Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BERLIN95
2010-01-25 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMAN AMB. IN IRAN: TRANSITION TO "NORMAL"

Tags:  PREL GPGOV IR GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000095 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020
TAGS: PREL GPGOV IR GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN AMB. IN IRAN: TRANSITION TO "NORMAL"
DICTATORSHIP

BERLIN 00000095 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000095

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020
TAGS: PREL GPGOV IR GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN AMB. IN IRAN: TRANSITION TO "NORMAL"
DICTATORSHIP

BERLIN 00000095 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: Germany's new Ambassador to Iran, Bernd
Erbel noted that he had not been warmly received by the
Iranian government and that most European diplomats are
finding the environment in Tehran increasingly difficult to
work in. His impression after his first two and a half
months was that the regime remained too weak to make any
concessions internationally, and was focused on consolidation
of domestic power bases. He saw the regime shifting its
basis of legitimacy away from the theological towards a more
"normal" power-centric dictatorship based on an established
spoils system with the IRGC serving as the backbone of a
Supreme Leader/Ahmadinejad focused dictatorship. He
criticized the opposition for lacking a clear leader or
clearly defined goals and predicted the current regime would
be able to maintain technical control of the country for the
foreseeable future. Erbel cautioned that almost any
sanctions would have a negative effect on the Iranian
population, and that one should be careful in devising
sanctions not to inadvertently pour more money into
IRGC/government coffers. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
IRI - Less Islamic, Less Republican, More Dictatorial
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In discussions with Poloff on January 21, Erbel said
he thought the Iranian leadership, which he defined as
limited to Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) and Ahmadinejad, was
in the process of consolidating its domestic power base. He
noted that almost all recent appointments to high-level
positions reflected former classmates of Ahmadinejad's or
close colleagues from his IRGC days. He said the
SLK-Ahmadinejad alliance was not based on ideological
sympathy or any deeper loyalty, but was rather a "marriage of
convenience" in which each partner needed something from the
other. He said that "legitimacy" was less important to the
new power structure which was moving toward a "normal"
dictatorship with primary focus on maintenance of power
through financial incentives. The government was not
supported by clerical or moral legitimacy nor by
revolutionary ideology - but rather by cohorts within the
IRGC who receive sufficient benefits to keep them happy and

loyal (jobs, houses, University admission, healthcare, tax
free shopping privileges, etc.) He noted that not even the
Iranian constitution has much import any more. The Iranian
system of "checks and balances" with its many councils and
assemblies -- flawed as it may have been -- is now all but
meaningless.

3. (C) He said this doesn't mean the government won't call
on religion as a source of legitimacy when they think it can
be useful, but fundamentally they no longer care if they
are/are not truly religious or moral. Thus, he predicted
that treatment of citizens was likely to get worse in the
near future as long as the government thinks that will help
them centralize their power.

--------------
Gov't Weak - But Here to Stay
--------------


4. (C) Despite the weaknesses within the regime which he
thinks will prevent any kind of negotiated settlement to the
nuclear crisis -- as was seen during the domestic debate
around the TRR deal-- Erbel is convinced the government
remains technically in control of the country and will remain
so for the foreseeable future. He doesn't see regime change
as credible for the next few years, barring some sort of
catastrophic, unexpected event (death of SLK, assassination
of Ahmadinejad, emergence of a true leader from the
opposition.)
--------------
Weak Opposition - Also Here to Stay
--------------


5. (C) Erbel call the opposition movement "headless" and
lacking a common goal, but noted they were not going to go
away either. He said the opposition seeks more intervention
on the human rights front, but he is not sure the government
is susceptible to much pressure on this front.

--------------
Nuclear-Issue and Sanctions
--------------


6. (C) Erbel didn't offer much insight into how to resolve
the nuclear issue, though he thought Iranian ambitions were
limited to achieving "breakout capability." Erbel noted in
passing that the Iranian Ambassador in Berlin, Ali Reza
Sheikh Attar, as recently as January 21, tried to convince

BERLIN 00000095 002 OF 002


him that the Iranian government really is ready to reopen
talks on the TRR and would be willing to discuss the whole
"1200 kilograms being transferred in one shipment." Erbel
brushed off such comments (which he said tracked with what
Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Soltaneih also whispered in
private to his German counterparts) as desperate attempts to
try to buy more time by those who have little say in the
Tehran decision making structure .


7. (C) Erbel did caution that almost any sanctions will have
a negative effect on the Iranian population, and that given
the IRGC's domination of the economy, an attack on the IRGC
is also an attack on the economy at large. He added that one
should be careful in devising sanctions not to inadvertently
pour more money into IRGC/government coffers by making the
black market more lucrative, given that the IRGC had a
monopoly on smuggling (from drugs/alcohol to high end
machinery.) On measures to target regime elites he
questioned whether it was wise to cut off all EU travel since
that would in effect cut-off any chances for dialogue or
engagement.

-------------- --
Government Intimidation Is Scaring Away Contacts
-------------- ---


8. (C) Erbel, who arrived in Tehran in October 2009 is an
Arabist and has served primarily in the Middle East, with his
most recent assignments being Ambassador to Baghdad and
Cairo. Erbel complained that it is hard to get meetings with
Iranians. People are increasingly wary of contact with
Western Embassies. He said the photographing of Embassy
guests as they entered the residence for Germany's October 3
National Day celebrations sent a stark warning to many
Embassy contacts. While the Embassy's language school is
still heavily visited he said Iranians have started turning
down scholarships to study in Germany for fear of government
reprisals.
DELAWIE