Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ADDISABABA372
2010-02-22 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

PM MELES PUSHES FOR UNITED STATES TO PREVENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221336Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7869
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000372 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA,
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC
SUBJECT: PM MELES PUSHES FOR UNITED STATES TO PREVENT
GENERALIZED CONFLICT IN SUDAN

Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000372

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA,
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC
SUBJECT: PM MELES PUSHES FOR UNITED STATES TO PREVENT
GENERALIZED CONFLICT IN SUDAN

Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) During a February 1 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy
to Sudan Gration, Prime Minister Meles emphasized the
importance of beginning post-2011 negotiations and convincing
the Government of Sudan to accept the outcome of the
referendum. He believed that an unsuccessful referendum
could spawn generalized conflict across Sudan, and so the
Darfur peace process must be sped up to reach agreement. In
negotiating post-2011 issues, Meles said IGAD would support
Mbeki's role on behalf of the AU, but that the United States
must play a key role. Meles said that the United States had
uniquely powerful influence in Sudan, but warned that
internal divisions in the US Administration threatened to
diminish its stature. End Summary.


2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott
Gration traveled to Addis Ababa from January 27-February 2,
2010 to attend the AU Summit with the U.S. delegation.

Referendum is More Critical than Elections
--------------

3. (C) Meles began by prioritizing the referendum over
elections as the most critical issue for the future of Sudan.
He believed the elections, while important, are not the
definitive act of democratic transformation. The Government
of Sudan, Meles said, believes it can win the elections
fairly, and so they appear to have a stake in making the
elections fair and transparent. The Government of Sudan also
expects "serious dividends" out of the elections, such as
easing the strains created by the Darfuri rebels and the
International Criminal Court indictment against Sudanese
President Omar el-Bashir.


4. (C) Still, Meles argued, the referendum is more critical
than elections. Going forward, the post-referendum plan must
be negotiated and the Government of Sudan must be convinced
that separation is not only an option, but the most likely
one. In the likely event of separation, Meles believed there

was a 90 percent chance the South would become a failed state.


5. (C) Meles said he raised his concerns during the AU
Summit with the Government of Sudan and President Bashir,
saying that the Government should work through post-2011
issues in advance and allow for the possibility of
separation. Meles questioned Basher's sincerity, but
reported that the Sudanese President stated that he preferred
unity, but would accept separation.

Referendum Could Spawn Generalized Conflict
Across Sudan; Speed up Darfur Peace Process
--------------

6. (C) Meles warned that if the South explodes after the
referendum, Darfur would follow. To prevent the referendum
from spawning "generalized conflict" across Sudan, Meles said
it is incumbent to address issues in Darfur now. He believed
the 15 January 2010 agreement between Chad and Sudan
represented a fundamental change in attitude, but that the
agreement may not hold. Chad, Meles said, may not want to
"bank on an agreement" and may "hedge its bets", which could
be interpreted as hesitation in Khartoum, and the agreement
could fall apart. To increase the likelihood that the
agreement will succeed, Meles believed that Chad needed
reassurances that the United States and others would handle
whatever "regional consequences they fear" and primarily with
Libya.


7. (C) On the Darfur peace process, Meles said that
negotiations were hindered by inefficiencies that made it
slow to reach agreements. To increase the efficiency of the
process, Meles believed that (a) the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) must recognize that the 15 January Chad-Sudan
agreement as a game changer and (b) "declare Doha a
tremendous success, close it down, make it a sideshow if

ADDIS ABAB 00000372 002 OF 003


necessary," relocate talks to Darfur, and assign a deadline.
Meles believed that moving the Darfur peace process to Darfur
proper would help "clear the deck" and "get fingers out of
the pie" by cutting out the meddling of the Qataris,
Egyptians, and other regional players-meddling which Meles
believe occurred because the United States was absent. The
Government of Sudan, he said, was not enthusiastic about
holding talks in Qatar in the first place, but allowed them
because they did not want to offend the Emir and because they
thought the Qataris could influence JEM to be flexible. He
believed the if the United States could get the Europeans on
board with the idea of relocating talks, then the Africans
would also be on board, and the peace process could move more
quickly.

Post-2011 Talks: Mbeki to Lead, IGAD Takes Back Seat
-------------- --------------

8. (C) Though both North and South say they are ready to
negotiate post-2011 issues such as borders and citizenship
rights, Meles said that "nobody would call their bluff or
hold their feet to the fire." Therefore, he believed it was
critical to get the parties to sit down and test their will
to negotiate.


9. (C) On the role of IGAD in negotiating post-2011
discussions, Meles believed that IGAD needed to be involved,
but that Mbeki could play the lead role on behalf of the AU
and IGAD. He warned that unless the parties in Sudan know
Mbeki has the backing of the United States, Mbeki would not
make much headway. Discussing the background of AU and IGAD
involvement in post-2011 negotiations, Meles said, was
looking to have a say in the process and that IGAD, enshrined
in the CPA, was simultaneously staking its claim. Despite
some jockeying between the AU and IGAD, Meles said that "now
it's no longer a game. It's serious: it's about making
peace." He concluded that if the AU and Mbeki were present
in negotiations, IGAD would take a back seat, but that the
United States could not be absent.

US Holds Key Chips, but Internal USG Divisions
Could Diminish Influence
--------------

10. (C) Meles believed the United States would play a
critical role in these negotiations. He said both North and
South are pragmatic and respect power, which they see in the
United States and not elsewhere. For Khartoum, Meles argued,
"the United States is the party to the conflict; the South is
a sideshow." He explained that the real issue for the North
is not just oil, but the haranguing of the United States
about the South and Darfur. Meles concluded that the United
States holds the &key chips8 with Khartoum, but that it
cannot successfully negotiate with the Government of Sudan
without including the possibility of "getting the United
States off their back," which Khartoum knows will not happen
unless Darfur is also resolved.


11. (C) Meles said that the United States is being asked to
step in so that Sudan has a real chance of avoiding
catastrophe. He emphasized that while African countries are
not concerned that the United States will impose solutions,
it should "back home-grown solutions with full force,"
including the AU High-Level Panel's report on Sudan, and play
a quiet, but active role behind the scenes.


12. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, Meles warned that
internal divisions in Washington threatened to diminish US
influence, and "the United States would be bit players like
everyone else." Africans, he said, do not understand the
full power of Congress, but worry about the unity of the
executive branch. If they see that the Administration is
behind the strategy and that "both feet of the United States
are in the same place," they will ignore what advocates and
some Congressmen are saying against the strategy and the
United States will be able to assume a greater role.

Participants in Prime Minister Meles Meeting:

ADDIS ABAB 00000372 003 OF 003


--------------

13. (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan
Cameron Hudson, Director of Operations, Office of the U.S.
Special Envoy to Sudan
Miriam Estrin, Special Assistant to the Special Envoy, Office
of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Charge D'Affaires, Ambassador John M. Yates
Kathryn Pongonis, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, U.S.
Embassy Addis Ababa, Control Officer


14. (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable.
YATES