ALGERIAN CT CHIEF PRESSES NEA DAS SANDERSON ON TSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000116

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AG UN US
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN CT CHIEF PRESSES NEA DAS SANDERSON ON TSA
LIST

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with NEA DAS Sanderson January 25, Algerian
Counterterrorism Coordinator Kamel Rezag Bara objected that
putting Algeria on the list of countries subject to enhanced
airport screening is at variance with Algeria's solid
commitment to fighting terrorism and its close security
partnership with the U.S. Noting that Algerian public
opinion viewed this measure negatively, he suggested the U.S.
could have implemented the measure without publicizing it.
DAS Sanderson stressed that this measure was aimed not
against Algeria but at increasing safety for the flying
public of all countries. Rezag Bara portrayed AQIM as a
global threat to security and to Algeria's and Islam's
central message of tolerance. The group was no longer a
threat to the country as a whole but had a residual presence
in the Kabylie and in the east. It enjoyed zero popular
support, in part due to its kidnappings of locals for ransom.
He said that Mali's continued reluctance to act against AQIM
was a major Algerian worry and the reason for the
postponement of the Bamako summit. He asked that the U.S.
intercede with Bamako to move it to start fighting AQIM. He
repeated a proposal made last October to set up a bilateral
interagency "contact group" that would exchange security
assessments. Algeria would seek to follow up UNSCR 1904 in
the UNGA and perhaps seek a resolution in the OIC. Rezag
Bara said that the two recent Guantanamo returnees would go
before a judge in a matter of days. End summary.

TSA Listing
--------------


2. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson met
Algerian Presidential Coordinator for Counterterrorism Kamel
Rezag Bara at the Presidency in Algiers January 25,
accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol-Econ Chief Bosshart and
EconOff Wazir. DAS Sanderson emphasized that we had built a
strong counterterrorism partnership with Algeria since 9/11,
which was very important to the U.S. The USG was
increasingly concerned by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb's
(AQIM) presence in the Sahel. AQIM was one of the top
priorities of the State Department Counterterrorism
Coordinator. We had heard Government of Algeria concerns
over the TSA listing of Algeria. This measure did not grow
out of our relationship with Algeria but was a response to a
new security threat.


3. (C) Rezag Bara agreed that the security partnership with
the U.S. was important. However, the "listing" of Algeria as
subject to enhanced airport screening ran contrary to that
partnership. Such treatment would be understandable for
state sponsors of terrorism; or countries in areas where U.S.
troops were fighting like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; or
for countries in turmoil like Yemen and Somalia; or perhaps
for Saudi Arabia, which had been the source of 19 of 22
terrorists involved in the 9/11 attack; or even Lebanon,
because of Hizballah. But it was not understandable for
Algeria or Libya. Libya was one of the first states to take
action against Osama bin Ladin. (Note: In addition to
sticking up for the only other Maghrebi state on TSA list,
Rezag Bara is a former Algerian ambassador to Libya.)
Algeria was a prime U.S. ally in fighting terrorism. How had
this list been drawn up? he asked. Rezag Bara said it might
have been acceptable to screen, for example, Algerians who
had visited Yemen or Afghanistan, but not all Algerian
nationals. He said he would not say more, but the government
of Algeria really (he put emphasis on this last word) wanted
the US to take Algeria off the list. At the end of the
meeting, he suggested the U.S. could have fortified its
already strong airport security measures in this or other
ways, but without publicizing them.

Sahel Security - and Mali
--------------


4. (C) Turning to the Sahel, Rezag Bara stated that al-Qa'ida
posed a global threat to security, the unity of Islamic
states, and to Islam itself and its message of peace and
tolerance. Since AQIM was no longer a threat to Algeria's
national security and stability as a whole, Algeria now
focused on denying AQIM the use of "first periphery"
countries -- Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- as sanctuaries.
Algeria also looked to a "second periphery" of Chad,

Burkina-Faso, northern Nigeria, and Darfur -- places where
there were substantial Muslim populations and where Al-Qa'ida
could seek to extend its influence. Mali was a major worry.
AQIM leaders Abu Zaid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar had some 200
armed men and used hostage-taking to generate media attention
and revenue to fund their operations.


5. (C) Rezag Bara spotlighted Mali as a particular problem in
regional counterterrorism cooperation. He claimed it refused
to coordinate or cooperate with Algeria on terrorism and
lacked the will to deny terrorists the use of its territory
as a sanctuary. The August 2009 Tamanrasset (Algeria)
conference of regional military chiefs of staff had decided
to coordinate counterterrorism operations and stand up mixed
units to patrol sensitive areas. Algeria had agreed to help
equip regional states. However, a shipment of radios Algeria
had delivered to Mali late last August had still not been
used. Algeria believed that Mali negotiated directly with
terrorists or with persons representing them. Niger and
Mauritania, by contrast, were cooperating. Rezag Bara said
Algeria needed U.S. help to convince Bamako it could not
negotiate an armistice with terror groups. The Bamako summit
of regional leaders could not take place until there was a
Malian commitment to cooperate against terrorism. There was
no need for a summit whose success was not certain. Asked
whether Algeria had given Mali development assistance, Rezag
Bara replied that Algeria still had no permission from Mali
to give development assistance to (Tuareg) areas in northern
Mali.


