Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ANKARA263
2010-02-17 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR U/S BURNS

Tags:  PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000263 

SIPDIS

DAMASCUS: FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMB JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S BURNS

REF: ANKARA 87

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000263

SIPDIS

DAMASCUS: FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMB JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S BURNS

REF: ANKARA 87

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Welcome to Turkey! With this cable, I'd like to
update you on where the relationship stands.

WHAT TO RAISE:

-- Move forward on the Armenia protocols; an end to
Turkey-Armenia reconciliation will harm, if not terminate,
the Minsk Group process (para 3).

-- Be prepared to support unified Security Council action to
convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course
(para 5).

-- Want to take our dialogue with you on missile defense to
the next level; Undersecretary Tauscher is prepared to
respond to your questions in detail (para 6).

-- Appreciate your effort to restore civility to the dialogue
with Israel; your success in maintaining balance in that
relationship increases your credibility as a potential Middle
East mediator (para 7).

-- Welcome your creative approach on Cyprus and urge you to
remain flexible and open in the search for a solution.
Continue to support Talat's moves (para 8).

-- Appreciate Turkish efforts in Afghanistan - the planned
Jowzjan PRT, expanded security forces training, assumption of
the RC-Capital command, coordination of development efforts
with USAID (para 9).

WATCH OUT FOR:

-- An effort to recast USF-I CG Odierno's February promise to
work with Turkey, Iraq and the KRG on the development of an
"action plan" against the PKK presence in northern Iraq as a
commitment to bring U.S. military force to bear directly on
the terrorists. We will look for ways to strengthen our
cooperation, but will not engage the PKK ourselves militarily
(para 10).

-- GoT suspicion that we have not been sufficiently energetic
in addressing the banning of Sunni candidates from
participation in the March 7 Iraq elections (para 11).

-- Complaints the U.S. is setting too high a bar for Bosnia
on its NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and does not support
increased Turkish activism in the Balkans (para 12).



2. (C) From Iraq to Afghanistan, we benefit greatly from our

close cooperation with Turkey. Nonetheless, we confront two
major challenges to the relationship over the next few
months. The first is Turkish unwillingness to side
unambiguously with the world community in condemning Iran's
nuclear ambitions. The second is the government's
reluctance, in the face of declining poll numbers and
increasing rumors of an early election, to muster the
political courage to drive ratification of the Armenia
Protocols through parliament.

TURKEY - ARMENIA
--------------


3. (C) Mindful of the Turkish public's sympathies with their
"cousins" in Azerbaijan and the parliamentary opposition's
desire to beat the ruling party with this stick, the
government has been unwilling to seek ratification of the
protocols President Gul signed last year with his Armenian
counterpart without some progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. That
progress is not forthcoming and, though we refuse to accept
linkage of the protocols to the Minsk Process, the former's
failure would likely damage, if not derail, the latter. By
proceeding with normalization, opening the border and
building people-to-people ties with Armenians, Turkey may be
able to draw momentum out of the Armenian Diaspora's
world-wide campaign to classify the events of 1915 as
genocide. Just by launching a ratification effort, Prime

Minister Erdogan would help us fend off for one more year a
Congressional Armenian Genocide Resolution that could throw
our bilateral relationship into the deep freeze and cripple
our critical logistics lines through Turkey to Iraq and
Afghanistan.


4. (C) We share our parliament-watching contacts' assessment
that, absent something "definable" as progress on
Nagorno-Karabakh, or a wink for Aliyev, Erdogan could not get
all his own MPs, let alone the opposition, to vote for the
protocols' ratification.

IRAN
--------------


5. (C) Turkey remains profoundly fearful of the collateral
damage to its economy that could result from sanctions or a
hysterical Iranian decision to retaliate for their imposition
by throttling its hydrocarbons exports. Turkey imports 36
percent of its oil from Iran (2008 figure). Iranian natural
gas constitutes roughly 11 percent of Turkey's consumption
(2008 figure). If Iran were to cut off that supply, some
Turks could grow cold in their homes and angry at their
government. Hoping to forestall sanctions, Foreign Minister
Davutoglu has repeatedly attempted to mediate compromise
between the Iranians and the woQd community. By the time of
your visit, he will have just returned from February 16
meetings in Tehran. We have not discouraged his shuttle and
telephone diplomacy, but his efforts have been without
effect; he likely Qs exceeded his brief. Both he and Prime
MinisteQErdogan, whose public dismissal late last year of
the international community's case against Iran as "gossip"
may have encouraged Iranian intransigence, should prepare
themselves for hard work at the UN to craft effective
sanctions that address Turkish equities.

MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


6. (C) We have asked Turkey to host an AN/TPY-2 radar as part
of the new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to European
Ballistic Missile Defense. Erdogan, initially very hesitant,
told POTUS and SECDEF he needs a NATO label to sell Turkey's
participation to his public. After Romania's announcement of
its willingness to host PAA assets and Iran's decision to
further enrich its uranium stock, Turkey may be more
flexible; Turks know the PAA can only protect Turkish
territory if a radar is located here. Erdogan was much more
forward-leaning with SECDEF this month than in December. U/S
Tauscher looks forward to responding to Turkey's missile
defense questions in detail.

