Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BEIJING233
2010-01-28 10:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

PRC/INDIA: CONTACTS SEE POSITIVE OUTLOOK FOR

Tags:  PREL PARM PTER MARR CH PK AF IN XD 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000233 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2035
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER MARR CH PK AF IN XD
SUBJECT: PRC/INDIA: CONTACTS SEE POSITIVE OUTLOOK FOR
RELATIONS IN 2010

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons
1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000233

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2035
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER MARR CH PK AF IN XD
SUBJECT: PRC/INDIA: CONTACTS SEE POSITIVE OUTLOOK FOR
RELATIONS IN 2010

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons
1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: China and India will seek to leverage the
positive atmosphere surrounding the 60th anniversary of
diplomatic relations in 2010 to project an image of a
healthy, stable bilateral relationship, according to PRC
academics and Indian diplomatic contacts. There is consensus
that territorial disputes along the China-India border face
little chance of resolution in 2010, but will remain
manageable through diplomatic channels. An expert at an
MFA-affiliated think tank described U.S. influence on
Sino-Indian relations as minimal, while a contact at Beijing
University suggested that the U.S.-India strategic
partnership has undermined China's national security and
soured relations between the two Asian giants. Our contacts
believe there is little enthusiasm for China-India
coordination on Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.

60th Anniversary Boost
--------------


2. (C) Embassy contacts at PRC government-affiliated think
tanks and the Indian Embassy separately explained that China
and India planned to use the 60th anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations in 2010 to showcase the
health and stability of the bilateral relationship. Indian
Embassy PolOff Satish Kumar January 21 highlighted plans for:
Indian President Pratibha Patil to visit Beijing at the
invitation of President Hu Jintao during summer 2010; stepped
up cultural exchanges; deepened cooperation on climate change
post-Copenhagen; coordination in Doha round negotiations;
joint involvement in the BRIC Summit and G-20 activities; and
a mutually agreed goal to increase bilateral trade from
roughly USD 40 billion in 2009 to USD 60 billion in 2010.

Accentuating the Positive amid Intractable Problems
-------------- --------------


3. (C) MFA-affiliated China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar Rong Ying told PolOff
January 12 that China and India would use the 60th

anniversary of diplomatic relations to deflect attention from
the unresolved border disputes and toward the positive
development of relations, but discounted the likelihood that
the bilateral relationship would produce any new concrete
outcomes. The development of China-India relations had
leveled in recent years, according to Rong, because many of
the previous bilateral irritants had already been resolved,
leaving only intractable problems like the border disputes
for both parties to manage. Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) South Asia scholar Wang Shida
provided a blunter assessment January 19, commenting that
until India stopped thinking of itself as South Asia's "big
brother," China-India relations would not mature. India's
unwillingness to acknowledge China's legitimate interest in
stability in South Asia stunted the growth of China-India
relations, according to Wang.

Border Dispute Manageable
--------------


4. (C) PRC academic and Indian Embassy contacts uniformly
predicted that Sino-Indian border disputes faced little
chance of resolution in 2010, but would remain manageable
through diplomatic channels. While concurring in the low
likelihood of conflict, Beijing University Professor Han Hua
warned January 5 that the potential for conflict could not be
completely ruled out. Two factors if not properly managed
could prompt a repeat of the border war in 1962: a spike in
nationalism in either country, and/or escalatory actions by
either military taken independently of the civilian command
authority. Han suggested that PRC authorities were capable
of controlling surges of nationalism, as demonstrated by the
PRC government's ability to manage anti-Japanese sentiment in

2005. Likewise, Hu Jintao had firm control over the People's
Liberation Army (PLA). The question was whether the same
could be said in either case for India, Han said.

Role of U.S. in PRC-India Relations
--------------


5. (C) CIIS' Rong downplayed the influence of the United
States on Sino-Indian relations, which were "propelled by
their own internal logic." Leaders in Beijing and New Delhi

BEIJING 00000233 002 OF 002


were committed to maintaining a stable bilateral
relationship. For China, leaders since Deng Xiaoping
understood that domestic economic development was a top
priority, and that stable China-India relations were a
prerequisite for domestic development, according to Rong.


6. (C) Beijing University's Han separately assessed that the
United States had a large influence on China-India relations.
According to Han, Sino-Indian relations had reached a high
point during Premier Wen Jiabao's April 2005 visit to New
Delhi, when the two countries had announced six broad
principles for reaching a boundary settlement. The bilateral
relationship had steadily deteriorated since, due to the
expansion of U.S.-India relations. Institutionalized efforts
by the United States and India to develop a strategic
partnership, and thus increased military interoperability,
expanded information-sharing, and the conclusion of a civil
nuclear deal, had greatly undermined China's national
security. Han explained that her research as the Director of
Beijing University's Center for Arms Control and Disarmament
had led her to conclude that unless stringent safeguards in
implementation of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal were put
in place and closely monitored, the civil nuclear deal could
provide India with the capability to produce up to 50 nuclear
warheads. Han declined to provide further elaboration.

Potential for Cooperation
--------------


7. (C) Beijing University's Han identified two potential
areas for U.S.-PRC-Indian cooperation: joint efforts to
protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian
Ocean and counterterrorism cooperation in South and Central
Asia. Han asserted that the Indian Navy "strongly opposed"
trilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean. On
counterterrorism cooperation, Han expressed confidence that
the U.S., India and China could identify common enemies that
would prompt increased information-sharing.


8. (C) On regional cooperation, Han dismissed the possibility
of China-India coordination on Afghanistan and suggested that
the United States urge India to reduce its assistance
footprint in Afghanistan because Indian involvement in
Afghanistan undermined Pakistan's sense of security. Indian
EmbOff Kumar likewise downplayed the likelihood of
China-India cooperation on Afghanistan. He claimed there was
no substantial China-India discussion on Afghanistan outside
of annual China-India-Russia Foreign Ministers meetings and
other international fora involving China and India where
Afghanistan was raised. For India, exchanging views with
China on Afghanistan amounted to China merely parroting
Pakistan's "paranoia" about Indian involvement in
Afghanistan, according to Kumar.
HUNTSMAN