CW DESTRUCTION PLAN IN IRAQ: NO MONEY AND SHIFTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000364

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR
THE HAGUE FOR BIEK
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN, CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CW DESTRUCTION PLAN IN IRAQ: NO MONEY AND SHIFTING
PLAYERS

REF: A. 09 HAGUE 738

B. HAGUE 39

C. HAGUE 79

D. MIKULAK-BANAA LETTER OF 4 FEBRUARY 2010

Classified By: PM MinCouns Cameron Munter for reasons 1.4(b) & (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a February 7 meeting with PMOff and
a United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) J-3 representative, Dr.
Mohammed Al Sharaa, Director General of the Iraqi National
Monitoring Directorate (INMD),claimed the GOI did not
forward prior chemical munitions find reports to the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
because these munitions finds had not been filled with
chemical agents. In addition, Dr. Al Sharaa, although
admitting the importance of designating key actors to
coordinate Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) destruction plans,
stated the GOI would not send the technical experts who
participated in the January CW destruction plan discussions
in The Hague to the February 22-26 follow-up discussions,
citing lack of funding. Finally, Dr. Al Sharaa revealed the
formation of a GOI inter-ministerial technical expert
committee that will review the proposed CW destruction plan
and decide whether encapsulation of the Muthanna bunker is a
valid option. The Embassy will continue to engage with the
GOI on these issue, stressing the importance of participant
continuity in destruction planning and the future funding of
CW destruction operations. End Summary.

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GOI CONFUSED OVER WHAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FINDS
NEED TO BE REPORTED TO OPCW
-------------- --


2. (SBU) On February 7, PMOff and LTC Steve Creighton, USF-I
J-3 CBRNE Fusion Cell Lead, met with representatives from the
INMD and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to discuss chemical
munitions finds reporting to the OPCW, the proposed CW
destruction plan and the upcoming OPCW Executive Council
meeting at The Hague. During this meeting, PMOff provided
the GOI reports of chemical munitions finds discovered by
USF-I between February and August 2009. Although these
reports were previously provided by the U.S. to Dr. Al Sharaa
and sBG Ali, MoD Chemical Defense Corps, the GOI failed to
forward them to the OPCW, as required under the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) (ref. A). When pressed by the USG
for the reasons behind its failure to transmit these reports,
Dr. Al Sharaa responded that the GOI would only transmit
munitions finds that had been filled with chemical agents.
For example, he claimed that the GOI would not need to report
munitions that had been rendered unserviceable by UNSCOM.
Further, he stated that in order to determine which munitions
finds the GOI needed to report to the OPCW, the GOI would
need to analyze them in a laboratory. (Note and Comment: The
U.S. does not intrusively test recovered rounds for
confirmation of agent type or fill. Rather, the U.S.
declares rounds that have been identified as having been
manufactured as chemical rounds. With this disagreement on
the reporting requirements under the CWC, it will be
important for GOI representatives, while they are at The
Hague in February, to go through these reports with the OPCW
Technical Secretariat (TS),clarifying the CWC's requirements
QTechnical Secretariat (TS),clarifying the CWC's requirements
for these and all future chemical munitions finds. End Note
and Comment.)

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FEBRUARY HAGUE TRIP: PREVIOUS TECHNICAL EXPERT
PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT ATTEND
-------------- --------------


3. (C) In response to PMOff's question regarding Iraqi
technical representation at the February OPCW Executive
Council meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa, although claiming to agree
that key Iraqi actors are necessary to coordinate Iraq's CW
destruction plan, admitted the GOI would send different
participants to the OPCW to continue the dialogue regarding
CW destruction plans in Iraq. (Note: In January, the GOI sent
Iraqi technical experts Mohanad Al-Helli, Director, Chemical
Activity Department, INMD, and Khalid Al-Janabi, Engineer, to
The Hague for discussions with the USG and the OPCW TS on

