DEPUTY GREAT LAKES ENVOY JIM YELLIN'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000073

C O R R E C T E D COPY: ADDED SPACES TO SEPERATE PARAGRAPHS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AF/C AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG BU RW BE
SUBJECT: DEPUTY GREAT LAKES ENVOY JIM YELLIN'S MEETING WITH
BELGIAN MFA

BRUSSELS 00000073 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: A/DCM Richard M. Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Introduction and Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) James Yellin, Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for
Africa,s Great Lakes region, met with Belgian MFA Africa
Division officials on December 18 after returning from his
travel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Burundi, and Rwanda with Roeland van de Geer, the EU Special
Representative for the Great Lakes Region. The meeting was
hosted by Africa Director General Renier Nijskens. Also
present were Foreign Minister Vanackere,s Africa Advisor
Karl D,haene, Congo Desk Officer Hugues Chantry, Jean-Michel
Dumont from van de Geer's office, and Poloff.


2. (C) Yellin said the U.S. places importance on
collaborating with the EU and Belgium on peace processes in
Africa. With regard to Burundi, he said that international
observers should be present before, during and after the
elections in 2010. The Belgian MFA officials agreed and said
they would examine the possibility of increasing the number
and length of stay of Belgian election observers.


3. (C) Dumont remarked that the FDLR had reorganized
effectively in the wake of the military operations against
them and had the initiative in eastern Congo. He said that
CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda seemed to be consolidating his
power over military units and the populace in Masisi to
protect himself in the event the Congolese government t@nder his International
CrimmaryQ` July 26, second round of presidential elections if
needed; July 28, Senate elected by Communal Councils;
September, lections for the Communal Councils and Hill
CQuncils. End note)


6. (C) Nijskens commented that Youssef Mahmoud, the head of
the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB),was concerned
about security during the elections and had asked UN planners
to come up with options for dealing with possible emergencies.

Congo
--------------


7. (C) Dumont from the office of the EU Special
Representative described the situation in North and South
Kivu as tense. He said the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) had reorganized into an efficient
organization in the wake of the military operations against
them and had the initiative in the Kivus. Although they had
lost important cassiterite mines, he noted, they continued to
exploit gold, timber, and charcoal. He suggested that MONUC
target military operations against FDLR military leaders in
the DRC.


8. (C) Dumont said the integration of the National Congress
for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and other armed groups
into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) had not taken place
as foreseen by the GoDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009..

BRUSSELS 00000073 002.3 OF 002


(Note: The March 23 agreement specifies that the CNDP will
transform itself into a political party and integrate its
fighters into the Congolese army and police. The GoDRC, for
its part, is required to establish a National Follow-Up
Commission and grant prominent government positions to CNDP
officials. Although the commission exists, its meetings have
been largely unproductive, and no CNDP officials have been
given national-level jobs in the GoDRC. End Note.)


9. (C) Dumont said the supposedly integrated army units
appear to be loyal to Bosco Ntaganda, not to the GoDRC.
Bosco seems to be pursing a two-pronged strategy of trying to
maintain good relations with both Kinshasa and Kigali, while
increasing his own control over local forces. According to
Dumont, Bosco has been delivering speeches in Masisi in North
Kivu asking the people of the province to rise up and join
him should he be arrested as required by the ICC warrant.
Dumont said that Bosco has access to funds from local
&taxation8 of approximately 250 thousand dollars per month.
Bosco's influence has risen in the east, Dumont said, while
Congolese central government authority, especially in Masisi,
has waned.


10. (C) Nijskens said that some governments, which he did not
specify, were uneasy with the perceived U.S. goal of
arresting Bosco soon and thought that it would be better to
wait. Dumont said he was told by GoDRC contacts that Bosco
would be arrested when the timing was convenient for the
GoDRC, and that Kinshasa might use his arrest as a
justification for withdrawing its opposition to an extension
of the mandate of MONUC. Dumont said that the government of
Rwanda was against Bosco's arrest at this time.


11. (C) Nijskens noted that Congolese president Kabila had
promised to hold local elections in February 2011 and
parliamentary and presidential elections on September 4,

2011. However, Nijskens continued, Congolese planning for
the elections is slow, and the government will be unable to
put in place the administrative and logistical mechanisms
needed to keep to this schedule. Dumont, by contrast,
believed that it would be possible to put in place the
necessary mechanisms but that the government would use
administrative and logistical problems as an excuse to delay
elections.

Rwanda
--------------


12. (C) The Belgian MFA officials said that Kagame is
concerned about the morale and loyalty of senior francophone
Tutsi army officers. To reduce the uneasiness of the Tutsi
francophone elite, Nijskens observed, Kagame had
reestablished diplomatic relations with France the same day
that Rwanda had joined the British Commonwealth.


13. (U) This message has been cleared by Yellin.

GUTMAN