Nonproliferation Meetings in Cairo: UNSCR 1540 Workshop and

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 CAIRO 000366

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC KNNP UN ETRD PBTS PREL EG CF CG KE MO NI GH
UG, NO, EUN, SF
SUBJECT: Nonproliferation Meetings in Cairo: UNSCR 1540 Workshop and
EXBS Bilaterals with Egypt


1. (U) Key Points: -- A United Nations multilateral workshop
for African countries on implementation of UNSCR 1540 was held
December 7-10, 2009 in Cairo. The workshop focused on countering
WMD proliferation through strengthened border controls.



-- U.S. -Egypt bilaterals on the margins of the workshop confirmed
GOE interest in technical assistance related to the WMD
non-proliferation goals of UNSCR 1540, and provided under the USG's
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. USG
assistance offer was sent to MFA February 1, 2010.



-- The UN workshop provided a platform for government
representatives from the African continent and various
international and regional organizations to discuss efforts and
subject areas related to their implementation of UNSCR 1540,
particularly the main elements of border and export and
transshipment controls.



-- Additional themes highlighted throughout the UN workshop were
connecting potential assistance programs with the needs identified
by participating member states, as well as enhancing cooperation
with international or regional organizations in provision of such
assistance. Effective use of the 1540 Assistance Template was
encouraged throughout the event as a means to request assistance.




2. (U) Workshop Background: UNSCR 1540 obligates all UN Member
States to develop and maintain "appropriate, effective" measures to
improve their indigenous capabilities to counter proliferation of
WMD against, inter alia, terrorist threats. The resolution has
also established a Committee responsible for implementation (the
Committee). In 2008, the Security Council unanimously agreed to
UNSCR 1810, renewing the Committee for an additional three years.
UNSCR 1810 also outlines funding mechanisms, including voluntary
contributions such as those used in support of this workshop, which
was organized by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs with funding
from the Governments of Norway, the United States, and the European
Union. There had been two (1540-focused workshops) already,
though the Cairo meeting was the first one focused on a specific
element of 1540.



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Opening Remarks

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3. (U) The Cairo workshop was well attended by representatives
from Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco,
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Republic of Congo. Charge
Matthew Tueller provided USG opening remarks; Khaled Shamaa, Deputy
Assistant Foreign Minister for Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs provided opening remarks for Egypt. Shamaa stated
that countries that are not NPT members are a threat to
international security. He also stated that state actors who
possess nuclear weapons are also a threat to international and
regional security. Daniel Shepherd, UNSCR 1540 Vice Chairman,
stated that Africa is vulnerable to terrorist attacks and it is
important that countries have necessary measures in place to
protect material such as uranium or radiological facilities that
exist in some countries in the region. Annalisa Giannela, European
Union, remarked that UNSCR 1540 reinforces the need to control WMD
material and illicit trafficking. She also pointed out that the
European Union has pilot projects to assist countries (Morocco,
United Arab Emirates) to implement export controls. Heidi
Johansen, First Secretary, Embassy of Norway gave opening remarks;

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she said Norway supports President Obama's vision of a world free
of nuclear weapons.



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Regional Themes

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4. (U) Several themes emerged during the formal and informal
sessions. Of particular note was the repeated focus on utilizing
regional and sub-regional organizations to establish cooperative
efforts, strategies, and mechanisms in Africa. The participants
pointed out that the resolution is complex and difficult to
implement for small countries that are poor and lack resources and
expertise. Also, some participants from Ghana and Republic of
Congo said the priority for most of the countries in the region is
poverty, disease, and clean water, not proliferation of WMD. They
also noted this topic is new for many of the countries, creating a
need to make their leadership aware of the issue. Many of the
African countries have not submitted a report to the UNSCR 1540
Committee, the most fundamental step to receive assistance. Mr.
O'Neil Hamilton, UNSCR 1540 Caribbean Regional Coordinator,
mentioned most of the country reports had information that could be
assessed. The Kenya delegation noted collection of revenue is the
priority for Kenya, rather than export controls or border security.
The Uganda delegation pointed out that in Africa there are
artificial borders, with families divided between countries and
effectively free movement of persons, making difficult any
imposition of border controls. However, all participants requested
further discussions on engagement for export controls and border
security and asked how their governments can request such
engagement with USG and other assistance programs.



