USAU: AFRICAN UNION STRUGGLES WITH AMISOM MEDIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000388

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E AND IO/UNP
NSC FOR MGAVIN
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PTER SO UN AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AFRICAN UNION STRUGGLES WITH AMISOM MEDIA
CAMPAIGN

REF: ADDIS ABABA 342

Classified By: USAU CDA Joel Maybury, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Seconded UN Public Information Officer (PIO)
reveals a "complete blockage" of African Union strategic
communications efforts on the eve of a major planned
offensive by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and
Transitonal Federal Government (TFG) forces, and blames the
Office of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of
the Commission (SRCC) for failing to sign a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) that would release up to $22 million to
support AMISOM's media campaign. She also identifies stratgic
communications needs of the TFG that cannot be satisfied by
the UN and recommends support by the AMISOM PIO and the
Nairobi-based Military Information Support Team (MIST) to
address these shortfalls. End Summary.


2. (C) United Nations PIO Seraphine Toe (protect
accordingly),who is seconded to the African Union Commission
to provide support to AMISOM, reported to USAU Military
Adviser on February 24 that, despite desperate pleas from the
Force Commander, AMISOM's media campaign is stalled for want
of a signature. Toe stated that the United Nations Support
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) has hired two expatriate media
experts and a staff of 10 Somalis to develop programming for
AMISOM radio stations (one each provided by the USG and the
UN). UNSOA reportedly has $22 million set aside to pay
staff, lease office space, hire technical experts, and
produce radio messages from a remote location in Nairobi for
transmission in Mogadishu. The UN has offered to assume
operational costs for both its transmitter and the broadcast
station provided by the USG.


3. (C) Per Toe, all that is lacking to operationalize UNSOA's
radio programming unit and the two radio stations is the
SRCC's signature on a MOU with UNSOA. Toe claims that this
MOU was submitted months ago to the previous SRCC Nicholas
Bwakira, but that bad advice from the SRCC's only PIO caused
Bwakira to demure. Toe states that newly-appointed SRCC
Boubacar Diarra is aware of UNSOA's offer and is reviewing
the MOU. Toe was worried, however, because Diarra does not
seem to realize the urgency of the matter and because he is
being advised by the same inept PIO.


4. (C) Toe proffered the following recommendations and asked
that they be reinforced by USAU Ambassador Battle and the
Nairobi-based Somalia Unit:

- Ensure SRCC Diarra understands the urgency of a strategic
communications plan and its linkage to the planned AMISOM-TFG
offensive;
- Recommend timely review and signature of the MOU to unlock
UNSOA funding that would allow two AMISOM transmitters to
begin broadcasting;
- Encourage the SRCC to pressure the AU's Human Resources
Department to hire an addtional PIO for the SRCC's Office and
fill the PIO vacancy in the AU's Peace Support Operations
Division; and
- Use non-UNSOA resources to help the TFG develop its own
media campaign plan and train Somali PIOs and radio
broadcasters.


5. (C) Toe reported that her conversations with the Somali
Minister of Information suggest that the TFG has no strategic
communication plan and is routinely missing opportunities to
showcase TFG progress and denounce al-Shabaab activity in an
effort to drive a wedge between the foreign extremists and
the Somali populace. She lamented the fact that UNSOA has no
mandate to directly assist the TFG in developing a media
campaign and operating Radio Mogadishu, the only functional
FM radio station that is not influenced by the extremists.
Toe suggested the following solutions:

- Provide UNSOA training in message development to AMISOM
Spokesperson Felix Kulaigye which he could impart to his TFG
counterparts in Mogadishu; and
- Use the Nairobi-based MIST to directly engage the TFG
Ministry of Information to develop a strategic communication
plan, radio messaging, and to exploit other media (e.g.

ADDIS ABAB 00000388 002 OF 002


Internet, TFG website, and SMS text messaging). (Note: USAU
understands that, unlike UNSOA, the Nairobi MIST has the
authority to engage the TFG directly, although this may
necessitate additional program funding and would require that
all MIST-developed products be approved by US Special
Operations Command before being used in support of TFG. End
Note.)


6. (C) Comment: Toe is a faithful USAU interlocutor and a
competent PIO. Being seconded from the UN to the AU with no
counterpart in the Peace Support Operations Division,
however, she feels her influence at AU headquarters is
limited. She has lost faith in her PIO counterpart based in
the SRCC's Office in Nairobi, and is nervous about
circumventing him or pushing the new SRCC too hard. But she
also knows how broken both AMISOM and the TFG are in terms of
strategic communications and would like to see improvement
before any major AMISOM-TFG offensive in Mogadishu. End
Comment.
MUSHINGI