possible options on destroying CW remnants in Iraq (ref. B).
End Note.) PMOff stressed the importance of continuity in
the destruction plan discussions and the technical expertise
of both Mohanad and Khalid (ref. C & D). Dr. Al Sharaa
responded by claiming the GOI did not have the money to fund
the travel for these two individuals and that he (Dr. Al
Sharaa) would be attending the February technical meetings
with Jwan Khioka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA),sBG
Mohammed Ali, MoD, and Dr. Essam, INMD. (Comment and Note:
Although Dr. Al Sharaa claims he recognizes the importance of
these meetings and the need for key GOI actors to coordinate
Iraq's destruction plan, his failure to send Mohanad, who
works directly for Dr. Al Sharaa, speaks volumes. Rather
than sending Dr. Essam from INMD to attend the upcoming
meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa could just as easily have sent
Mohanad, the head of his Chemical Activity Department, and an
individual with both the knowledge and expertise to
participate in these important CW destruction planning
discussions. In addition to issues within INMD, there appear
to be issues with the MoD as well. Minister of Defense Abd
Al-Qadr Al-Mufriji has given permission for sBG Ali to travel
to The Hague for the February meetings; however, it is
unclear whether he will ultimately be allowed to participate
in the meetings. Previously, Minister Al-Mufriji rescinded
his permission for sBG Ali to depart Iraq without any
explanation for this decision, thereby denying the
participants an opportunity to consider the Iraqi military's
views on CW destruction plans in Iraq. (ref. D). End Comment
and Note.)

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GOI TECHNICAL EXPERT COMMITTEE FORMED TO
REVIEW THE CHEMICAL WEAPON DESTRUCTION PLAN
--------------


4. (C) In order to review the CW destruction plan proposed
in January, the GOI has formed an inter-ministerial technical
expert committee that will determine whether encapsulation of
the Muthanna bunker would be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa
revealed. Although the GOI had not selected him to serve on
this committee, Dr. Al Sharaa expressed concern that
encapsulation would be insufficient and the contents of the
bunker could have a negative environmental effect on
neighboring areas. At one point during this discussion, Dr.
Al Sharaa claimed there are unexploded ordinances (UXO) in
the bunker. (Note and Comment: Dr. Al Sharaa showed U.S.
representatives several aerial photos of the Muthanna bunker,
which clearly showed a hole in the top of the bunker and
chemical munitions scattered on the bunker floor. Dr. Al
Sharaa would not allow us to take these photos, claiming they
were classified. It is unclear whether this demonstration was
meant to suggest the scattered munitions were UXO, as he
claimed. However, based upon previous USG assessments, there
are no UXO in the Muthanna bunker (ref. B). End Note and
Comment.)


5. (SBU) After expressing his concerns that encapsulation
would not be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa then seemed to shift
gears, claiming a previously-proposed U.S. plan for
destruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the
Qdestruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the
plan that had been proposed by the German government (ref.
A),which was not as detailed or as expensive as the U.S.
plan. LTC Creighton suggested that another alternative the
GOI might consider could be a hybrid of the German and U.S.
plan, further suggesting that the GOI break the destruction
plan into tasks and request international assistance with
each specific task. Further complicating the issue, Dr. Al
Sharaa informed the U.S. reps that the GOI does not have the
money to fund CW destruction, claiming the GOI budget has
already been passed and the earliest the GOI would have money
for destruction costs would be in FY 2011.


6. (C) Comment: Based upon the failure of the GOI to grasp
the importance of sending the same technical expert team to
The Hague for further CW destruction plan discussions with
the OPCW TS and the U.S. and the statements made by Dr. Al
Sharaa that the GOI is unable to fund any CW destruction in
the immediate future, there may be concerns that the GOI does
not consider compliance with the CWC a priority. What is
apparent is that any CW destruction plan would require

complete funding by the international community, as the GOI
has not made the task of either encapsulating the bunker or
breaking the seal and inventorying and destroying the
contents of the bunker a fiscal priority. If Iraqi CW
destruction implementation is envisioned for any time in the
near future, significant buy-in from the international
community is required. However, without a clear CW
destruction plan and executable tasks that can be
communicated by the GOI, complete international funding is
uncertain. The Embassy will continue to engage the GOI,
stressing the importance of CW destruction funding and the
importance of consistent Iraqi participation at international
forums. End Comment.
HILL