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Country Presentations

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Democratic Republic of Congo

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5. (U) The delegation from the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) described DRC's regulations on mining, nuclear energy, bio
products, chemical materials, membership in various
nonproliferation regimes, and the Pelindaba Treaty. The delegation
acknowledged the need to modernize many existing regulations. DRC
noted that its assistance request has gone unanswered by the UNSCR
1540 Committee, and stated that DRC needs international support to
develop legal infrastructure related to WMD; the DRC added that
their enforcement agencies were underdeveloped and needed
assistance. DRC also stated that proliferation is not an African
priority compared to development issues (i.e., refugees, security,
nutrition, water) and that if awareness is not raised
continent-wide the issue will continue to be seen as irrelevant.
DRC representatives noted difficulty with border security given
that it is a large nation with multiple neighbors (nine in all),
and that post-war conflict conditions also apply. DRC identified
two areas requiring immediate assistance: 1) uranium mine security,
and 2) a system of protection on the borders.



Congo

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6. (U) The delegation from the Republic of Congo discussed
Congo's progress to address proliferation issues. Congo acceded to
the CWC, the focus of which is on prevention of CWC-related
terrorist attacks, even though Congo does not develop or
manufacture any chemicals. The delegation mentioned that Congo has
established a national committee to assess 1540 implementation and
suggested there should be regional and sub-regional levels for 1540
implementation to enhance cooperation and integration. During the
bilateral discussion, the delegation mentioned that Congo needs
equipment to improve its border security.



Egypt

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7. (U) The Government of Egypt (GOE) presented Egypt's efforts to
meet UNSCR 1540 obligations. Egypt said it has 1540 implementing
legislation and is in the process of passing new nuclear energy
regulations that will take precedent over all other laws related to
nuclear material, transportation, ownership and licensing and
includes punitive measures. The new law is expected to be passed
in March 2010. Egypt did not mention in the UN setting any
challenges in implementation or any need for assistance. Egypt
insisted that nonproliferation must be paired with disarmament.



Ghana

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8. (U) Ghana mentioned that it has regulations for food safety.
Ghana's enforcement agencies have the right to stop and inspect any
arms cargo and has a border patrol unit within the Ghana
Immigration Service (GIS) which is focused on liberalization of
movement for people and trade. A Terrorist Interdiction
Program/Personal Identification, Secure Comparison & Evaluation
System (TIP/PISCES) capability is installed at only four main ports
of entry. Ghana considers transit cargo its highest
threat/vulnerability and is considering installation of additional
scanners. Ghana requested assistance with physical infrastructure,
institution building, capacity building, and acquisition of
state-of-the-art equipment and technology. Ghana requires
mandatory examinations for radiological sources and electronic
goods, chemicals, food and drugs. During bilateral discussions,
Ghana requested workshops to be held in Ghana to better understand
WMD issues and also requested training to identify WMD commodities
and equipment to detect them. Ghana is currently working with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection on inspection techniques and
procedures, but their equipment is inadequate and has no technical
expertise.



Kenya

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9. (U) Kenya noted existing legislation is not specific to
implementation of 1540 obligations. Customs' primary function is
revenue generation - 40% of government revenues come from Customs
duties on imports. Other priorities, in diminishing order, include
trade facilitation, enforcement, compiling trade statistics, and
finally enforcing regional and international agreements (i.e.,
1540). Kenya does not have WMD subject matter experts, but has

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benefitted from received limited seminars through the EXBS program.
Kenyan customs conducts limited inspections for imports and
exports. Kenya has scanners and cameras at the port of Mombasa,
but scans only imports not exports. Kenya claims to have a
targeting center and conducts limited targeting and risk management
and requires advanced manifests. In 2008, Kenya began negotiations
with the Department of Energy/Megaports program to install
radiation portal monitors at the port of Mombasa. Kenya has
limited patrol boats to secure its coastline, but the delegation
mentioned the USG has provided radiation pagers and K9 unit in
Mombasa and Nairobi airport. The delegation commented their focus
is on imports for tariff collection, and recommended caution, as
anything that interferes with exports will be opposed and/or seen
as more of a benefit to the United States than Kenya.



Morocco

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10. (U) The Moroccan delegation highlighted the link between
terrorism and proliferation, particularly with regards to
transshipment. Morocco has draft export control legislation that
is going through an inter-ministry review. The delegation also
heighted its cooperation on this issue with the United States, and
EU.



