Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAMAKO98
2010-02-19 12:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

NEW ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR

Tags:  MARR ML PREL PTER 
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S E C R E T BAMAKO 000098 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020
TAGS: MARR ML PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NEW ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for reasons 1.4 (b)
(d).

S E C R E T BAMAKO 000098

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020
TAGS: MARR ML PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NEW ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for reasons 1.4 (b)
(d).


1. (S) The new Algerian Ambassador to Mali, Nourredine
Ayadi, paid what turned out to be much more than a courtesy
call on the Ambassador on February 10. Ayadi said Algeria's
and Mali's fate were tied together by history and geography.
Unfortunately, the two countries have a very different
approach to dealing with the threat of AQIM, which has
installed itself in the North of Mali, and has proven itself
capable of doing a lot of harm not only in the region but
internationally. The GOM is not living up to its
international obligations with respect to countering
terrorism and has displayed a fair degree of laxity, if not
to say complicity in dealing with the terrorists.


2. (S) Algeria will continue to play a role in mediating
the dispute between various Tuareg groups and the GOM. The
ADC has told the GOA that the Algiers Accords are not being
implemented, and the Government of Mali's response thus far
has largely been ceremonial. The ADC has asked for an
evaluation of the status of implementation of the accords,
but the Malians have put it off sine die. The GOM wants to
move the Kidal Comite de Suivie to Bamako, on the grounds
that its work has been accomplished and it needs to move to
the capital for the next phase. The ADC and GOA think more
work needs to be done, but the GOA has not taken a position
about the move. Algeria offered to the ADC to hold meetings
in Algiers as they work on Algiers Accords implementation.
The Algerian Ambassador felt this may have soured Bamako on
Algerian involvement as the GOM seems to have seen Algiers,
offer to the ADC as interference and encouragement to one
side in the Algiers Accords. The meeting of Tuareg groups in
Algeria was viewed to be a sop to Mali's enemies by the
Government of Mali, to judge by press reports.


3. (S) Ayadi said the P5 of the UN Security Council has
a duty to uphold UNSCR 1267, which established a sanctions
regime to cover individuals associated with Al Qaeda and
subsequent resolutions. Paying ransom in exchange for
hostages is a violation of international law.


4. (S) The Ambassador said the United States has the

same policy not to make substantive concessions to terrorists
or hostage takers. She noted that it is difficult to level
criticism on countries like Mali and Burkina Faso for
facilitating negotiations when the countries that pay ransom,
like Austria and Canada are given a pass. Everyone needs to
get the same message. Ayadi agreed. He said paying ransom
will only make citizens of the ransom-paying nations targets
of future hostage taking attempts. If they stay out of the
North, the terrorists will only come down to Bamako to snatch
them.


5. (S) The Ambassador said there has been lots of talk
of a heads of state meeting in Bamako. A number of high
level U.S. military and civilian government officials have
made the trip to Algiers to discuss the AQIM problem, and the
GOA has consistently stated that "Yes, we want cooperation;
yes, we want Mali to do more; yes, we want to attend the
Bamako summit." The Ambassador noted that she has met with
Malian Government officials, who have said that whenever they
try to organize the summit one or the other of the
prospective participants claims to be unable to attend. She
asked how, if the summit is important, even from a
superficial point of view to give political cover, we can
work together to ensure that it happens. If it is not
important to Algiers, what can we do for the Malian
President? The Ambassador said ATT vacillates between saying
he is going to go it alone, if necessary, and expressing the
view that he has to wait until the summit or until he has the
clear agreement to cooperate from neighbors like Algeria.


6. (S) As for cooperation on a joint center for
operations at Tamanrasset, the Ambassador noted Algeria
states that cooperation has started and they are willing to
move forward, but the Malians are dragging their feet. The
Malians claim the reverse is true: they have hosted high
level visits from Algerian generals and have sent
equivalent-level representation to Tamanrasset for meetings,
but nothing concrete ever comes of it, according to them.
Without inserting the United States in an inappropriate
manner, the Ambassador asked, what would you propose that we
do?


7. (S) Ayadi said that when one's house is on fire, one
does not wait for the fire truck to do something. The GOM is
not operating in good faith. The summit is not a
pre-condition to action. We do not have the impression that
the GOM thinks of AQIM as the enemy. He said the release of
the information he was about to relate had not been cleared
by Algiers: the Algerian army had attempted to conduct an
operation against AQIM with the Malians on Malian soil, but
AQIM had been tipped off in advance and moved out of range.
He said that several months ago, Algeria had formally
requested the extradition of two high level detainees, but
the GOM responded that they were not in their custody. If
Mali were to show the will to engage, we will support them.
The Ambassador asked if these were the conditions of support:
extradition of the two detainees and conducting some
military action against AQIM.


8. (S) Ayadi said yes. We don't need permission to take
action if the GOA and the GOM want to take action. The
Algerian side is ready. He said we speak from experience.
The first attack took place in Algeria in 1989, against a
military outpost far away from Algiers. Everyone said "it's
far away, we don't have to worry about it," but two years
later Algiers was in blood and flames. People in Mali don't
realize what they are getting themselves into. We Algerians
have paid a very heavy toll to gain mastery over the
situation and now we don't want to see things come apart
again because AQIM has established itself in Northern Mali.


9. (S) The Ambassador said the United States is trying
to take a systematic approach to training and equipping
Malian Army units, particularly those units responsible for
providing security in the North. We find the Malian soldiers
to be willing partners with extremely limited resources.
Success will not be achieved overnight; they are not able to
do much. We would like to get to a point where if the Malian
Army tries to engage they will not face humiliation and
become demoralized.


10. (S) Ayadi claimed that the Malian Army had shown
capability to take action against the Tuareg rebellion but
refuse to do anything about AQIM. Niger has fewer resources
but does more in the fight, and the proof is that AQIM has
been unable to establish a base in that country. It looks
worse than weakness on the part of the Malians, it looks like
willful complicity. Ayadi mentioned the Tenere radios, and
how Mauritania had used its ability to communicate with
Algeria via radio to cooperate on the hostage crisis. In
Mali, by contrast, the Tenere radio has not even been taken
out of its plastic wrapping. The Ambassador noted that Mali
had only recently received a Tenere radio from Algeria, that
we were working to provide more, and that she understood they
had been testing secure communications.


11. (S) Comment: Ambassador Ayadi,s accusatory and
dismissive assessment of Mali is consistent with the views of
his predecessor and with views expressed in Algiers to
various high level USG representatives. His laughing off the
idea of a Bamako Summit and his explanation of Algeria,s
bottom line requirement of the Malians, that they undertake
military operations against AQIM before Algeria will consider
working with or helping them, however, is at variance with
statements coming from Algiers. What is consistent is the
pattern of frequent changes in describing the faults of the
Malians that are causing Algiers not to act. Our attempts to
elicit constructive information about how to bring the two
neighbors together to deal with a common problem, and
questions about practical follow up to Tamanrassett and
Mali,s proposed operation plan, were consistently
disregarded in favor of pursuing a litany of complaints
against Bamako. The dispute between Mali and Algeria over
two detainees whom Algeria wants extradited and France wants
liberated in exchange for its hostage has particularly soured
Malian-Algerian relations at the moment. As it is easier,
and feels more virtuous, to list problems than work toward
solutions, it seems likely that efforts to bring Mali and
Algeria closer to fight AQIM, though necessary, will continue
to be a very uphill battle.

MILOVANOVIC