Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BEIRUT89
2010-01-29 08:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

S/E MITCHELL RULES OUT FORCED NATURALIZATION OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MEPP KPAL SY IS LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1102
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0089/01 0290811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290811Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6425
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4298
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000089 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MEPP KPAL SY IS LE
SUBJECT: S/E MITCHELL RULES OUT FORCED NATURALIZATION OF
PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MEPP KPAL SY IS LE
SUBJECT: S/E MITCHELL RULES OUT FORCED NATURALIZATION OF
PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George
Mitchell affirmed to Lebanese President Michel Sleiman,
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and Foreign Minister Ali
Chami that the U.S. opposes the forced naturalization of
Palestinians in Lebanon under any circumstance. During his
January 19-20 visit to Beirut, S/E Mitchell also reiterated
that no regional peace deal would come at the expense of
Lebanon. All of his Lebanese interlocutors highlighted the
importance of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to the
stability of the rest of the region. Sleiman and Berri, in
particular, criticized Israel's perceived lack of commitment
to stability in the region and argued for continued U.S.
support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UN Special Coordinator
for Lebanon Michael Williams assessed that Israeli withdrawal
from northern Ghajar in Lebanon could be a catalyst for
advancing other regional initiatives, but cautioned that
either "we move forward or we move backwards; a decision has
to be made." Lebanese interlocutors again raised concerns
about new Transportation Security Administration guidelines
and H.R. 2278. (Special Envoy Mitchell's conversation with
PM Hariri is reported septel.) End Summary.

S/E MITCHELL: U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT TAWTEEN
--------------


2. (C) Special Envoy Mitchell reassured President Sleiman,
Speaker Berri and FM Chami that the U.S. would not conclude
any regional peace agreement at the expense of Lebanon. S/E
Mitchell reiterated that Lebanon was a valued ally and friend
of the U.S. and the U.S. would continue its full support for
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. To that end, S/E
Mitchell expressly confirmed that the U.S. would not support
the forced naturalization ("tawteen") of Palestinians in
Lebanon. (Note: S/E Mitchell first raised U.S. opposition to
tawteen with PM Hariri. End note.) This issue, he said,

would be for the GOL to decide. Sleiman and Chami responded
positively to these assurances and thanked the U.S. for its
continued support. Speaker Berri, in contrast, said that
while he appreciated the U.S. position, it would have no
bearing on how Lebanon's 18 recognized sectarian groups would
seek consensus among themselves for how to deal with the
status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT NECESSARY FOR REGION
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Sleiman, Berri and Chami agreed that solving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the most important item on
the regional agenda to maintain stability. Sleiman
encouraged U.S. leadership and persistence to get the parties
to reach an agreement. S/E Mitchell advised that this was
exactly his mandate and, complexities notwithstanding, the
most important next step was to have the sides return to
negotiations. He advised that the U.S. had adopted
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's position that
the issue of borders should be the first issue to be
discussed. However, the current challenge was to have both
sides commit to restart talks, even if they begin at lower
levels.


4. (C) Speaker Berri reported that when Abbas visited Beirut
in late December, Abbas was "humiliated" because of Israel
and worried about Arab public opinion. S/E Mitchell
acknowledged that both Abbas and PM Netanyahu had experienced
personal setbacks in their efforts, but emphasized that the
current environment was not sustainable for Israel, the
Palestinians, or the region. Once a Palestinian state came
into existence, it must be viable and sustainable from the
first day, S/E Mitchell continued. To that end, the U.S. is
pursuing the "bottom-up" track in parallel with the political
track. FM Chami asserted that he was confident in the
ability of the U.S. to move negotiations forward and that the
region was counting on its efforts. Speaker Berri recalled
that it was U.S. pressure on Israel that made the Madrid
conference -- and later the Oslo Accords -- possible, and he
deemed it critical that the U.S. apply similar pressure now.

GHAJAR
--------------


5. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams
informed S/E Mitchell that Israeli withdrawal from northern
Ghajar at the earliest opportunity could yield other positive
results in the region. The status of Ghajar as Lebanese
territory was indisputable and Israel had virtually
"abandoned" the territory in 2000 when it first withdrew,
Williams reasoned. He urged S/E Mitchell to encourage Israel

BEIRUT 00000089 002 OF 002


to withdraw once again, as it would be an easy
confidence-building measure, especially because Ghajar does
not represent any political obligations or debts to be paid
from the Israeli domestic point of view. However, not
withdrawing from Ghajar or continued delay in doing so has
spillover effects in other regional matters, Williams warned.



6. (C) Williams summarized that the Lebanese political
context had changed significantly. The biggest change, he
noted, was the improved bilateral relationship -- albeit
still tentative -- between Lebanon and Syria. With the
change in the political environment, some Lebanese
politicians had "defected" from PM Hariri's camp and moved
closer to Syria, Williams explained, but with little
practical impact. However, Williams surmised that if Israel
did not withdraw from Ghajar soon, it would weaken PM Hariri
and strengthen the "ideology of resistance." On Ghajar, "we
either move forwards or backwards now," he said. Other
issues that would also impact regional peace efforts included
the status of Shebaa Farms and continued Israeli overflights
of Lebanese territory, Williams enumerated. Resolving
Ghajar, though, could be a crucial, positive first step to
dealing with the more difficult issues, he insisted.

LAF NEEDS CONTINUED SUPPORT
--------------


7. (C) S/E Mitchell congratulated President Sleiman for
recently making his first trip to south Lebanon to visit the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and informed him that the U.S.
would continue to support efforts of the GOL to exert its
control over all Lebanese territory by providing needed
resources to the LAF. Sleiman thanked the U.S. for its
military assistance. He added that the LAF required more
assistance to find an effective method to assert effective
control along Lebanon's borders, and he explained that no one
in Lebanon had the intention to enter a conflict with Israel.
Hizballah's weapons would be a matter for discussion during
the National Dialogue, Sleiman insisted. While he expressed
concern over Hizballah's arsenal, Sleiman also raised concern
that Israel actively took steps to prevent "a stable
Lebanon." He encouraged the U.S. to discuss with Syria ways
to prevent further smuggling of weapons to both Hizballah and
Palestinian groups, and he claimed the GOL would do the same.


TSA LIST AND H.R. 2278
--------------


8. (C) As they have done in a number of recent meetings with
U.S. officials, S/E Mitchell's Lebanese interlocutors also
raised their concerns about new Transportation Security
Administration procedures that list Lebanon as a "country of
concern" following the failed bomb attempt in the U.S. in
late December. To assuage concerns, S/E Mitchell explained
that TSA's policies were designed for the safety and
protection of everyone entering the United States and in no
way were targeted against Lebanon or the Lebanese people.
The policies are constantly under review and changed
according to the information available at that time, S/E
Mitchell emphasized. Similarly, Sleiman, Berri and Chami
expressed disappointment with U.S. House Resolution 2278,
which would target satellite and other media providers if
they distribute content deemed to incite violence against
Americans. H.R. 2278 -- which would apply to Hizballah's
radio and television outlets -- was contrary to freedom of
the press and expression, they argued. S/E Mitchell
responded that he would advise President Obama of their
concerns.


9. (U) Special Envoy George Mitchell's staff has cleared this
cable.

SISON