Nigeria

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11. (U) Nigeria's primary legislation addressing nonproliferation
policy stems from adherence to the NPT, CWC, and BTWC. Nigeria has
a National Nuclear Security Committee comprised of several agencies
including military, Customs, Police, Internal Security and their
National Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA). NNRA is responsible
for administering nuclear regulations including licensing to use,
import, export, and transfer nuclear and related materials. NNRA
has collaborated with the IAEA to repatriate sources to their
country of origin, and has received equipment training from DOE.
The delegation stated Nigeria has one point of entry for
radiological sources, Lagos International Airport, which also has a
portal radiation monitor provided by the European Union. Nigeria
has an active BWC Advisory Committee to assist with compliance with
OPCW and BWC and has received security service training and
provision of equipment through the IAEA. During the bilateral
discussion, the delegation requested explosives detection support
for Nigeria's police, especially using a train-the-trainer
approach; discussed border challenges including lack of equipment
to detect WMD or other contraband; noted inspection rates at
airports are very low; and requested assistance in
capacity-building for Customs.



South Africa

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12. (U) The only participant from South Africa was a
representative from its UN mission in New York, who noted South
Africa is considered a developing country but has advanced
technology and industrial sectors. The delegate stated South
Africa is a member of all the international and multilateral
regimes, yet supports Non-Aligned Movement policy stances. South
Africa's Nonproliferation Act (Act 87) of 1993, amended in 1995 and
1996, governs all nonproliferation policy and controls, including
export controls. The implementation of UNSCRs is managed by South

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Africa's constitution.



Uganda

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13. (U) Uganda borders five countries and is a major transit
route. There is no permit or license requirement for goods in
transit and the country is in the process of purchasing a cargo
tracking system to monitor the movement of transit traffic.
Uganda's controls focus on stopping any diversion into the domestic
market, so as to safeguard revenue collection; its controls
therefore focus only on imports. Export and import declarations
are automated. There are 34 customs stations linked together
through a computer network. Uganda has close customs cooperation
with bordering nations, especially under sub-regional
organizations, East African Community (EAC),which covers three
bordering countries and a customs union protocol, and COMESA
(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). Uganda often
shares advanced data and holds joint border patrols with the Kenyan
Revenue Authority (KRA) - and described Kenya as the "gateway to
the region" for trade. Police and military cooperation in the EAC
is under the Peace and Security Committee. Uganda also has a
national task force to stop small arms. Uganda's challenges, as
described, include limited cooperation with the DRC and Sudan;
porous and artificial borders (though communities straddle the
border with frequent cross-border movement, cooperation between
local border communities is good); limited resources (with priority
for resource allocation given to revenue-generating activities);
and political instability which increases potential for illicit
trade. During bilateral discussions, the delegation requested
border security assistance and more information on export control
legislation.



U.S. - Egypt Bilaterals

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14. (SBU) In a U.S.-Egypt bilateral on the margins of the
workshop, First Secretary Ahmed Shandawily of MFA's Disarmament
Division, which reports to Khaled Samaa (para 3 above) supported
the idea of additional export control cooperation. Mr. Shandawily
stated that he would brief the Minister of available training and
provide a response to Embassy Cairo on any training or assistance
related to USNCR 1540 that USG offers.




15. (SBU) USG's UN workshop delegation head, Varvara Psaros, from
ISN/ECC and Embassy Econoff held separate bilaterals with Egyptian
officials, at the Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA) and MFA December
8 and 10. Psaros and Econoff met with Ms. Neveen El-Husseiny,
First Secretary, in MFA's Americas Division, to brief her on the
EXBS program and urge further engagement on export controls with
the GOE. Ms. El-Husseiny was familiar with UNSCR 1540 and said
cooperation with the EXBS program would benefit Egypt. However,
the EXBS program would need to provide a specific assistance
proposal for the Minister to review. Also, Psaros and Emboff
called separately on Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA),
Commissioner, Ahmed Farag Seoudi, and Mr. Galal Ibrahim Abo
El-Fotouh, Customs Advisor to the Minister of Finance and former
ECA Commissioner. Both welcomed USG training and equipment aimed
at enhancing border security and reiterated the success of the
August 2009 International Border Security Training held for ECA in
Cairo. ECA asked that USG route any proposed training to ECA via
MFA before scheduling any follow-on training and procurement of
equipment.

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16. (SBU) Subsequently, Embassy Cairo received proposed training
menu from Department EXBS authorities (ISN) and on February 1
passed the training menu to MFA, which confirmed receipt and
promised to share with Egyptian Customs, Maritime Authority, and
other GOE technical agencies as appropriate.




17. (SBU) A draft of this cable was cleared with the U.S. UNSCR
1540 Coordinator Thomas Wuchte in ISN/CPI. For further information
and background on the EXBS program, please contact Thomas Wuchte at
WuchteTA@state.gov.
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