S/GC SPECIAL ENVOY FRIED SEEKS WAY FORWARD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000174

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE AND S/GCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PTER BE
SUBJECT: S/GC SPECIAL ENVOY FRIED SEEKS WAY FORWARD ON
TUNISIAN DETAINEES WITH BELGIUM

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Eason, reason 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Daniel Fried, U.S. Special Envoy for
Guantanamo Closure, met on January 27 with Stefaan De Clerck,
Minister of Justice of Belgium and (separately) with Dirk
Wouters, Chief of Staff to Minister of Foreign Affairs Steven
Vanackere. S/E Fried was joined by Matt Olsen, the Director
of the Guantanamo Detainee Review Task Force. Deputy Chief
of Staff Marc Van Den Reeck attended the Wouters meeting on
the Belgian side. In both meetings, Fried briefed on his
latest discussions with European Union (EU) counterparts
regarding Guantanamo. Fried also sought to identify
acceptable ways for the Belgian government to receive two
Tunisian detainees who were convicted in 2004 (in absentia)
by Belgian courts of terrorism-related crimes. In the
primary meeting on this issue, De Clerck protested that his
ministry could not request the extradition of those two
detainees given the responsibility it would impose on him for
any national security threat posed by those individuals. In
the same line of reasoning, De Clerck allowed that if the two
Tunisians were present in Belgium by some other means, the
Ministry of Justice would seek their arrest and prosecution
in accordance with its duty to address the prior conviction.
S/E Fried accepted this as a way forward and offered that he
understood from the defense counsel for both individuals that
each would agree to the imposition of various security
measures if allowed to arrive in Belgium. In the later
meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Van Den Reeck
complained that the two posed a high security threat but that
their transfer to Belgium would result in a re-trial and
likely acquittal. Further to that reasoning, Van Den Reeck
contended that Belgium would have no legal basis under the
criminal justice system to monitor or control the Tunisians
if they were released immediately or after serving a
sentence, despite any voluntary security measures. At one
point, Van Den Reeck suggested the two simply be "sent to
Thomson" for indefinite detention. End Summary.

EU DISCUSSIONS
--------------


2. (SBU) S/E Fried reported on his other meetings in Brussels
with EU Parliamentarians and officials to update them on the
progress the United States has had in closing Guantanamo.
Fried specifically noted that he had thanked Belgium among
those governments which had resettled detainees (Belgium
resettled a Syrian detainee in October 2009). Fried informed
of his request to the EU and its Members for renewed
assistance to close Guantanamo, including for countries that
have not taken any detainees to do so while also asking
countries that have already taken detainees to consider
one-two more. Additionally, Fried and Olsen said that the
review of the 240 Guantanamo detainees (now at 192 remaining)
has been completed. There are still difficulties ahead,
especially in addressing the large Yemeni population
remaining at Guantanamo, but that there is still progress,
not least of which includes the help shown by European
governments to resettle detainees. (The list of European
countries that have resettled detainees
is currently at seven: France, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium,
Hungary, Slovakia, and Switzerland; Italy also received two
detainees, but for prosecution on criminal charges in Italian
courts. Spain, Bulgaria and Latvia have (or, in the case of
Latvia, will shortly) publicly announced their intention to
resettle detainees in the near term.)

BELGIUM,S RESETTLED DETAINEE
--------------


3. (C) De Clerck appreciated Fried,s public thanks for
Belgium,s reception of a Guantanamo detainee, noting
(accurately) that it was more than what some others in Europe
had done. De Clerck called the resettlement of the
individual difficult, but manageable. In the later meeting
at the MFA, Van den Reeck stated that he coordinates an
interagency monitoring group that addresses the former
detainee,s progress, especially in regard to security
measures in place to prevent the individual,s re-engagement.
Van den Reeck said that this is primarily done as a
contingency because the individual,s resettlement is
progressing well and without security concern.

NO OPTION BUT BELGIUM FOR THE TUNISIANS
--------------


4. (C) Fried explained to De Clerck that in the cases of Adel
Hakeemy and Hisham Sliti, two Tunisians whose cases had been
TUNISIAN DETAINEES WITH BELGIUM

discussed with the Belgians, their convictions in absentia by
Belgium make it impossible to resettle them in any other
country. Additionally, repatriation to Tunisia is not
possible at this time as it is more likely than not that they
would be mistreated if returned there. Fried eminded De
Clerck of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that had been
provided to the MOJ as an alternative to a formal extradition
request by Belgium. He noted that this type of arrangement
was done in the case of the two Tunisians transferred to
Italy for prosecution. Fried also conveyed a new offer
extended by the defense counsel for both Tunisians, that
those individuals would be willing to face trial in Belgium
and would additionally accede to voluntary and extended
security measures in order to facilitate their transfer.