6. (C) Rezag Bara said that the old Malian argument that the
Tuareg threat prevents Malian movement against AQIM was no
longer valid. Tuareg tribes were disarmed and no longer a
source of rebellion. Mali also believed that the Tuaregs
could not help in the fight against terrorism. Tuareg
leaders visiting Algiers earlier in January had refuted that,
telling Algerian officials that Tuaregs wanted only
development assistance for their region and the integration
of some of their forces into the Malian army. (Comment:
Malian Tuareg leaders were in Algiers earlier this month,
reportedly to discuss reviving the Algiers Accords of 2006.
End comment) He said all Tuaregs who had been in Algiers --
including the radical Ag Bahanga -- had supported this
position. Algeria wanted Mali to consider the Tuaregs not as
a risk but as a partner against AQIM. But any Algeria
support to the Tuareg areas would require Malian government
support.

Security in Algeria
--------------


7. (C) DAS Sanderson inquired about the security situation in
Algeria. Rezag Bara replied that the GOA was still worried
about the Kabylie and the east, where small groups of armed
terrorists numbering 8-10 each still carried out attacks
against the security services. However, they no longer had
support among the local population, largely due to their
practice of kidnapping local notables for ransom. The main
threat was in the south and in the countries bordering the
south. The government's security "doctrine" was to deny the
terrorists the ability to act in cities. This strategy had
succeeded. The government also intervened in prisons,
mosques, schools and banks to deny these areas to the
terrorists.

Ransom Payments - UNSCR 1904 Not End of Story
--------------


8. (C) DAS Sanderson asked about Algeria's consultations with
European countries on outlawing ransom payments to
terrorists. Rezag Bara said his own consultations with the
Russians in Moscow last October had produced agreement that
ransom payments were a form of terrorist financing. The UK
also agreed with this Algerian view, but the French had been
less cooperative. In any case, UNSCR 1904 was an
international legal norm making it unlawful for states to pay
ransoms to terrorists. He conceded, however, that others
could pay ransoms even if states could not. He noted that
UNSCR 1904 was not the end of the issue. Algeria was
deliberating not only the possibility of bringing the issue
of ransom payments to the UNGA, but also how to sensitize EU
partners, and whether to work via the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) for issuance of an "Islamic legal
position" on the taking of hostages and ransom payments.

U.S.-Algeria "Contact Group"

--------------


9. (C) DAS Sanderson noted that State Department
Counterterrorism Coordinator Benjamin had asked her to
explore how we could set up the U.S.-Algeria "contact group"
that Rezag Bara had proposed previously and how it would
function. Rezag Bara said it should be an informal,
bilateral, interagency dialogue on threat assessment. It
would include high-level representatives from the ministries
of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior as well as defense
and intelligence services. Algeria already had this
arrangement with Russia, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands
and was close to setting something up with the UK. The
Algerians also included at different times representatives
from customs, their financial intelligence unit, and other
ministries as needed. To set it up, the U.S. Ambassador
could write the GOA requesting that a U.S. interagency group
visit Algeria, or that an Algerian interagency group visit
Washington, to sign a memorandum of understanding on
establishing the group. Rezag Bara emphasized that existing
"contact groups" were informal discussion fora that did not
make formal decisions. (On departing the meeting, he told
the Ambassador he himself would be interested in a visit to
Washington sometime before May.)

Guantanamo
--------------


10. (C) DAS Sanderson thanked Rezag Bara for Algeria's
acceptance of a number of Algerian citizens detained in
Guantanamo. Carrying out the administration's commitment to
close Guantanamo was a difficult job because many dangerous
persons were held there. Rezag Bara replied that, beginning
in 2005, Algerian officials had visited some 26 or 27
Algerian detainees in Guantanamo. Algeria welcomed the USG
determination to close the facility, which he said was
contrary to U.S. values. Algeria remained prepared to accept
Algerians who were freed. Two recent returnees would be
appearing before a judge within a day or two. But there had
been reports that some did not want to go back. The GOA
wished to confirm if this were so, and specifically, whether
some Algerian nationals at Guantanamo had explicitly
expressed a will not to go back. (Note: Rezag Bara stopped
short of saying that Algeria would accept only those
detainees willing to return, which had been Algeria's
previous position and which would have rolled back recent
statements by Medelci and others indicating the Algeria was
prepared to cooperate with the US on all remaining detainee
cases. End note)

Morocco
--------------


11. (C) To a question about Algeria's counterterrorism
cooperation with Morocco, Rezag Bara responded that the two
countries cooperated operationally on threats to each other's
country originating in the other. The meeting concluded with
DAS Sanderson pointing to the upcoming visits of a Department
of State Anti-terrorism Assistance group and a Department of
Justice ICITAP delegation, which will work out
counterterrorism training programs with Algerian officials.


12. (U) DAS Sanderson cleared this message.
PEARCE