BASRAH ANTI-IRAN DEMONSTRATION: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/2020
TAGS: PGOV SOCI SCUL KPAO IZ IR SA
SUBJECT: BASRAH ANTI-IRAN DEMONSTRATION: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 112

B. BAGHDAD 70

C. 09 BAGHDAD 3334

D. BASRAH 61

E. BASRAH 57

BASRAH 00000002 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT, US State
Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (U) This is a Basrah reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Basrah-based representatives of political
parties and tribes staged a brief and peaceful protest on
January 2 at the Iranian Consulate to protest the reported
December 18 Iranian occupation of the cross-border Al Fakkah oil
well in nearby Maysan Province. Initial and unverifiable media
reports claimed that three hundred or more participants raised
banners and shouted anti-Iran slogans condemning the "Iranian
occupation," called for the immediate withdrawal of Iranian
forces, and condemned the GOI's own "acquiescence." Two
prominent journalists provided a starkly different account of
the demonstration, laughing at reports of "hundreds" of
protestors. They characterized the crowd as only around 50-60
participants at the 30-minute event. For these journalists, the
more relevant issue is the struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia
and Shi'a Iran to control the future of Iraq. End summary.

Al Fakkah takeover sparks reported fiery demonstration
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3. (C) On January 2, Basrah-based representatives of political
parties and tribes staged a peaceful protest in front of the
Iranian Consulate to protest the reported December 18 Iranian
occupation of the cross-border al Fakkah well in nearby Maysan
Province (refs A-C). Initial media reports claimed three
hundred or more participants. (Note: The PRT's initial
understanding of the event came from unverifiable media reports.
PRTOffs cannot get near the Iranian Consulate without our
military movement team drawing massive and unwanted attention.
End note.)


4. (C) According to these initial reports, the marchers raised
banners and shouted anti-Iran slogans condemning "Iranian
occupation" of the oil wells. The crowd called for the
immediate withdrawal of Iranian forces from Iraqi territory in
defense of Iraqi sovereignty and unity. One participant
reportedly referred to the Iranian forces as invaders and
occupiers of Iraqi resources and sucking Iraq's blood. The
group also reportedly threatened further actions including a
boycott of Iranian imports.


5. (SBU) These protestors also reportedly condemned Prime
Minister Maliki and the GOI for "acquiescence" in failing to
take action against the "invasion," and demanded a strong GOI
position against the violation of Iraqi sovereignty. They
described the GOI policy as "incredibly weak" and speculated
that there were those within the GOI who support Iran's policies.


6. (C) The event's organizer, Awad al-Abdan, General Secretary
of the Movement for the Liberation of the South, a small
quasi-political organization, read a statement "on behalf of the
masses of Basrah and southern Iraq." The declaration demanded
Iranian forces stop interfering in Iraqi affairs and depart
immediately from the oil well. For Abdan, the oil well was
representative of Iraqi sovereignty and wealth.


7. (C) Others downplayed the significance of the event.
Provincial Council member Walid Keitan, a Shi'a member of
Allawi's Iraqi National Accord, said that the Al Fakkah
incursion provided Abdan a "target of opportunity and something
to raise a ruckus about." He suggested that the demonstration
did not indicate a significant anti-Iran shift in Basrah.

Other participants
--------------


8. (C) Working with local journalists and based on discussion
with Abdan, PRTOffs identified other participants at the
protest. They included Hussein Al Sadr, General Secretary of
the anti-Iran Al-Shaab (Population) party; followers of Vice
President Tariq al Hashimi's Sunni Iraqi al-Tajdeed party;
Dialogue Front party followers of Dr. Saleh al Mutlak; and some
trade unions. In addition, local tribal sheikhs (and PRT
contacts) included Mohammed al Bahadli (from Basrah's Hayyaniyah
neighborhood, ref E),a branch of the Al Bahdil tribe; and
Mohammed al Zaydawi, from the (anti-Iran) Abu Zayd tribe in
central Basrah province.

