Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ATHENS133
2010-02-25 09:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE: VIEWS ON IRAN TRR AND RECENT EU FAC; SYRIA DEMARCHE

Tags:  PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR SY GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0133/01 0560946
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 250946Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1624
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000133 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR SY GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: VIEWS ON IRAN TRR AND RECENT EU FAC; SYRIA DEMARCHE
PASSED

REF: STATE 16530; STATE 15979

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC IAEA IR SY GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: VIEWS ON IRAN TRR AND RECENT EU FAC; SYRIA DEMARCHE
PASSED

REF: STATE 16530; STATE 15979

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA interlocutors welcomed points explaining our
position on the Tehran Research Reactor, and appreciated our
interest in addressing the humanitarian issues facing Iran. They
stated that due to a great divergence of views among members, the
EU had not yet decided if it will apply unilateral measures against
Iran, and is watching to see what the UN Security Council does
first. They expressed great concern that Greece could suffer
economically in the case of oil sanctions due to its dependency on
Iranian oil, and significant shipping interests corollary to that -
particularly if China did not support the sanctions. In a separate
engagement on Syria, MFA took on board our concerns about Syrian
nuclear activities and the need to for Syria to cooperate fully
with the IAEA, stating our paper would be reviewed carefully. END
SUMMARY.



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IRAN: EU STILL SPLIT, GREECE CONCERNED ABOUT BOTTOM LINE

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2. (C) Pol-Mil Chief delivered reftel B points jointly February 23
to the MFA's International Organizations Directorate (D1)
Disarmament Sub-Section Head Loukas Tsokos, who has primary
responsibility for IAEA policy, and Common Security and Defense
Policy Directorate's (A11) European Correspondent Alexandros
Ioannidis, who coordinates Foreign Affairs Council preparation and
accompanies the Minister to Brussels monthly. Points were shared
February 24 with the Middle East Directorate's (A6) Iran, Iraq, and
Gulf States Counselor Grigoris Karahalios, as well. All welcomed
the explanation of our position on the Tehran Research Reactor and
the accompanying non-papers, and appreciated our interest in
addressing the humanitarian issues facing Iran.




2. (C) Tsokos stated that Greece shared our views with regard to
the humanitarian concerns in Iran, and was increasingly concerned
at Iran's intransigence toward the international community.

Ioannidis provided a glimpse into the restricted EU FAC session on
Iran. He stated that while most EU members agreed that Iran had
gone too far and the EU needed to do something, there was a wide
divergence on the "what" and the "how" of potential EU action, and
thus the FAC concluded nothing concrete. All eyes were on New
York, with a general view that the EU needed to support the UNSC
before implementing any additional EU measures. Karahalios added
that the Council's COMEM working group on the Middle East and Gulf
was set to continue discussion February 25 on possible measures the
EU could take in the trade, finance, transport, and energy sectors.





3. (C) All three were adamant on the potential damage to Greece's
economic bottom line should sanctions be applied, and especially if
China did not fully participate. Ioannidis reiterated the
longstanding Greek concern that Greece receives approximately 30
percent of its oil imports from Iran, much of that carried by Greek
ships. Karahalios said that while Greece had explored diversifying
and importing more from other producers, Middle East and Gulf
producers replied that production levels were booked, which would
leave a thirty percent gap in Greek oil imports in the case of
sanctions unless alternate sources could be found. All expressed
the firm view that if China did not participate in sanctions,
Chinese industry would simply consume any excess Iranian oil supply
created by sanctions, and that Chinese ships would quickly replace
Greek ships in the transport sector.



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IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO GREECE: WE DON'T TRUST THEM

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4. (C) Karahalios stated that the Iranian Ambassador to Greece had
come to the MFA the preceding week, and told them that Iran was
ready to do an exchange of LEU for reactor fuel, but that Iran did
not trust the U.S. and others not to keep the LEU and refuse to
honor their side of the deal. Karahalios expressed the view that
Iran would eventually accept an exchange, if negotiations could
continue. PolMil Chief pointed Karahalios to the fact that we have
offered Iran substantial assurances, and that the international
community also needs a strong sign of Iran's good faith in order to
give us the confidence we need following Iran's lengthy history of
non-compliance.



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SYRIA: POINTS DELIVERED

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5. (C) Separately on Feburary 24, we delivered to Tsokos U.S.
concerns about Syrian nuclear activities and the need for Syria to
cooperate fully with the IAEA. He took our concerns on board and
stated that our paper would be reviewed carefully.
SPECKHARD