Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BANGUI2
2010-01-05 17:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bangui
Cable title:  

FURTHER ATTACKS TARGETING NGOS IN NE CAR MARK TROUBLING

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF CT 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0002/01 0051709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 051709Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1118
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0259
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0125
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0362
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0375
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0274
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0214
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0563
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0552
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0196
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0539
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1413
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000002 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR JPEKKINEN
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF CT
SUBJECT: FURTHER ATTACKS TARGETING NGOS IN NE CAR MARK TROUBLING
TREND

REF: A - 09 BANGUI 272

BANGUI 00000002 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000002

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR JPEKKINEN
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF CT
SUBJECT: FURTHER ATTACKS TARGETING NGOS IN NE CAR MARK TROUBLING
TREND

REF: A - 09 BANGUI 272

BANGUI 00000002 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The December 22 and 23 targeted attacks on
International Medical Corp (IMC) facilities, in northeastern
Central African Republic (CAR) continue a disturbing pattern in
this lawless and unstable part of central Africa (Ref A). The
recent discovery of the three IMC vehicles for sale in Am
Dukhan, Sudan may shed more light on the perpetrators of the
attack, and it is increasingly clear that paramilitary groups in
the region have identified NGOs with vehicles, satellite phones,
and potential hostages as lucrative targets. Given the Central
African army's lack of capacity to control the territory, more
NGOs may be forced to leave a region already suffering from
insurgency, food insecurity, and a lack of government services.
END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The late December attacks in northeastern CAR were
brazen in scope. After attacking the IMC office in Ouanda Djalle
and killing two civilians, the attackers set upon Sam Ouandja,
site of 3,500 Darfuri refugees. There, the group attacked with
100 UFDR militia members based just outside of town and as units
of the Central African Army (FACA) were doing a detachment
change over - meaning there were up to 30 soldiers in the
proximity. Multiple sources confirm that the FACA were alerted
to the possibility of an assault, but after maintaining watch
from four am until eight am, the FACA were caught on a shift
change and apparently fled their barracks when the assailants
attacked. Remarkably, the whole operation took less than 45
minutes, with the assailants escaping with three IMC vehicles.
Post contacts reported that one FACA installation was pillaged
and seven AK-47s were stolen.


3. (SBU) Perhaps even more troubling, IMC appears to have been
deliberately targeted. IMC is a U.S. based healthcare and
development NGO that receives 40 percent of its funding in the
CAR from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. IMC
currently operates in multiple locations in the region. In

addition to the three vehicles, IMC offices in both Sam Ouandja
and Ouanda Djalle were pillaged for communications equipment and
supplies. According to the NGO, the assailants inquired about
the whereabouts of one western expatriate employee in Ouanda
Djalle, and for the western expatriate country director in Sam
Ouandja - fortunately both had left days before. MINURCAT
reports that while 15 militants went into Ouanda Djalle, 30
left, suggesting significant reconnoitering and pre positioning
of personnel.


4. (SBU) On January 4, IMC reported to Post that their three
vehicles were spotted for sale over the weekend in Am Doukoun,
Sudan, located 20 km from the CAR/Sudan border. POLOFF informed
the Sudanese Charge (SCDA) of the information and the SCDA said
he would pass on the details to the competent authorities right
away. He did admit that if the vehicles were in the hands of
criminals, it may be difficult to recover them.


5. (SBU) So far, the two most credible hypotheses vis a vis the
identity and motive of the culprits are:

-- The attack was planned by a shadowy figure named Omar
Yulusse, also known as Omar Sodiam (NOTE: SODIAM is the acronym
for a Central African diamond trading company. END NOTE),who is
a diamond merchant and former member of the Union of Democratic
Forces for Unity militia (UDFR),and carried out by Sudanese
mercenaries. Yulusse may be seeking to take control of the
lucrative diamond trade from the UFDR, which nominally controls
the region with the consent of the CARG. It is also thought that
this is the same ``Sudanese'' mercenary group was responsible
for the kidnapping of French NGO workers in Birao, CAR in
November 2009 (Ref A). This time, the group is working for a
different person, Yulusse, with a different agenda (diamonds)

BANGUI 00000002 002.2 OF 002


but the attacks were startlingly similar in their effective use
of local intelligence, speed of action, and their modus
operandi. Also, one contact on the ground claims that Yulusse's
brother was part of the armed band.

-- Another contact with close links to the FACA speculated that
Chadian rebels, very likely those discussed in Ref A,
perpetrated the attacks to replenish stocks of weapons, cash and
other vitals after previous conflict with the government of
Chad. This may explain their desire to perpetrate kidnapping for
ransom, the theft of weapons, and the speed and unusual
professionalism of their attack.


6. (SBU) It is worth noting that most informed contacts in
Bangui believe there is no connection between these attacks and
the attacks of December 11that left two UFDR members and a third
person dead. (The third person was identified by the UFDR as a
refugee from the camp.) As a result of the meeting between
MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo and President Bozize in Bangui at
the end of December, UFDR leader Zakaria Damane pledged not to
attack the refugees or stop humanitarian aid from reaching the
camp. This was met with wide acclaim in the media, but it should
be noted that the UFDR has increased its presence in Sam
Ouandja, and more than one contact has commented on the clear
intention of the UFDR to pressure the refugees into leaving the
area. (NOTE: While Bozize's probable pressure upon Damane,
along with the blood price paid by the Sudanese refugees for the
killing of the UFDR members, appears to have calmed the
situation, Post has little faith that the two sides have found a
lasting solution. Additionally, the UNHCR in Geneva is now
considering the case of moving the refugees further into the
CAR. No word yet on how the CAR government (CARG) will react to
this. END NOTE).


7. (SBU) COMMENT: Northeastern CAR has been continuously
destabilized for several years by internal conflict related to
control of resources and the general lawlessness that prevails
throughout the tri-border region. Furthermore, these recent
attacks targeting NGO resources and expatriates also further
imperil Darfuri refugees camped at Sam Ouandja and the local
Central African population by driving away the few NGOs that
provide food, shelter, and medical services. Although willing
to react and provide information, the small UN peacekeeping
force in the region, MINURCAT, does not currently have the
mandate or the resources to counter the attacks.


8. (SBU) According the SCDA, there is a CARG delegation in Sudan
to discuss border defense. This is a positive step in a region
that is in desperate need of security and stability. Short term
stability will be enhanced by MINURCAT, which sent a platoon of
Nepalese soldiers to Birao on December 26 to augment the 300
Togolese currently stationed in the town. None the less, only
robust Sudanese and Central African government measures will
stabilize the region. END COMMENT.
COOK