TURKEY - ISRAEL
--------------


7. (C) Though Erdogan and former Prime Minister Olmert often
disagreed, they maintained an unmediated and mutually
beneficial dialogue that ended suddenly when Israel launched
its "Cast Lead" intervention into Gaza in December of 2008.
Erdogan's vituperative criticisms of Israel thoughout 2009
have kept PM Netanyahu at a distance. Israeli diplomats here
candidly admit their country needs Turkey more than Turkey
needs Israel and are still working hard to circumvent Foreign
Minister Lieberman's hostility to re-establishing a channel
to the GoT's senior political level. The GoT showed
remarkable restraint when it refused to be provoked by Deputy
Foreign Minister Ayalon's rude treatment of the Turkish
ambassador in early January and chose, instead, to receive
visiting Defense Minister Barak. You should encourage your
interlocutors towards more efforts to restore civility to the
dialogue with Israel. The GoT's success in maintaining
balance in its relationship with Israel increases Turkey's
credibility as a potential Middle East mediator. More
generally, Turks' infatuation with the "Arab street" and
rogue actors in the immediate aftermath of Cast Lead and
Davutoglu's appointment may be waning as they witness the
decline of their leverage as "a friend to all."

CYPRUS
--------------


8. (C) A long brain-storming session at the Turkish MFA

several weeks ago generated a series of creative ideas to
avert an impasse in the Cyprus reconciliation talks, and a
recent Turkish Cypriot proposal seems to have pushed the
process somewhat forward. However, President Christofias
remains less flexible and uncharismatic Turkish Cypriot
"President" Talat faces a difficult re-election campaign this
April. His opponent suggests he may abandon the goal of
reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots, if this round of
talks fails. We encourage Turkey's quiet support for Talat.
Cyprus remains a key obstacle to the progress of Turkey's EU
candidacy.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


9. (C) Turkey's re-assumption of the RC-Capital command, its
force contribution of nearly 1800 troops, Wardak province
PRT, planned Jowzjan province PRT, increased security forces
training effort and new collaboration with AID on Afghanistan
development make it a major NATO and USG partner in the
multi-national effort to consolidate stability and democracy
in Afghanistan. Turkey's history, Muslim traditions and
culture give it a special credibility with Afghans (but, at
the same time, contribute to Turkey's extremely passive
military posture there). We applaud Turkey's engagement and
encourage its ongoing diplomatic effort, through the Ankara
Process, to build trust between the Afghan and Pakistani
leaderships.

PKK ACTION PLAN
--------------


10. (C) USF-I Commanding General Odierno's unprecedented
meeting here February 3 with the high-level Turkish
inter-agency security affairs group constituted USG
acknowledgment that the most serious impediment to
realization of Turkey's potential as a post-USF-I force for
stabilization in Iraq and countering influence to Iran is the
continued PKK leadership harbor in northern Iraq. Odierno's
visit alone improved Turkish morale, which had been shaken by
the PKK's ambush and killing of seven soldiers December 7 in
interior Turkey, far beyond the terrorists' normal area of
operations, and by a surge of civil violence late last year
in towns and cities across Turkey's heavily Kurdish
southeast. Odierno accepted Turkey's request that USF-I
facilitate the drafting of an action plan against the PKK in
cooperation with the GoT, the Iraqi government and the
Kurdish Regional Government. The fight to root the PKK out
of northern Iraq has already been a long one. Key to
ultimate success against the terrorists will be substantive
KRG cooperation with Turkey, something we will encourage.
Though we will continue to assist Turkey in many ways,
especially by providing targeting intelligence, we will not
engage directly in military action against the PKK.

IRAQ
--------------


11. (C) In Davutolgu's words: "Iraq is an existential issue
for Turkey." From the USG's perspective, Turkey has been, by
far, the most constructive of Iraq's neighbors in
contributing to its stability. Last October, Erdogan led a
delegation of eight of his ministers to Baghdad where they
signed nearly 50 MoUs and agreements that laid legal
foundations for cooperation on counter-terrorism, commerce,
hydrocarbons trade, transportation infrastructure
construction, health care, and water management. Turkey
wants the Iraqi experiment to succeed; however, the GoT fears
we will leave before it can. A gathering Turkish suspicion
is that we have been too low-profile, not energetic enough,
in challenging the Accountability and Justice Commission's
banning of key Sunni candidates from participation in the
March 7 elections. Ambassador Hill is daily quietly prodding
Iraqi political leaders towards a solution to the banning
that does not disenfranchise Sunnis. We will remain
reluctant to issue statements or act in a high-profile manner
that might embarrass PM Maliki, who is a also a candidate and
attracts the support of a significant segment of the
population.

BALKANS
--------------


12. (C) Turkey is seeking to leverage its credibility with
Bosnia's Muslim population into influence in the Balkans
generally. It fears the transition to a European Union
Special Representative will cost it the voice it enjoyed with
the Office of High Representative. We will continue to
advocate a place for Turkey at the table. You may want to
remind your interlocutors that, with regard to Bosnia's MAP,
we want the government to be of sufficient functionality so
that Bosnia can be a reliable Ally.
Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"