KRG OFFICIALS ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000064

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2030
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM USNC IZ
SUBJECT: KRG OFFICIALS ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK

REF: BAGHDAD 3229

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with senior leaders of the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),the Ambassador's Senior
Advisor for Northern Iraqi (SANI) emphasized U.S. support for
a negotiated, consensus-based solution to Kirkuk. SANI
stressed to Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Kamal Kirkuki
and Kurdistan Regional Government Deputy Prime Minister Azad
Barwari that deliberate, careful consultations between all
parties were needed to avoid exacerbating tensions in the
disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) areas, including Kirkuk.
Kirkuki, a hardliner, claimed the Kurds had compromised on
the election law based on perceived promises in the
POTUS/VPOTUS calls to KRG President Barzani and the White
House statement of December 7. He insisted on implementing
Article 140 in accordance with the Kurds' interpretation (a
census followed by "up or down" referendum on Kirkuk),
claimed any other approach would engender civil war and
"another genocide" for Iraq's Kurds, and threatened to
boycott the national elections. Barwari was more measured,
saying he saw "nothing new" in the White House statement and
that while the election law compromise was not ideal, it had
allowed Iraq to move forward. Barwari expressed concern that
mounting tension between the Kurdish PUK and Goran Movement
parties could lead to political violence in the run-up to
national elections. He also said the merger of KDP and PUK
peshmerga elements was moving forward, and he offered that
"unhealthy" U.S. policies in the region were such that Iran
would continue to benefit as long as discussions over its
nuclear program continued. Barwari denied that Kurds in
Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran aspire to a unified, independent
Kurdish state, and cautioned that Iraq and other states with
significant Kurdish populations needed to protect Kurds'
rights. Kirkuki's hardline, emotional reaction to our view
on Kirkuk -- especially the need for negotiated consensus as
a precursor to any referendum under Article 140 -- highlights
the difficulties in resolving Kirkuk's status through a
negotiated process, instead of the less consensual approach
favored by the KRG. END SUMMARY.

SANI CLARIFIES U.S. POSITION ON ARTICLE 140 & KIRKUK
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2. (C) The Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq
(SANI) met with the Speaker of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament
(IKP),Kamal Kirkuki, on December 20 in Erbil. (Note:
Kirkuki, a member of the KDP's politburo and a former
peshmerga general, is a hardliner on Kurdish national
interests, particularly Kirkuk. End note.) SANI conveyed
reftel points, clarifying that U.S. support for
implementation of Article 140 of Iraq's constitution
envisions a referendum to confirm a negotiated,
consensus-based resolution of Kirkuk's status (a
"confirmatory referendum"),not/not an "up or down"
referendum to decide among possible solutions for Kirkuk's
status. He noted Ambassador Hill's experience in the
Balkans, where several types of referenda -- including those
to affirm consensus agreements -- contributed positively to
the resolution of complex and difficult political situations.
As the WH statement of December 7 made clear, the U.S. is
ready to support the GOI's effort to conduct an accurate
census as one element in support of future provincial and
national elections. From the U.S. perspective, there was
flexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the
Qflexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the
census, all-party negotiations, and a subsequent referendum
to affirm a negotiated solution on Kirkuk.

KIRKUKI REJECTS ALTERNATE APPROACHES
--------------


3. (C) Kirkuki pushed back strongly, claiming the U.S.
committed in the POTUS/VPOTUS telcons with KRG President
Barzani on December 6, and in the WH statement on December 7,
to implement Article 140 according to the "normal" Kurdish
intepretation, e.g., census followed by a straightforward
referendum offering two options: Kirkuk Province either: A)
becomes part of the KRG, or; B) becomes a regular province
with no affiliation to the KRG. If the U.S. was not faithful
to its original promise, he said, there would be "a crisis
for the Kurds". He rejected "completely" that there could be
any flexibility in applying Article 140, arguing that it
clearly called for a census followed by a referendum on
whether Kirkuk would become part of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region (IKR). In a long, emotional presentation, Kirkuki
conveyed the following points:

- The KRG would reject any attempt to use Article 142 to
amend Article 140.
- KRG leaders were under heavy pressure to avoid concessions
on Kirkuk. The Kurdish opposition (i.e., the Goran Movement)
claimed the U.S. "deceived" KRG leaders into accepting an
election law compromise unfavorable to Kurdish interests and
that KRG leaders had "betrayed" the Kurdish people, limiting
KRG leaders' room for maneuver.

- It was unfair to expect the IKR's inhabitants to remain
part of Iraq without having their constitutional rights
(i.e., implementation of Article 140 according to the Kurdish
formulation) protected. Kurds "would not understand this".

- Claiming Kurds "had not had justice" in Iraq, Kirkuki
alleged that former PM Allawi, former PM Jaafari and current
PM Maliki had all promised to implement Article 140 (again,
according to the "normal" Kurdish formulation),but none had
done so.

- Arabs were "extremists" who would exploit power to
"slaughter" other groups. The U.S. was mistaken if it
believed the Arabs would be "wiser now" with respect to the
Kurds than in the past, when they had deployed chemical
weapons against Kurdish civilians.

