MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000043

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: AU Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by a
delegation from SADC, the UN, COI, and the OIF, met with
Madagascar's political leaders January 21-22 to propose a compromise
solution for implementing the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords. De
facto president Rajoelina immediately rejected Ping's approach,
although Ping encouraged him to reconsider over the next 15 days and
hopes he has not heard the HAT's last word. In a reversal of prior
statements, both Ping and the French Ambassador said that they
supported the return of SADC mediator Chissano if Rajoelina was
willing to re-engage in negotiations. If Rajoelina definitively
rejects the olive branch offered by Ping by February 5, the AU is
likely to move to targeted sanctions against the HAT. African heads
of state might take this up during the upcoming AU Summit; if not,
the issue will wait until the next AU Peace and Security Council
meeting, to take place by February 15. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) African Union Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by Peace and
Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, visited Madagascar January
21-22 in an effort to encourage Madagascar's leaders to apply the
agreements that they had signed in Maputo and Addis Ababa in 2009.
During his stay, he met with de facto president Rajoelina
(tete-a-tete lunch),co-presidents Andrianirina and Rakotovahiny,
consensus PM Mangalaza, TGV's PM Vital, other members of the
Ravalomanana/Zafy/Ratisiraka movements, military and civil society
leaders, and the local representatives of the International Contact
Group.

3. (SBU) Ping presented a "compromise solution" to the four
movements which demanded the application of the signed Maputo I and
Addis accords, while clarifying a few points of contention regarding
the roles of the president and co-presidents. The proposal followed
a principled approach, in line with the positions of the USG and
SADC, rather than following the tack of HAT appeasement recommended
in the French proposal before the visit. The compromise solution
maintained the two co-presidents; assigned Ravalomanana's appointed
co-president to carry out transition goals and Zafy's appointed
co-president to focus on development issues; allowed acts taken by
the president in cabinet meetings that were not co-signed by the two
co-presidents as required by the Addis accord to be reviewed a
second time by the cabinet for approval; granted the president
precedence on protocol issues; and empowered the cabinet to
determine the role of the two co-presidents on protocol matters. It
reaffirmed Eugene Mangalaza, dismissed by TGV in December, as the
consensus prime minister and stated that the fair manner of dividing
ministerial portfolios among the four movements agreed to in Addis
should be maintained. The compromise solution also recommended that
a constitutional referendum should be held first, followed by
legislative and presidential elections at the same time no later
than October. Finally, the amnesty agreements reached in Maputo
should be respected, and the amnesty law should be passed by the
transition senate and congress.

4. (SBU) Although the Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy movements
appeared pleased by the AU proposal, Rajoelina rejected it
immediately. In a likely pre-cooked written statement, Rajoelina
avowed that "cohabitation" was impossible and requested support for
rapid elections.

5. (SBU) In a briefing of the ICG members following the first day's
events, Ping explained that the purpose of his mission was to
unblock implementation of the Maputo I and Addis accords. Most
diplomats were in agreement that the compromise solution would fail
due to the HAT's rejection. Ping did not disagree, but said that if
the Malagasy would like to re-launch negotiations, President
Chissano would take the lead as mediation was outside the scope of
Ping's mandate for this visit. Ping suggested that, given the
likelihood of a failure of the Maputo process, targeted sanctions
against the HAT might be discussed at the AU summit in late January,
or delayed for Peace and Security Council consideration between
February 5 and 15. The French Ambassador was visibly upset by the
suggestion of sanctions and engaged in an undiplomatic exchange with
Ping on the issue. Ping asserted that the AU must stick to its
principles against coups and also respect the SADC's views. In the
end, the French Ambassador assured Ping that France would continue
to support the AU's lead here.

6. (SBU) Following further meetings the next day, Ping again briefed
the ICG late on Jan 22. He said that despite the letter from TGV
rejecting the compromise proposal, which he asserted was mainly for
domestic consumption, some HAT representatives - even TGV's
hard-line adviser Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana -- appeared open to
discussions. All four movements, even the HAT, discussed the
establishment of the AU-SADC-OIF-UN follow-up mechanism for
implementation of the Maputo accords in Madagascar. However, as
there is nothing currently in place to monitor, the follow-up
mechanism will not be implemented, Ping said. Ping was not overly
optimistic, but thought that the HAT might be willing to make
concessions when faced with the now-serious threat of sanctions. He
added that the AU did not consider TGV's letter as the HAT's final
response, but would give them the full 15-day period, through Feb 5,
to reflect and respond.

7. (SBU) The French Ambassador noted that he had received frantic

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calls from HAT representatives all Friday morning, indicating their
concern about the possible ramifications (read sanctions) of their
actions [Comment: from which they now realize the French will be
unable to protect them. End comment.] In a surprising reversal of
prior statements and/or apparent positions, both the French
Ambassador and Jean Ping said that they supported the return of SADC
mediator Chissano if the HAT was willing to re-engage in
negotiations. Ping suggested several times that the HAT may be
willing to re-engage if they can save face by maintaining their
Prime Minister Camille Vital as the "Consensus Prime Minister"
called for under Maputo I. As Vital is known as a "Ratsirakiste"
and according to prior agreement it was Ratsiraka who provided the
PM names for approval by the four movements, Ping thought there was
a possibility of Vital being retained as the new "consensus PM".
The French clearly also support retention of Vital, their ambassador
having argued that his presence was key to maintaining stability
within the military.