5. (C) De Clerck opened by adamantly stating extradition was
not an option for Belgium. He explained that in balancing an
extradition request, he had to consider not only the rights
of the convicted individuals to an in-person trial (they were
convicted in absentia),but also the national security of
Belgium. Accordingly, given the profile of the two
Tunisians, his answer would have to be "no" to requesting an
extradition. Further, in addressing S/E Fried,s suggested
MOU arrangement, De Clerck dismissed it as a "fake"
extradition and not an acceptable basis for moving forward.
In both cases, De Clerck said, he would be responsible for
any bad act taken by those two individuals after their
transfer and eventual release into Belgium. Elaborating, De
Clerck assessed that although each had been sentenced to
three to four years of prison in 2004, when transferred and
re-tried -- as would be their right -- both would "be on the
street" again soon after their transfer. He mentioned that
the Belgian appellate court addressing their original
conviction will hold a hearing sometime in February, though
it may be postponed and was already postponed twice before.
The attorneys in Belgium for the two Tunisians are likewise
heavily pressuring the MOJ to extradite the individuals to
Belgium to appear at that hearing. If the two were present
in Belgium by some means other than an extradition, then of
course the MOJ would do its duty and provide them their right
to an in-person trial. S/E Fried said that the United States
could be flexible in how it might arrange the transfer of the
two Tunisians, but that the Belgian government would have to
allow for the transfer. The U.S. would not simply put them
on a commercial flight to Brussels.


6. (C) De Clerck repeated that even if they are convicted and
serve time, the Tunisians would eventually have to be
released. It is not good news to the Belgian public that the
GOB is "importing" such prisoners. De Clerck then introduced
that both Tunisians were formerly resident in Italy and asked
why the United States was not approaching Italy to take them.
Fried responded that the Italians have not expressed an
interest in either detainee and more to the point, Belgium
had convicted them and must therefore take responsibility.
In the later meeting at the MFA, Van den Reeck informed that
both Tunisians were also convicted in Italy, but that they
had been "graced". Throwing this out as another obstacle to
Belgium receiving them, Van den Reeck claimed that while
Belgium could not "grace" the men, it would have to clear up
with the Itthere was a
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7. (C) De Clerck Qmeeting by
highlighting: 1) working with the
detainees, lawyers to remove the extradition rQquest and
propose voluntary security measuresrequired for any
transfer; and 2) resolving a.y complications associated with
the former resdency of both individuals in Italy.
Fundamentally, De Clerck reiterated, Belgium does not ant to
be seen as officially saying that it wQnts the Tunisians.
Fried stressed that the USG cannot send them to Belgium
without some arragement, but that the exact shape this takes
iQ open for discussion.

STRONG PUSH-BACK FRM THE MFA
--------------

8 (C) In his meeting with Wouters and Van Den Reeck, S/E
Fried repeated the substance of his dicussion with De
Clerck, about which both had Qlready apparently been briefed.
Van Den RQeck was quick to take control of the conversation
from Wouters and to list why the transfer of the Tunisians to
Belgium is not a viable option. First, he claimed that

because both individuals had been sentenced in Belgium to
less time than they have already served in Guantanamo, he
feared a Belgian court would release them immediately, either
upon arrival or even if convicted in a new trial. On the
proposed solution of voluntary security measures, Van den
Reeck claimed that a Belgian court would not honor them and
that once released by the court, the two could simply ignore
or dissolve the agreement. Embassy Brussels A/PolCouns Kiene
suggested in response that the issue not be handled as a
criminal matter, but as an immigration matter, thereby
allowing for the imposition of voluntary measures. While Van
den Reeck conceded that this might be possible, he viewed
this as an unsatisfactory solution due to the fact that
Belgian security services consider these two a high security
risk and likewise there would not be the option of residency
in Belgium, only prolonged immigration detention. He
questioned aloud whether a removal proceeding would be
initiated to return them to Tunisia after being placed in
immigration detention and stated that even Amnesty
International had determined there is no path to integration
for these individuals in Belgium.


9. (C) Further speaking to the second prong of his opposition
to the transfer, Van den Reeck claimed that Belgian services
had determined both men are highly dangerous and connected to
terrorist networks. Likewise, Belgium could not treat them
as they did with the previously resettled Syrian detainee.
He wondered whether it might be better for them at Thomson
(the proposed U.S. detention facility),"where they belong."
Finally, Wouters added that the already resettled Syrian
detainee had specifically mentioned these two Tunisians as a
threat to his own personal security. S/E Fried noted that
the U.S. assessment of both Tunisians was that their threat
could be mitigated with appropriate security measures and
emphasized that there was no other resettlement possibility
for them given the Belgian conviction.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The Belgians are clearly digging in to resist the
transfer of the Tunisians to Belgium. Despite the 2004
convictions, De Clerck will not accede to an extradition or
quasi-extradition proceeding as it would make him the
responsible party for their transfer to Belgium at a time
when he,s already facing public pressure to make Belgium
safer. In the MFA, there is clear hostility to the idea of
either Tunisian resettling in Belgium outside of a prison.
In short, even with an agreement by the Tunisians to a list
of security measures, it will be difficult to implement an
arrangement to transfer the men, as neither the MOJ or MFA
will take responsibility for doing so.


11. (U) S/GC Special Envoy Fried has cleared this telegram.

GUTMAN
.