- If Kirkuk's status was not resolved "according to Article
140 and the constitution" (i.e., the Kurdish formulation of
normalization, census and up/down referendum, in that order),
there would, "for sure", with 100 percent certainty be a
civil war.

- If Article 140 and the constitution are not implemented,
there will be "another Kurdish genocide" after the drawdown
of U.S. forces, which KRG leaders cannot permit.

- In a Kurdish language aside to his assistant, Kirkuki said
that if the SANI's message accurately reflected U.S. policy,
KRG leaders should instruct Kurds to boycott the March 2010
national elections.


4. (C) Pushing back, SANI stressed that the POTUS/VPOTUS
calls to Barzani reflected the U.S. commitment to its
friendship with the KRG and the Kurdish people. Even after
the withdrawal of its forces, the diplomatic and political
efforts of the U.S. would continue. It was important to make
progress in the coming period on Kirkuk and other problems in
the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas. U.S. leaders
understand Kirkuk is a complicated issue, but a civil war
would hurt Kurdish interests, undo the IKR's achievements and
jeopardize Iraq's unity. SANI asked for commitment to a
step-by-step process that would allow all parties to proceed
in a deliberate, careful manner. The U.S. view was that such
a process should comprise the following elements: 1) holding
on-time national elections; 2) conducting, with U.S. support,
a census in 2010, and; 3) negotiating a consensus-based
agreement on Kirkuk's status. He urged continued close
consultation between KRG and U.S. leaders, aimed at
preserving Kurdish rights and Kurdish achievements within a
unified Iraq.


5. (C) Saying the U.S. views resembled those of UNAMI, which
employed many Arabs and was "biased against the Kurds",
Kirkuki asked whether SANI's message represented the view of
the Embassy and UN, or also that of the White House. Noting
he had been at the White House on the day Iraq's election law
was adopted and the December 7 WH statement had been drafted,
SANI assured Kirkuki that he conveyed a unified U.S.
position. The U.S. closely consulted with UNAMI and viewed
it as neutral. Iraqi unity was an overarching priority;
there should be a constructive solution for Kirkuk that
strengthened the Iraqi nation. Building a stronger, more
autonomous KRG with an eye toward independence was dangerous.
Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a
Q Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a
well-armed, centralized government, Kirkuki stressed that
unless the DIBs were resolved before the U.S. drawdown, there
would be "a valley of problems". He urged SANI to focus on
implementing Article 140 (in accordance with the KRG's
formulation) and to refrain from any further discussion of a
negotiated, consensus-based agreement on Kirkuk's status.

PESHMERGA MERGER
--------------


6. (C) Kirkuki confirmed media reports that there had been
progress in merging the KDP and PUK-affiliated wings of the
peshmerga. Barzani had issued instructions that the
peshmerga, which previously had separate KDP and
PUK-affiliated headquarters in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah,
respectively, should be integrated into a single entity with
a shared command structure and operating protocols. The
budget for the peshmerga would eventually come from the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense. (Note: Media reports claimed that during
his recent visit to Baghdad, KRG DPM Barham Salih discussed
with PM Maliki the status of the peshmerga merger. There are
unconfirmed reports that Maliki will soon travel to Erbil to
meet with Barzani and sign an agreement for the eventual
integration of the merged peshmerga into the Iraqi Army (IA).
End note.)

KRG DPM BARWARI LESS STRIDENT ON KIRKUK
--------------


7. (C) In a subsequent meeting on December 26, KRG Deputy
Prime Minister (DPM) Azad Barwari was more measured in his
analysis of the POTUS/VPOTUS calls with Barzani and the
December 7 WH statement. (Note: Barwari is a senior member
of the KDP's politburo; it is widely reported that Barzani
installed him as DPM to closely watch KRG Prime Minister (PM)
Barham Salih, a PUK member. End note.) On the statement,
Barwari said he "saw no problems with it" and nothing in it
that represented new U.S. policy. The election law
compromise was not ideal, but it was a solution that allowed
the country needed to move forward. He anticipated problems
registering out-of-country voters (OCVs),and urged that an
accurate national census be conducted in accordance with the
December 7 WH statement to mitigate demographic questions and
facilitate future elections.

IRAN WINS AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE
--------------


8. (C) Responding to SANI's observation that KRG PM Salih was
visiting the "Iranian brothers" in Tehran, Barwari carefully
noted they were "not brothers, but cousins". (Note: A
reference to President Talabani's familiar dictum that the
Kurds can choose their friends (e.g., the U.S.),but cannot
choose their neighbors any more than a person can choose the
members of his/her family. End note.) Referring to the
recent takeover by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
troops of an oil well in the al-Fakkah field on the Iraq-Iran
border, Barwari said if he had been in Salih's place, he
would have postponed visiting Tehran. He lamented the "bad
timing" of dissident Iranian cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein
Ali Montazeri's death, saying it could hurt efforts to
moderate Iran's behavior. Noting Montazeri's criticism of
Iran's nuclear ambitions and its defiance of the
international community, Barwari claimed that "Iran never won
in a war, but it wins by politics". The Iranian account was
"complicated", but U.S. policy in the region - characterized
by contentious issues like Pakistan, Yemen's Houthi rebellion
and Iraq - was "unhealthy" and ultimately benefited Iran.
For its part, Iran was unclear about its policy goals and
pursued maximalist negotiating positions, which was
unhelpful. On balance, as long as discussions with the
international community continued, Iran won.

