organization and that PSI would
retain its flexibility. He stated that the United States is
developing the terms of reference to implement its role as
the PSI Point of Contact and would share that with the OEG
states. Responding to his query regarding hosting of the PSI
Operational Experts' Group meeting, the Japanese side stated
it had committed to do so but could not confirm yet that it
would as the budgetary request has not yet been approved.
Foley announced that Burma had recently agreed to implement
UN Security Council Resolution 1874.


13. (U) This cable has been cleared by DOS/PM, DOS/ISN,
DOS/EAP, DOS/S/SRAP, DOD/OSD.
BLEICH