BASRAH'S REACTION TO DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000005

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/20/2020
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRAH'S REACTION TO DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 266

B. BAGHDAD 338

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CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary
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1. (C) The conflict over de-Ba'athification has sparked three
demonstrations in Basrah, and provoked strong reactions from the
government and influential leaders. While a demarche to the
Provincial Council Chair appears to have dampened emotions over
perceived USG involvement in this issue, the issue remains
potent and politically useful. There is no lack of theories
from prominent Basrawis on who was behind the latest
de-Ba'athification effort, and who might profit or suffer from
it. Basrah's body politic reacted vehemently against the Court
of Cassation's February 3 ruling staying the parliamentary
Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) ban on some 500
candidates, which was later withdrawn on February 7. Many PRT
contacts view the de-Ba'athification process as an effort to
isolate secular and nationalist political entities. PRT
intervened with influential local tribal leader Khathem
al-Ghatrani (Sunni Iraqiyya supporter) to prevent him from
organizing a boycott in response to the de-Ba'athification
order. End summary.

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AJC Actions Provoke Two Demonstrations
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2. (C) Before the AJC finalized the list of disqualified
candidates on de-Ba'athfication grounds, members of the
Shi'a-led Coalition of National Unity demonstrated in Basrah on
January 12 in support of its Secretary General Nehru Mohammed
Abdel Kareem al-Kasnazani. They feared he might be barred from
the March elections by the AJC. (Note: According to a list
obtained from IHEC, 21 Basrah candidates were recommended for
exclusion by the AJC. Kasnazani's banned Coalition of National
Unity fared the worst. Five of its Basrah candidates were
excluded. Allawi's Iraqiyya coalition had three on the list,
and the PM's State of Law coalition had two barred. End note.)
Basrah journalist Mahmoud Bachari told PRToffs that 50-80
protestors were mainly followers of Kasnazani and not people
protesting the ban as a whole. That said, a spokesman for the
group told Radio Sawa that the AJC's expected ban on Kasnazani
and others was motivated by sectarianism, and risked destroying
the democratic process.


3. (C) On January 21, Basrah was the setting for a larger
demonstration in support of the ACJ's de-Ba'athification order.
A journalist who covered the event told us the demonstration
stretched for several kilometers and drew thousands. General
Mohammed al-Huweidi, the head of Iraqi Army security for Basrah,
confirmed to the PRT that it was a large demonstration, but
estimated less than a thousand people participated. During the
demonstration, pictures of Ba'athists from the prior regime were
burned, and demonstrators called for criminal proceedings
against those who had been identified by the ACJ for
disqualification.

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Court Ruling Sparks Strong Reaction
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4. (C) The Court of Cassation's February 3 decision delaying the
de-Ba'athification adjudications until after the election
ignited a strong reaction from the Basrah government and
population. On February 7, the Provincial Council (PC) adopted
a resolution rejecting the ruling. The resolution also called
for the Council of Representatives to withdraw all confidence in
the court, its judges, and the ruling. The PC condemned all
foreign interference in Iraqi internal affairs, specifically
warning of USG and "Arabian country" interference. On February
8, PRTOff explained the USG position to PC Chair Jabar Amin
Jabar (Da'wa Tantheem),underlining USG opposition to the Ba'ath
party and support for Iraq's independent judiciary. Jabar
seemed to understand the explanation and said that he would
strike references to USG interference from future resolutions.


5. (C) A day after the PC adopted its resolution, demonstrators
took to the street to protest the court's ruling. According to
Bachari, some 2,500-3,000 people gathered in downtown Basrah and
marched to the Governor's Office. Governor Shiltagh Aboud
(SLA/Da'wa) spoke to the protestors, as he had during the
January 21 demonstration. At the first protest he had rejected
the return of Ba'athists to government. He upped the ante
during the second stating that he would "start a campaign to
remove the Ba'athists from all departments in all governorates."


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Officially Neutral, but Personally Biased

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6. (C) PC Chair Jabar Amin Jabar confirmed the reports of his
and the Governor's appearance at the protests. He said an
appearance was standard protocol whenever demonstrators appeared
outside their office building. Prior to the court's ruling, the
PC Chair told PRToff that though he personally favored the AJC's
ban, he was officially neutral. He claimed that in the first
round of protests for and against the AJC ban, he had met with
representatives of both groups. The media reported his meeting
with those supporting the de-Ba'athification ban and his strong
statements against letting Ba'athist "criminals" into the next
government. There were no reports on his meeting with the
opponents of the ban.