KDP FEARS VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN GORAN AND PUK
-------------- --


9. (C) On upcoming national elections, Barwari said delaying
polling until March, when better weather was expected, would
facilitate greater turnout in the IKR. Conceding that the
open list system would change electoral dynamics, he said
Kurdish parties, accustomed to party lists and strict voter
discipline, were working to adjust. KDP leaders "feared"
competition between the PUK and Goran ("Change") Movement in
Sulaimaniyah. It was not important which of the parties
prevailed, but that they did not destroy the political system
in the process by fomenting political violence. There was
"no evidence" that either party had planned such
provocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari
Qprovocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari
predicted violent clashes between the PUK and Goran in the
run-up to the March elections. He characterized Goran's
candidates as being "slightly more confident" than the PUK's,
but said the PUK also believed it would do well. (Comment: It
is clear the KDP is not entirely comfortable with Goran's
threat to the traditional bipolar KDP/PUK order; Barwari's
remark about PUK candidates' confidence may have represented
a triumph of hope over analysis. End comment.)

PESHMERGA MERGER A "VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT"
-------------- -


10. (C) Barwari characterized progress on merging KDP and PUK
peshmerga elements as a "very positive development".
According to Barwari, USF-I CG Odierno had visited the IKR
several times to discuss the effort and there was a good
plan, captured in a draft law, to implement the merger. The
IKP's Council of Ministers needed to approve the draft law,
which also addressed the proposed merger of KDP and PUK
Assayesh elements. It would then go to the full IKP for
approval. It would be problematic if the peshmerga remained
divided into politically-affiliated camps; the merger would
mitigate the potential for political violence in the IKR.
The SANI asked about reports that PM Maliki would soon visit
Erbil to follow up on recent meetings in Baghdad with KRG PM
Salih and, according to press reports, sign agreements
related to the eventual integration of the peshmerga into the
IA. Barwari claimed to have no knowledge of dates, but noted
that it would be "natural" for Maliki to visit since the IKR
was part of Iraq and therefore fell within his bailiwick.

NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE AND KURDISH ASPIRATIONS
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Barwari questioned whether the IA's capacity and
authority were equal to the challenge of implementing the
joint security architecture in the DIBs areas. Kurdish
forces would help lend capability to those forces within the
context of the joint checkpoints and joint patrols. The IKR
was part of Iraq, but Arab Iraqis claimed the Kurds were
working to achieve independence. The IKR needed to be a
"real partner" in Iraq; it would be helpful for the Iraqi
national parliament to clarify the interpretation of key
dispute articles of the constitution to reduce friction
between the IKR and the rest of the country. Agreement on
those interpretations should be achieved through democratic
consensus, not by the dictates of the majority.


12. (C) Acknowledging sectarian and ethnic tensions, Barwari
stressed that Iraq needed to move beyond those. Noting that
there would always be problems if Kurds' constitutional
rights were denied, Barwari stressed that Kurds in Syria,
Turkey, Iraq and Iran did not/not aspire to a unified,
independent Kurdish state. The prevailing political culture
in the states with significant Kurdish populations was such
that they wanted to contain what they perceived as a Kurdish
threat to their territorial integrity. It was therefore
incumbent on the Kurds to be mindful of the perceived threat
they posed and be "a bit patient" in their demands. Noting
that one of the only points of agreement between those states
was a desire to oppress the Kurds, Barwari expressed hope
that the issue of Kurdish rights could be successfully
resolved as it had been in Iraq.


13. (C) COMMENT: The difference in Kirkuki and Barwari's tone
in discussing implementation of Article 140 underscores that
views within the KRG are not homogeneous. That said, Kirkuk
remains a highly emotive issue and the KRG's moderates feel
constrained in their ability to advocate for less contentious
approaches. Kirkuki's emotional reaction to the U.S.
position on Kirkuk highlights the difficulties we will surely
face when the time comes to press in earnest for resolving
Kirkuk's status through a negotiated, consensual process,
instead of the up-or-down, instant decision by referendum
approach that has become the default position of the KRG.
More sophisticated Kurdish interlocutors, such as Barzani
chief of staff Fuad Hussein, readily acknowledge the need for
a negotiating process with Arab, Turkoman and other minority
communities as part of the any "settlement" of Kirkuk
(details septel). We will need to promote a negotiated,
consensus-based approach in our discussions with KRG leaders
in the months ahead to prepare the ground for an eventual
diplomatic push to resolve Kirkuk's status.
HILL