Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BUJUMBURA37
2010-01-19 10:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Bujumbura
Cable title:  

UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF EXTREMIST CELL IN BURUNDI

Tags:  ASEC BY PTER 
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O 191045Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1956
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000037 


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS: ASEC BY PTER
SUBJECT: UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF EXTREMIST CELL IN BURUNDI

Classified By: CDA Judy Buelow for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000037


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS: ASEC BY PTER
SUBJECT: UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF EXTREMIST CELL IN BURUNDI

Classified By: CDA Judy Buelow for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (S) Summary. On 17 January, the founder of the MSD
political party, Alexis Sinduhije, met with RSO Bujumbura.
Sinduhije requested this meeting to report his knowledge of
a possible terrorist cell in Burundi. Sinduhije stated one
of his party members had learned that two Arabs and four
Somalis had arrived in Burundi, and planned to hold a
meeting of Burundian youth in a mosque in the northern city
of Ngozi. The source was unable to provide specifics, but
he was suspected the proposed meeting was linked to Islamic
militancy. RSO relayed Sinduhije,s source's name and
contact information to RAO Kigali. RSO and RAO are yet unable
to determine whether there are truly any suspicious
foreigners or activity, or what motives are behind the
supposed meeting and recruitment of Burundian youth. End
Summary.


2. (S) RSO Bujumbura held a meeting with MSD party founder
and politician Alexis Sinduhije at his request at the
Chancery on 17 January at 1930. RAO was present at the
Chancery, but remained in another room; ARSO related the
meeting's progress under pretense of leaving the meeting to
call a Kigali-based counterterrorism specialist on a secure
phone. Sinduhije stated that on 14 January, he met with a
Muslim MSD party member from the northern city of Ngozi
(Source). Source is affiliated with a particular mosque in
Ngozi.


3. (S) In his meeting with Sinduhije, Source stated that
al-Shabaab was in Burundi, but could not provide specific
evidence of this. Source claimed a Burundian who had studied
theology in Nairobi had returned to Burundi and begun to make
preparations for the arrival of six others, two Arabs and
four Somalis. Source stated the group contacted him and
asked him to participate in a meeting of Muslim youth to
occur on 22 January; source was suspicious of the group and
believed they fit a pattern of enticing young Muslims towards
radical ideology in preparation for enacting a terrorist
plot. Source requested permission from Sinduhije to attend
the meeting, which Sinduhije granted.


4. (S) Sinduhije stated he was bringing the information to
the US Embassy because the Burundian national intelligence
service (SNR) is his number one enemy. Sinduhije therefore
believed that if he brought this information to the Burundian
authorities himself, he would be immediately arrested for
involvement in a terrorist plot or held indefinitely in the
general prison population for "investigative purposes," as is
common for witnesses in Burundi. (Sinduhije and many
political activists suspect that the SNR is behind
politically-motivated assassinations; they believe the
national intelligence agency is a tool of the ruling party.)
Sinduhije told us that to protect Burundi's security, he
must notify someone who could act on the information.


5. (S) Sinduhije could give no further information on
specific threats or plots, but stated Source would be willing
to share his information so long as he would not draw
unwarranted attention by doing so; RSO consulted with RAO and
offered the opportunity for Source to travel to Embassy
Kigali to share the confidential information. Using a
prepaid cell phone provided by RAO, Sinduhije contacted
Source and arranged a meeting. RSO further informed
Sinduhije that the matter would be best handled directly
between Embassy Kigali and Source, and that for everyone's
safety, Sinduhije should avoid further involvement. (Note:
RAO does not have an official liaison relationship with the
Burundian SNR, which has a record of serious human rights
abuses. RAO considers the SNR's level of professionalism to
be low, and does not believe it would investigate the
Source's allegations effectively. The meeting ended amiably
and RSO escorted Sinduhije out of the Chancery at 2130.


6. (S) Approximately 45 minutes after the meeting, DATT
received a telephone call from an apparently drunk Gilbert
Bulanje, Director of External Intelligence for the SNR,
Burundi's national intelligence service. Bulanje demanded to
know why the Embassy had met with Sinduhije on a Sunday
evening. The DAO deflected the question and notified RSO of
Bulanje's inquiry via encrypted radio. The following
morning, Bulanje, now sober, called the DATT again, and
demanded that DATT meet with the SNR Chief of Staff to
explain the Sunday night meeting. We are considering how, or
if, Post should respond to this request.


7. (S) Comment. Post remains wary of Sinduhije,s
intentions; he is a skilled political grandstander, and in
light of the minimal details known, Post is hesitant to draw
any conclusions. However, it stands to reason that Sinduhije
would be unwilling to deal with the SNR or Burundian National
Police, and Post feels his fears of arrest or worse in
connection with this information are valid. Post is
confident that direct contact between Source and RAO will be
effective in obtaining further details on the situation in
Ngozi, and devising a plan of action if warranted. End
Comment.


Buelow