7. (C) Jabar's official neutrality, questionable even before the
Court of Cassation ruling, dissolved completely after it.
Calling the court ruling a political decision, he drove adoption
of the PC resolution condemning it, and publicly supported the
demonstrators protesting it. In a conversation with PRToff,
Jabar defended his actions and the PC resolution as a
"humanitarian response" in support of Basrawis who suffered
under Ba'athist rule. Jabar remarked that he was imprisoned for
seven years and his brother was hanged. He believed the
"constitutional" working of the AJC had addressed a real threat
of Ba'athist resurgence, which was then undermined by the
"illegal and "political" decision" of the Court of Cassation.
(Note: The Court of Cassation reversed itself on February 7, and
agreed to complete all appeals by the first day of the official
campaign on February 12. See ref B. End note.)

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Public Largely Favors Ban but Concerns Are Voiced
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8. (C) The disparity between the two large demonstrations and
one small protest on either side of the de-Ba'athification issue
mirrors the split in Basrah public opinion. Taleb al-Baderi, a
well known local TV reporter, told PRToff that the majority of
Basrah's largely Shi'a population favors the AJC actions. Other
PRT contacts told us that Basrah's relatively small Sunni
population generally objects to the ban. One influential Sunni
tribal sheikh, Khadthem al-Ghatrani, a strong supporter of
Allawi and his Iraqiyya coalition, threatened to lead a boycott
of the national elections if Saleh Mutlaq was not reinstated on
the ballot. Sheikh Ghatrani reconsidered following an
intervention by PRT Leader, and said that he would vote in the
election and urge others to follow suit.


9. (C) A sampling of our contacts from across the political
spectrum reveals a general view that the de-Ba'athification move
was political. While several contacts suspected PM Maliki was
behind it, others saw it as Iran's handiwork, citing Chalabi and
Lami's prominent roles.

-- Walid Keitan, a Shi'a member of Allawi's Iraqi National
Movement party, considered the ban as another example of
Maliki's using the levers of government power to benefit his
party. He suggested that Mutlaq's removal would be beneficial
for the PM by diminishing the chances of the Iraqiyya coalition.


-- Awad al-Abdan, a local Sunni leader who heads a Basrah-based
anti-Iranian group (Movement for Liberation of the South),saw
the de-certification of "these national, liberal" candidates as
a blow to everyone who was trying to build a stronger national,
non-sectarian identity for Iraq.

-- Similarly Sunni Sheikh and PC member Abd al-Karim al-Dusari
saw the move as Maliki's attempt to exclude nationalist figures
from the election. He said the growth of nationalist parties
that could appeal across sectarian lines threatened the Da'wa
party and the PM.

-- Basrah business mogul Hatem Bachari viewed the ban as
Maliki's attempt to stay in power, but said that his
de-Ba'athification push might ultimately hurt the Prime Minister
by alienating those who saw him as a budding nationalist. His
cousin, Mahmoud Bachari saw Iran behind the ban, but believed
Maliki would profit from it.

-- Khadim al-Hussein, head of the Basrah branch of the Communist
Party, said that the fear of Ba'athists is real and widespread
in the province. He believed that both Da'wa and ISCI created
the Ba'athist scare because they believed they were losing
popular support, and could use it to consolidate their electoral
base.

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Comment
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10. (C) In this predominantly Shi'a province, it makes sense
that the public opinion and reaction would be break
significantly in favor of the de-Ba'athification effort. That
said, among the Basrah elite, both Shi'a and Sunni, there are
prominent players supporting reconciliation and favoring a ban
limited solely to those Ba'athists who acted criminally in the
Saddam era. While some of our interlocutors question the wisdom
of the latest de-Ba'atification push, all have a ready answer
for who was behind it and who is likely benefit from it. A
demarche to the PC Chair appears to have dampened emotions over
USG involvement, but Basrah's body politic refuses to let go of
the de-Ba'athification issue. Given its potency and political
usefulness, we can expect the Governor and the PC to keep
de-Ba'athification alive throughout the election season and
perhaps beyond.
NALAND