Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BEIRUT145
2010-02-12 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

CHRISTIANS OBJECT TO BERRI'S PROPOSED

Tags:  PGOV PNAT PINR SOCI KDEM LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000145 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PINR SOCI KDEM LE
SUBJECT: CHRISTIANS OBJECT TO BERRI'S PROPOSED
DECONFESSIONALIZATION COMMITTEE

REF: BEIRUT 0061

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PINR SOCI KDEM LE
SUBJECT: CHRISTIANS OBJECT TO BERRI'S PROPOSED
DECONFESSIONALIZATION COMMITTEE

REF: BEIRUT 0061

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese
civil war called for "deconfessionalization," the abolishment
of the quotas for sectarian representation that undergird the
Lebanese political system. Like many tenets in Taif, the
proposal has yet to be implemented. Recently, Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri, a Shia, publicly proposed forming a
committee to study the issue. His advisors argue that the
discussion should begin now in order to capitalize on the
current period of domestic and regional reconciliation, even
if implementation takes "at least a generation." The
Christian community, including Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah
Sfeir and Berri's nominal ally Michel Aoun, has strongly
rejected Berri's proposal. In particular, Maronite
Christians, who would lose some of their disproportionate
political clout in a deconfessionalized system, insist that
Christian privileges must be protected despite evidence of
Christians' declining demographic weight. Christian leaders
like Lebanese Forces head Samir Geagea also accuse Berri of
raising the issue to distract the government from dealing
with Hizballah's weapons. Meanwhile, the Sunnis sit on the
sidelines in support of their Christian March 14 allies,
while the Druze favor Berri's plan. Like many significant
issues in current Lebanese political culture, Berri's
proposal will likely be postponed for future decision. End
Summary.

BERRI CALLS FOR COMMITTEE TO
STUDY DECONFESSIONALIZATION
--------------


2. (SBU) Speaker Berri challenged the basis of the political
status quo during the late November parliamentary debate to
grant the newly-installed government a vote of confidence
when he called for the formation of a committee to study
"deconfessionalization." Article 95 of the Lebanese
constitution, as amended by the 1989 Taif Accords, calls for
the "abolition of political confessionalism according to a
transitional plan" under the leadership of the parliament,
whose representatives are currently elected on a formula of

equal seat distribution between Christians and Muslims. All
political positions in Lebanon are currently divided equally
between Christians and Muslims, with the Maronite Christians
taking the lion's share of the Christian half despite
demographic estimates that suggest that their numbers are
significantly less that half of the Lebanese population.
Berri's proposal only addressed "political"
deconfessionalization -- such as ending confessional quotas
for MPs, ministers, and senior civil servants -- not the
creation of civil family law to end religious authorities'
control over matters of birth, marriage, death and
inheritance. As called for by the constitution, Berri
proposed forming of a committee headed by President Michel
Sleiman that would include representatives of all
confessions, members of civil society, religious figures, and
academics as a first step to implementing Article 95.


3. (C) Berri's senior advisor, Ali Hamdan, explained to
poloffs in late January that Berri sought to urge the
Lebanese political establishment to capitalize on regional
and domestic reconciliation efforts to begin addressing the
controversial issue. When asked why Berri launched his
aggressive campaign in the media at this time, Hamdan
rhetorically answered, "Why not now?" Full
deconfessionalization, as called for in the constitution,
would still take "at least a generation," but there would be
no better time than the present to begin the dialogue, Hamdan
argued. Among the recent positive developments opening the
door to Berri's proposals, Hamdan listed regional
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Syria, the two
parties who pushed for the 1989 Taif Accord; the formation of
a national unity government; and reconciliations among the
primary confessions since the June 2009 parliamentary
elections.

TIE COMMITTEE FORMATION
TO NATIONAL DIALOGUE?
--------------


4. (C) The sectarian divide on the topic of
deconfessionalization is stark. A recent poll commissioned
by Berri from the Lebanese research firm Information
International showed that 75% of Muslims support the concept
of eliminating sectarianism from political life, with Shia
support rising to 89%. Meanwhile, a mere 35% of Christians
support addressing the topic now. In response to accusations
from March 14-allied Christian leaders that Berri was using
the deconfessionalization issue as "political theater" to
divert attention away from Hizballah and its arsenal, an
exasperated Hamdan complained that "the Christians never want
a resolution" to confessionalism, preferring instead to use
sectarianism as a "coat rack to hang every problem on." He
challenged the Christians to "be brave" by exhibiting
creativity and seizing Berri's proposal in order to link
their greatest fear -- domination by Hizballah's weapons --
with their most valuable negotiating card, their
disproportionate strength in the confessional system. The
Speaker, he said, had discussed his proposal with President
Sleiman to explain that it was meant to take a step forward
in constitutional implementation, but he would not pressure
Sleiman to include it on the National Dialogue agenda.
(Note: Sleiman, who will lead the Dialogue, was the first to
call publicly for the formation of a deconfessionalization
committee during his remarks to celebrate Lebanese
independence day on November 22, but sicne then he has not
declared any intention to expand the Dialogue's agenda to add
deconfessionalization to discussion of the national defense
strategy (a euphemism for Hizballah's weapons). End note.)