8. (SBU) Five representatives of the Zafy movement told the
ambassador Jan 22 that unilateral elections can not resolve the
political crisis and asserted that the risk for the country would be
extremely serious if the three opposition movements were excluded
from the transition government. They expressed concern about the
ambiguous position of France and the actions of certain French
nationals, suggesting clearly that reprisals against French
nationals and interests may become frequent if the French do not
alter their "meddling" approach. They said the military is the key
to Rajoelina's power and noted that the opposition movements are
reaching out to sympathetic military leaders to urge them to not
support Rajoelina but to "remain neutral". They argued that the
Malagasy people and the army react slowly after events, but assured
us that after some time, they would react "correctly". Due to the
lack of rule of law, increase in corruption, rising number of armed
attacks, and the encouragement of the three opposition movements,
the people, they argued, would eventually rise up and attack those
that are benefitting from this crisis.

9. (SBU) Consensus Prime Minister Mangalaza met with the ambassador
on Saturday to reaffirm his willingness "to be of service" if
needed. He is returning to his home outside Tamatave, for both
security and financial reasons; he no longer receives any support
from the government and presumably is having to pay for his hotel
room and all other expenses himself. He reported that Vital had
given Ping a formal letter requesting his designation as "Consensus
Prime Minister" instead of Mangalaza. The conversation with
Mangalaza raised the strong possibility that he had become
unacceptable not so much to Rajoelina (with whom he never had any
particular confrontation) as to the French: Mangalaza recounted
several instances of attempted French strong-arming, which he
resisted, much to their chagrin. At the same time, there is indeed
a major issue of face-saving involved in the identity of the
consensus prime minister following Rajoelina's firing of Mangalaza,
and no individual should be deemed irreplaceable. A Saturday call
to the ambassador by a HAT insider also suggested that the HAT may
be looking at finding a more acceptable substitute for co-President
Fetison Andrianirina, whose strong public words against Rajoelina
and the HAT also raise issues of face and compatibility in any
cohabitation. That the HAT is examining such potential personnel
changes gives some small hope that the HAT will opt to resurrect
Maputo and Addis after all, but such "insider" glimmers generally
have proven false in the past.

10. (SBU) A former presidential candidate, not affiliated with the
four movements, reiterated to Emboff separately that the Malagasy
are slow to react. They build up grievances one by one and then
explode, she explained. It is unclear when that point may come, but
she predicted that it might occur once the results of a
unilaterally-organized presidential election were known. She would
like to mobilize people to stop TGV from moving unilaterally forward
to what she believes will be rigged legislative and presidential
elections, but complained that she lacks financial resources and
feels powerless to stop this high speed train.

11. (SBU) Other Malagasy citizens that are paying attention to
politics - even Ravalomanana supporters -- have told us
alternatively that they support rapid elections. Some argue that
once the elections are held, it will be obvious that TGV lacks a
support base, while others argue that the crisis will continue until
elections are held so it would be best to have them as soon as
possible. As long as the international community is divided and
perceived to be supporting both sides (HAT and opposition),each
side will feel buoyed and will continue to perpetuate the crisis,
others argue. Some contacts argue that there will be a civil war if
elections go forward, while others see civil war as a stronger
possibility if the crisis drags on without elections. Ping said
that certain colonels and generals with whom his delegation met
implied that they might be pushed into committing a coup d'etat if
the politicians continued to take the country down a dead-end road.
He of course advised them to stay in their barracks, but recognized
that they might not.

12. (SBU) Comment and Action Recommendation: Our view is that the

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unilateral election plan envisioned by the HAT would in fact
perpetuate and aggravate the crisis by further postponing national
reconciliation and forcing a confrontation; reconciliation and
renewed consensus are the prerequisites to elections, not vice versa
(as some French may still believe). However, the international
community's resistance to early, unilateral elections and its call
for "inclusiveness and consensus" are not well understood by the
majority of the population here who just want the crisis to end. We
think it unlikely that the HAT will change its tune substantially or
sufficiently in the next two weeks to avoid AU sanctions.

13. (SBU) Comment Continued: While remaining open to the
possibility of a new negotiated solution under Chissano, we
recommend that the USG begin preparing for the imposition of
targeted travel bans and freezing of assets against Rajoelina,
members of the HAT, and selected others, in coordination with the
AU, SADC, and - hopefully - the EU. (Note: the EU must decide on
its own "appropriate measures" - sanctions -- before the end of
February). For our part, we have started on a draft list of target
names. If the HAT responds positively to the AU's compromise
proposal before Feb 5, negotiations could resume and the
AU-UN-SADC-OIF follow-up mechanism would be established in
Madagascar. However, in the more likely event that the HAT's
response remains negative, sanctions will be the next step. End
comment.
MARQUARDT