Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BEIJING369
2010-02-11 10:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING

Tags:  PREL PHUM MASS PGOV SOCI CH TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1161
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHBJ #0369/01 0421028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111028Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8089
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000369 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2030
TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS PGOV SOCI CH TW
SUBJECT: VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000369

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2030
TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS PGOV SOCI CH TW
SUBJECT: VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor
Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 11 meeting with the
Ambassador, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai
delivered a "stern representation" and expressed
China's "grave concern" about the President's
planned February 18 meeting with the Dalai Lama.
Such a meeting "would amount to connivance with the
Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's
internal affairs." Bilateral ties were already
"severely damaged" by the announcement of new Taiwan
arms sales, and the Dalai Lama meeting was "equally
severe." The Ambassador responded that the
President would meet with the Dalai Lama in the
latter's capacity as an internationally recognized
religious leader and would urge the Dalai Lama to
continue the dialogue process with China. The
Ambassador noted that differences over Taiwan and
Tibet were not new and said both countries should
look ahead to important events in 2010, including
the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Cui repeated
standard talking points about Tibet and Taiwan being
China's "core interests." The Ambassador and Cui
agreed on the need to find the "right course" to
move the relationship forward. End summary.

Nice to Meet You; Let's Get Down to Business
--------------


2. (C) In an introductory meeting his first official
day as Vice Foreign Minister in charge of North
American affairs, VFM Cui skipped pleasantries and
noted that PRC Ambassador to Washington Zhou
Wenzhong had been informed that President Obama
planned to meet with the Dalai Lama February 18. He
said the Chinese side had made its points clearly in
repeated representations expressing China's strong
opposition to a visit by the Dalai Lama to the
United States and to any meeting between U.S.
leaders and the Dalai Lama under any circumstances.
Despite the fact that the United States "must be
very clear already" about the Chinese position, the
President still planned to meet the Dalai Lama.
Accordingly, Cui said, he had been instructed to

make a "stern representation and express China's
grave concern."


3. (C) Tibet was a matter that touched on China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, Cui
continued. Reciting China's well-known
characterization of the Dalai Lama as a separatist,
Cui said that any U.S. leader meeting with the Dalai
Lama at any time "would amount to connivance with
the Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's
internal affairs." This was even more true in the
current context of bilateral relations, which had
been "severely damaged" by the announcement of U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan. The Dalai Lama meeting was
"equally severe." Cui urged the United States to
"honor its commitments to recognize Chinese
sovereignty and territorial integrity, not support
Tibet independence, not destabilize Tibet and not
harm bilateral relations."

You, Too; Let's Move the Relationship Forward
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Taiwan arms
sales issue and the President's meeting with the
Dalai Lama were not new and their impact on
bilateral relations had been dealt with successfully
in the past. He reiterated U.S. policy that Tibet
was a part of China, and that the President would
meet with the Dalai Lama in the latter's capacity as
an internationally recognized religious and
spiritual leader. He noted that the President had
taken great care to be sensitive to PRC concerns
regarding his meeting with the Dalai Lama, and that
in his meeting would stress our desire that the
Dalai Lama's representatives engage in more dialogue
and promote greater peace and communication with
Beijing.


5. (C) On Taiwan arms sales, the Ambassador reminded
Cui that U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan,
including arms sales, was consistent with the three
joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act.
U.S.-China relations as a whole were more important,
and more significant, than one or two issues. The
relationship was multifaceted, deep, and of great

BEIJING 00000369 002 OF 003


importance to both countries. In 2009, the
relationship had reached unprecedented heights, and
in 2010 we were already looking forward to a visit
by Deputy Secretary Steinberg, the Nuclear Security
Summit and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

"Core Interests"
--------------


6. (C) VFM Cui said that China had "kept the door
open" to talks with the Dalai Lama's
representatives, as evidenced by the January
invitation to the Dalai Lama's representatives for
talks with the United Front Work Department.
Unfortunately, Cui said, "the talks have shown that
the Dalai Lama's side is sticking to its previous
rhetoric, specifically its demands for so-called
genuine autonomy and greater Tibet." This was a
"wrong position," Cui said, and there was "no
future" for them until they "genuinely give up
separatism." Until they did that, he said, there
would be no basis for successful talks. If the
United States was interested in the talks' success,
Cui added, it should "immediately reverse its wrong
decision on the President's meeting, cancel the
Dalai Lama's visit to the United States and stop
giving wrong signals to the Chinese people."


7. (C) VFM Cui noted positively the Ambassador's
statements that the United States "recognizes
China's sovereignty over Tibet and the one-China
policy." If the United States was committed to
these ideas, he said, "China will wait to see
concrete results of your statements." Cui said the
"important consensus" from President Obama's visit
to China was the fact that the United States and
China needed to put each other's concerns in better
focus, particularly each other's "core interests."
Tibet and Taiwan were both crucial to China's core
interests, he said, and China hoped the U.S. side
would come up with "credible steps" to "truly
respect" China's core interests.


8. (C) Putting aside the paper containing the Tibet
demarche, VFM Cui noted that China and the United
States shared many major common interests and had
the responsibility to overcome the problems and
differences the relationship was currently
experiencing. "But to be frank," he said, "China is
not to be blamed for these problems and differences
and we do not want to see such things happening.
All of these issues bear on China's core interests,
and so there is no room for concession or compromise
on China's part." He said the Chinese public
reaction to these issues was well-known, and the
Chinese government had to "adhere to its
principles."

A Shared Desire to Find the "Right Course"
--------------


9. (C) VFM Cui praised the "positive momentum" from
President Obama's November 2009 visit to China and
said that the United States and China should do
something positive to promote the benefits from our
relationship. Recent events had disrupted the
momentum and raised doubts about U.S. sincerity in
the bilateral relationship. The United States
should come up with "credible moves" to show
sincerity. The United States needed to take
"positive steps" to improve the relationship and
should "studiously consider" this issue.


10. (C) VFM Cui warned that the tone and content of
Western media reporting on the U.S.-China
relationship painted a grim picture of relations and
raised the possibility of creating a "narrative
trap" or self-fulfilling prophesy that could have an
even more negative impact on the relationship. He
urged the Ambassador to engage the U.S. Congress and
media to "keep them on the right course."


11. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States
and China were "two great countries with different
histories, traditions and political systems." We
had in common the desire for a strong economy and
security in the region. In addition, we clearly
needed to do a good job strengthening our
understanding of each other's core interests. In
that respect, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
would be important, and the United States urged

BEIJING 00000369 003 OF 003


China to work with us to set a date as soon as
possible.
HUNTSMAN