Abdan's outspoken views on Iran
--------------


9. (C) Al-Abdan, an occasional PRT contact, confirmed on January
15 that he had led the protest. Al-Abdan is a frequent and
harsh critic of what he says is Iran's economic, cultural, and
political dominance in southern Iraq. He claims that he seeks

BASRAH 00000002 002.2 OF 002


to "restore" Basrah's "lost rights." On the Al Fakkah incident,
he said that in some ways it was a positive thing showing
everyone Iran's "true colors." It is consistent with his view
that Iran - and its Consul General in Basrah in particular -
meddles in Iraqi internal affairs (ref D) and floods the local
market with Iranian goods. He has twice led boycotts targeting
Iranian imports. (Comment: It is unclear how possible or
effective any boycott of Iranian goods could be. Low-priced
Iranian goods represent a substantial percentage of local goods
benefiting the Basrawi consumer. End comment).

Leading journalists describe an entirely different event
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9. (C) Two prominent journalists offered PRTOffs a starkly
different version from media accounts of the demonstration and
Abdan himself. Mahmoud Bachari, Director of the Ihlas Haber
Ajansi Turkish news agency in Basrah, characterized Abdan as
"slippery" and a "charlatan" who is supported by outside
interests, probably Saudi Arabia. He said that Abdan has
unexplained wealth. Offering to share the video, he said that
his studio is next door to the Iranian Consulate and he filmed
the entire event. He laughed at media reports of "hundreds" of
protestors and said there were 50-60 paid and transported
participants at a 30-minute staged event. He said that Abdan
paid Iraqi television station Al Sharqiya "around USD 1000" to
have journalists cover the event and another USD 600 to
broadcast the coverage. He suspects Saudi Arabia and/or Kuwait
support Al Sharqiya. Subsequent internet accounts of a "massive
demonstration" were simply recycled from the Al Sharqiya piece.


10. (C) Al Fayhaa television journalist Taleb al-Baderi's views
largely coincided with those of Bachari. He said that Abdan
changes his views and alliances and "is not an independent
player." He suggested that Abdan receives outside assistance
and that many Basrawis believe this. Baderi said that his work
on the story revealed that demonstration organizers sought a
permit for the event from Governor Shiltagh, which the latter
refused to grant despite a direct appeal from GOI VP al-Hashemi.
The PRT's Bilingual and Bicultural Advisors working in the
Provincial Governor's office also heard the same account of the
events. Even without the permit, organizers went ahead and a
quick "hit and run" event occurred before anyone could stop it.
He added that Abdan "loves the limelight" and makes trouble
because he and the rest of demonstrators are not benefiting from
the "new Iraq."

The "real war" in Iraq today: Saudi Arabia vs. Iran
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11. (C) Journalist Mahmoud Bachari broadened the context of this
demonstration. He said it was part of the struggle between
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to control the future of Iraq.
"The United States always blames Iran for problems in Iraq, but
it should look more at Saudi Arabia instead. In fact, it is
sometimes Saudi Arabia that starts problems here, to which Iran
reacts." He noted that at least some elements within Iran are
trying to help Iraq in a more constructive, non-violent manner.
As an example, he noted tactical alliances with sheikhs, and the
provision of essential services - in the style of Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, "does not want to see
any Iraq 'democracy model' succeed," and thus is waging a
"low-key war" against it.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) While the PRT cannot verify all of Bachari and Baderi's
views, what is clear is that Abdan's "party" and following are
relatively small. The PRT has noted a general uneasiness among
some Basrawis about Iran's perceived outsized economic and
political influence, but there is no one-size-fits-all "Basrah
view" of Iran. Given the vast and complex economic, religious,
and cultural ties that bind them, there is no easily generalized
"Basrah view" of Iran. Most Basrawis are too overwhelmed by the
daily grind to form more than personal and cursory views of
Iran.


13. (C) As for the protest itself, the PRT does not believe that
there was great "meaning" to it. The fact that there is an
apparent toleration in Basrah's public space for groups to
peacefully blow off occasional steam is a good thing,
irrespective of just how "spontaneous" or genuine this
particular march actually was. Such events were unthinkable
under the old regime.
NALAND