LINKAGE BETWEEN DDR AND ELECTIONS COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000041

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: LINKAGE BETWEEN DDR AND ELECTIONS COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR
THE CAR

REF: A. A- 10 BANGUI 29 AND PREVIOUS

B. B- 09 BANGUI 157

C. C- 09 BANGUI 237 AND COOK - MAZEL EMAIL 02/04/10


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The 2010 Central African elections and the
country's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
programs are becoming increasingly linked, which could result in
serious difficulties for the country in the coming months. The
opposition continues seek every opportunity to delay the
elections past the June 11 date required by the constitution,
and it appears their efforts will likely push the elections past
the projected April 18 first round date(Ref A). The DDR program
is the victim of competing political interests, and suffered a
serious setback on February 9 when teams enacting an information
campaign were turned back to Bangui by truculent militia men in
the country's troubled north. The opposition, by insisting on
the completion of DDR process as a prerequisite for the
elections seeks to push Bozize into a constitutional crisis
resulting in a power sharing agreement that will placate major
donors. The president, though he remains the clear favorite to
win the elections, knows that a successful DDR process that
results in the enfranchisement of voters in opposition areas may
threaten his prospects. Therefore, a devilish catch 22 is
developing: hold the elections without the DDR and risk an
election that is not representative, or delay the elections and
risk an unpredictable constitutional crisis - neither of which
is in the interest of the CAR or the USG. END SUMMARY.


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The Democratic Opposition: Fighting Over Every Issue
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2. (SBU) After President Bozize's heavily publicized attempt to
broker a solution between the opposition and the president of
the Independent Electoral Commission at the end of January (Ref
A),the Collective of Forces for Change - made up of the
opposition umbrella organization National Union of Concerned
Citizens (UFVN),several members of the non-aligned parties and
one politico-military group, won some serious concessions from
the President of the IEC and his supporters in the majority.
Negotiations under the auspices of the National Mediator to
resolve the stalemate resulted in:

-- The replacement of the UFVN's members in the IEC: the UFVN
and the Army for the Restitution of Democracy (APRD) militia
will send new delegates to the IEC Committee (NOTE: The former
members, who didn't want to lose their IEC salaries and other
perks, refused to obey the parties' demands that they quit the
commission. They have since been expelled from their parties.
END NOTE.).

-- An independent audit of the IEC finances to date, with
special attention paid to the IEC President's expenditures. It
is yet to be decided who will complete the audit. The
opposition demands an audit by an accredited firm while the
government insists on using the government's own audit team.

-- The appointment of unspecified civil society representatives,
who were not previously granted membership in the IEC.

-- The local IEC committees unilaterally established - possibly
illegally - by the President of the IEC, were annulled.

-- Establishment of the Permanent Political Dialogue Framework,
recommended by the December 2008 national dialogue but until now
opposed by President Bozize. (Comment: This may be an attempt by
the opposition to create a framework which would serve as the
basis for a transitional government if the elections are not

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held.



3. (SBU) UFVN members are hoping to send very high ranking party
officials to take their place on the IEC in an effort to have
extra influence on the electoral process. However, the
negotiators did not reach any agreement on the UFVN's request
for cancellation of decrees which appointed new mayors
throughout the country (NOTE: Municipal elections were to be
held this year, but the president abruptly appointed new mayors
in January 2010 and canceled the proposed elections. END NOTE.).
In addition, no mention was made of the opposition's ``non
negotiable'' demand that the President Binguimale of the IEC
resign. The opposition strongly suspects that he has squandered
a considerable amount of IEC resources on travel and other
things. Opposition representatives said on condition of
anonymity that Binguimale's position would be discussed at a
later date.



4. (SBU) With the first round of the elections scheduled for
April 18, each delay paralyzes preparations and kills valuable
weeks that are needed to set up the regional IECs, establish
voting offices, print ballots, train election workers, etc. The
audit is expected to take one to two weeks, at which point, if
the auditors discover impropriety, a new debate will rage about
the fate of the IEC president.


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DDR: Each Side Playing a Dangerous Game
--------------



5. (SBU) The DDR process has been much maligned for a lack of
direction and because it does not address the root problems of
the Central African Republic (Ref B):

-- It addresses the fate of 8,000 militia members while ignoring
nearly 300,000 internally displaced people and refugees.

-- It ignores the challenges of reintegrating people into an
economy that barely exists.

-- It makes no provision for who will provide law and order once
the local militias are demobilized. The Central African Army,
with 5,000 soldiers, is incapable of securing the national
territory.

Still, the UNDP has made significant progress over the last year
and stands ready, from a technical standpoint, to start the
first two steps of the process.



6. (SBU) Unfortunately, both the militias and the government
continue to stall the procedure. The largest group the process
aims to demobilize is the APRD. Holding sway over two of the
most populous prefectures of the CAR - the Ouham and Ouham Pende
make up 20 percent of the CAR's population - many observers
mistakenly view the APRD's demobilization as the one least
fraught with difficulties. The most recent dispute is over the
money provided by the government to pay for three months worth
of food. The President wants the money to go through the local
(CARG-appointed) governors in an effort to enforce their
authority. The APRD wants the money distributed uniquely by
their representatives. After a week, both sides remain
intransigent, and the DDR sensitization team returned to Bangui
just four days into a month-long mission. This is symptomatic of

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the deep seeded lack of trust between the two sides that
culminates in repeated delays in implementation.

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The Collision between the DDR and the Elections
-------------- --------------



7. (SBU) Some informed observers worry that the President,
knowing that the APRD wants their people to control the funding,
is insisting on the local governors' authority because he does
not want the DDR to happen at all before the elections. Though
he is the odds on favorite to win a second term, the President
is thought to be advised by people who would rather see an
unrepresentative election than one in which the Ouham and Ouham
Pende might turn the vote against him. Some in the opposition,
particularly the political head of the APRD, Jean Jacques
Demafouth, feel that the militias are a trump card for them
going forward. By having an armed force behind them, they may be
able to demand further concessions from Bozize in a possible
second round of elections or in a government of national unity.



8. (SBU) COMMENT: Post suspects that the opposition is playing a
game it will have difficulty winning. Though there are examples
of Central Africans taking to the streets, the last seven years
of Bozize's rule have seen Bangui calmer and safer than at any
point since the 1980s, and violence in the populous western half
of the country has decreased substantially. Most observers agree
that while people recognize Bozize's short comings, the
opposition lacks cohesion, message, and charisma. Bozize's
``peace dividend'' is therefore likely to keep people from
rallying to the opposition's cause if elections delays push the
country into a constitutional crisis. Even France, who as
recently as a year ago had taken a hard line with the regime,
has significantly softened its stand - a leaked cable from the
French Embassy in CAR called Bozize's rule an ``idyllic grain of
hope''. This will likely embolden Bozize, who already feels
strengthened by the attainment of HIPC debt relief and increased
support from international actors like the IMF and China (Ref
C),in his dealings with the opposition. END COMMENT.
COOK