PRC SCHOLARS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON SOUTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000146

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2030
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EPET PHUM SOCI KDEM CH SU
SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLARS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON SOUTHERN
SUDAN REFERENDUM; DRAW PARALLELS TO DOMESTIC ETHNIC TENSIONS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: PRC scholars view the late-December passage
of the Southern Sudan Referendum Law as "only the first step"
in a long and difficult Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
implementation process. The scholars acknowledged that
Southern Sudan will likely vote for independence in January
2011 and predicted additional referendum-related conflicts
and violence, particularly in the North-South border areas.
An MFA official said China would prefer for Sudan to remain
united, and predicted that a Southern Sudan pro-secession
vote would destabilize the region and threaten China's oil
interests. PRC scholars drew comparisons between Sudan's
North-South conflict and China's own ethic tensions in Tibet
and Xinjiang and cited this parallel as additional
justification for China's preference for a unified Sudan.
End Summary.

PRC: NCP was "Pressured" into the CPA
--------------


2. (C) PRC Africa scholars were subdued in their reaction to
the Southern Sudan Referendum Law that was finally approved
by Sudan's National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) December 29. Wang
Suolao, Associate Professor in the School of International
Studies at Peking University (PKU),told PolOff January 7
that the passage of the referendum law merely "opened the
door" to a long and difficult journey ahead and that full
implementation of the CPA remained "far off." The NCP had
been "pressured" into the CPA, Wang suggested, because the
Sudan government had been unable to "get a handle" on the
Southern Sudan rebels. The NCP also had external pressures
from the European Union and the United States and feared
"serious consequences" had it not agreed to the CPA. Wang
claimed that U.S. and Western countries' "black and white"
approach to Sudan -- labeling President Bashir and the NCP as
the "bad guys" at the same time encouraging Southern Sudan's
independence -- placed the PRC in a difficult position. He
said that ideologically, the PRC supported a unified Sudan
but also recognized that Chinese oil interests were located
in the South. As a result, he concluded, the PRC had to
"keep one foot in each boat" and maintain "friendly"
relations with all sides.

PRC Ethnic Tensions Parallel Sudan's
--------------


3. (C) Professor Wang stated that China would "absolutely
prefer" for Sudan to remained a unified country. Comparing
Sudan's situation with China, Wang noted that China was also
a country with many ethnic minorities, and each successful
ethnic independence movement abroad made the central
government "more nervous." Separately concurring with Wang's
assessment, Ministry of State Security-affiliated China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations Institute
of Asian and African Studies Research Professor Zeng Qiang
told PolOff January 12 that China's ethnic tensions in Tibet
and Xinjiang, like ethnic- and religion-based conflicts
elsewhere, were identity driven and therefore almost
impossible to resolve. To keep groups with fundamentally
different values together required either a strong central
government or a common economic market, and neither was
present in Sudan, Zeng concluded.

NPC and SPLM Have Different Goals
--------------


4. (C) The NCP and SPLM had different priorities at the
moment, MFA West Asian and North African Affairs Department
North Africa Division Attache Yu Chunhua told PolOff January
8, stating that the North was preoccupied with the April
elections while the South was focused on the 2011 referendum.
The SPLM was "indifferent" toward the April elections
because it wanted to focus on the referendum. Yu predicted
that after the April elections, the NCP would turn its
attention back to the referendum and concentrate on creating
"technical road blocks" to impede the referendum. Yu
anticipated an increase in North-South violence, particularly
in the border areas as the referendum drew closer.

China's Oil Interest
--------------


5. (C) Yu expected Southern Sudan's independence to result in

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a domino effect and create further instability for the
region, particularly in Darfur. He stressed that above all
else, the PRC wanted "security and stability," both
domestically and abroad. China preferred a unified Sudan
because Southern Sudan's separation and the resultant
regional instability would have a negative impact on PRC's
oil interest in the region, he added.


6. (C) Zhang Yongpeng, Deputy Director for the Institute of
West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS),offered a more sanguine view of the
situation, telling PolOff January 13 that regardless of the
referendum outcome, Sudan was dependent on support from
foreign oil companies. Southern Sudan's oil fields could not
operate without Chinese oil companies' financial support and
technical expertise, and would need to cooperate with the
Chinese whatever the outcome of the referendum.

China's Relationship with Bashir
--------------


7. (C) PRC scholars agreed that President Bashir would be
reelected in April as president of Sudan, although they
predicted a difficult election for him. PKU's Wang suggested
that Bashir would have to appease hardliners in the North and
take a harsher position toward Southern Sudan in order to
stay in power. Given China's relationship with Bashir, the
PRC would be "embarrassed" if the NCP decided to contest
Southern Sudan's independence. Wang insisted that although
Western countries strongly disliked the Sudanese President,
Bashir remained crucial to the implementation of the CPA.
CASS' Zhang maintained that China supported an open and fair
election process in Sudan and had contributed USD 4 million
to assist with the elections. Zhang stressed it was
important for China to uphold its principle of
non-interference and provide assistance to Sudan without
interfering with its domestic politics.
HUNTSMAN