CHRISTIANS REACTING TO FINAL RESULT
RATHER THAN COMMITTEE FORMATION
--------------


5. (C) Christian opposition to Berri's plan, although clearly
linked to existential Christian fears, has followed two lines
of reasoning. Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and Berri's
nominal Christian ally Michel Aoun argue that "now is not the
time" to discuss deconfessionalization, revealing an
unwillingness among Maronites in particular to reconsider the
basis of a state in which they hold disproportionate control.
Aoun told the Ambassador in mid-January (reftel) that his
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) was working toward the full
secularization of the Lebanese state, but he insisted that
the first step is granting "full civil rights to all
citizens" before moving to confessional electoral reform. In
his view, ending the confessional quotas is the "last step"
in the reform process, not the first, and he has posited
repeatedly that sectarianism should be "eliminated from
citizens' souls" before being changed on paper.


6. (C) A second argument against deconfessionalization is
championed by Christians affiliated with March 14, especially
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea (also a Maronite),who
echo Aoun's argument while also raising the specter of
Hizballah's arms playing an even more prominent role in local
political dynamics without the current constitutional
guarantees of Christian parity. Geagea instead advocates
that each confession vote for its own representatives in the
parliament instead of voting by district. Similarly, Kataeb
party MPs insist that disarming militias should come before
"the last page of Taif" (i.e., deconfessionalization).


7. (C) Other objections to Berri's proposal center on his
methods or suspicion about his intentions. FPM MP Ibrahim
Kenaan asserted to us that Berri should have asked parliament
to determine its priorities in implementing Taif before
calling for a committee to study deconfessionalization. Ali
Hamdan, who proposed that the committee's work could be done
"behind closed doors," assessed that the Christians were
afraid to "take from Berri's hand even though he's offering
something good." Any change to the status quo, Hamdan
pointed out, would have to be approved by cabinet and
two-thirds of parliament, thus guaranteeing Christians a
veto. Meanwhile, some non-Maronite Christians, such as Greek
Orthodox and Catholics, privately express support for Berri's
proposal, arguing that Berri is willing to negotiate the
issue instead of trying to impose change. If the debate is
delayed further, Orthodox political figure Marwan Abu Fadel
assessed, the next speaker of parliament -- who he believed
would likely be a Hizballah appointee -- would not be as
friendly to the protests of an even more diminished Christian
community.


SUNNIS NON-COMMITTAL,
DRUZE SUPPORTIVE
--------------


8. (C) While the Shia and the Christians spar over
deconfessionalization, Sunni political leaders have been less
vocal, with Prime Minister Saad Hariri carefully avoiding the
subject in his public statements. Hamdan claimed that Hariri
does not oppose Berri's proposal himself, but Hariri's Future
Movement officially opposes Berri's initiative, saying "the
time is not right" for discussions on the contentious issue.
Sunnis nonetheless acknowledge that deconfessionalization
will be an important step towards the implementation of Taif,
although the personal sentiments of Future Party
representatives vary. MP Jamal Jarrah fears that through
deconfessionalization, the Shia will take over the country,
while MP Mohammad Qabbani told poloff that he personally
supports deconfessionalization, which he assessed would
actually benefit the better-educated Christians competing in
a system rewarding "competence and expertise" instead of
religious affiliation. Other majority Sunnis explain
privately that Future's official opposition to Berri's
proposal is a result of pressure by Hariri's Christian March
14 allies, most notably Geagea, and not from the Sunni base,
which the Information International poll showed supports the
idea by 63%.


9. (C) Meanwhile, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has publicly
supported Berri's proposal, perhaps because a Druze is tipped
to head the senate called for in the Taif Accord. Although
the Druze account for less than 12% of the Lebanese
population by most estimates, 66% are in favor of taking
steps to eliminate sectarianism, according to the Information
International poll.


10. (C) COMMENT: Berri, who acknowledges that
deconfessionalization could take "at least 20 to 30 years,"
made a smart move by calling for the formation of a committee
to examine it -- a move that will shore up his Shia base by
showing him to be championing full constitutional
implementation. His proposal is unlikely to gain much
traction, however, given broad and vocal Christian
opposition, even from Berri's own allies. In the face of
that opposition and despite his early support for the idea,
President Sleiman has not sought to take the lead on this
issue of national importance. As a result, the question of
deconfessionalization will likely continue to be postponed
for a decision at some unspecified time in the future.
Berri's proposal and the ruckus it provoked have had one
notable short-term effect: they have diverted attention away
from discussion of Hizballah's arms. Maybe that's what he
intended all along.
DAUGHTON