Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ADDISABABA331
2010-02-18 10:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE

Tags:  MARR PGOV PREL KPKO AU 
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8073
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000331 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/C, AF/E, AND IO/UNP
NSC FOR MGAVIN
LONDON FOR PLORD
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL KPKO AU
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE
FOREIGN MINISTER THAMBWE

Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000331

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/C, AF/E, AND IO/UNP
NSC FOR MGAVIN
LONDON FOR PLORD
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL KPKO AU
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE
FOREIGN MINISTER THAMBWE

Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle.


1. (U) February 1, 2010; 2:45 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
Under Secretary Maria Otero
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
NSC Senior Africa Advisor Michelle Gavin
Special Advisor Howard Wolpe
Deputy Special Advisor Jim Yellin
USAU Military Advisor Ellington (notetaker)

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Foreign Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba


3. (C) Summary: On the margins of the African Union (AU)
Summit in Addis Ababa, Congolese Foreign Minister Alexis
Thambwe told the American delegation that both the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) have been diminished, but blamed United
Nations Mission in Congo's (MONUC) tepid operational support
on the fact that FDLR is not yet defeated. He cited three
government demands on MONUC: the redeployment of all MONUC
combat forces to Eastern Congo; MONUC-led defense sector
reform; and a phased MONUC disengagement plan beginning with
at least a symbolic withdrawal by June 30. Thambwe reported
normalizing relations with Rwanda and Uganda, but sought USG
intervention in the growing oil dispute between Angola and
DRC. He predicted another LRA-type cycle of violence if
Mbororo transhumance is not reined in by neighboring
governments, and denied a government offensive against the
Banyamulenge. Thambwe indicated that the GDRC wants to move
forward on the National Command Training Initiative
previously proposed by Wolpe. End Summary.


4. (SBU) In response to A/S Carson's solicitation of
Thambwe's thoughts on developments in DRC, the security
situation, and the future of the MONUC, the Foreign Minister
characterized the past 15 months as mostly positive. He
stated that while the FDLR and the LRA have not been
defeated, they have been "diminished." Thambwe chastised

MONUC for not providing sufficient operational support to the
Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) in its offensive against the
FDLR, suggesting that the FDLR might have been defeated had
MONUC not limited its support to rations and transportation.
Things might have been different had MONUC intervened with
all its military might, said Thambwe.

Much-maligned MONUC
--------------


5. (C) Thambwe outlined three GDRC objectives regarding
MONUC. First, all of MONUC's combat forces should be
relocated to Eastern DRC. Thambwe blamed NGO pressure for
MONUC's tepid support to Operation Kimia, and said that "if
MONUC can't fight the FDLR, then they should go." While he
admitted that without MONUC's presence the GDRC would have
lost territory in the past, Thambwe claims that the security
situation in the Kasais, Katanga, Bas-Congo and elsewhere no
longer merits MONUC presence.


6. (SBU) Second, MONUC should "help us develop a real army."
Thambwe blamed MONUC's lack of emphasis on defense sector
reform for FARDC's ineffectiveness on the battlefield, and
entreated the United Nations to train an unspecified number
of brigades that would form the "backbone" of Congo's new
army.


7. (C) Finally, Thambwe demanded a MONUC disengagement plan.
He indicated that MONUC's withdrawal should be phased, but
must begin with at least a symbolic departure by the June 30
independence day celebrations.

Zero Tolerance?
--------------




8. (SBU) When pressed about conflict and sexual violence in
particular, Thambwe admitted that there are small pockets
where rape continues to be a problem. He invoked President
Kabila's "zero tolerance" policy and claimed that military
tribunals are investigating and prosecuting FARDC
perpetrators, per Secretary Clinton's request.

Regional Relations and Security in the East
--------------


9. (C) On regional relations, Thambwe said that things are
going well with Rwanda. He reported that the presidents
speak regularly, that ministers are in touch, and that the
joint commission is operational. Thambwe reported similar
success in Congo's relations with Uganda. He offered as an
example of normalizing relations a hot-pursuit incident about
three weeks earlier in which Ugandan forces chased rebels 22
kilometers into Congolese territory. Congo reportedly
protested and the GOU apologized, the whole matter being
sorted out within 24 hours, said Thambwe.


10. (C) In response to a question about Ugandan operations
against LRA in Northeastern Congo, Thambwe denied that
Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) are engaged in combat
operations on Congolese territory. Only small UPDF
intelligence units continue to operate against LRA inside
Congo, he claimed, towing the party line. Thambwe reported
that while most of the LRA has decamped to the Central
African Republic, small groups of 5-6 LRA fighters continue
to operate in the vicinity of Garamba National Park. Thambwe
stated that he was not certain where Kony is located.


11. (C) Thambwe then launched into a rather emotional
indictment of the Mbororo people, threatening to wage war on
the pastoralists if neighboring governments fail to rein them
in. (Comment: The Mbororo are a large subgroup of the Fulani
or Peul ethnic group who span several countries in West and
Central Africa. Mbororo people generally practice Islam, and
often come into conflict with cultivators as they travel in
search of water and pasture for their livestock. End
Comment.) Thambwe explained that in years past Congolese
peasants tolerated the seasonal migration of the Mbororo, but
that recently the pastoralists are staying longer and are
arming themselves. He warned implausibly that inaction now
would lead to an LRA-type situation in a few years. Thambwe
said that the GDRC would ask neighboring governments to
recall the Mbororo, and seek AU diplomatic intervention at a
meeting in March 2010. Failing that, Thambwe threatened
military force. When Carson questioned the wisdom of this
course, Thambwe relented a bit and suggested a police action
instead. Carson reminded Thambwe that police actions have a
nasty habit of escalating, and suggested as alternatives
mediation through a regional body or an eminent personality.


12. (C) Asked about reports of a significant offensive on the
Banyamulenge of Minembwe (South Kivu),Thambwe told Wolpe it
was nothing more than a pro-integration element of the
Banyamulenge community attacking another. One group is close
to the GDRC and wants to integrate with the FARDC, and the
other refuses, he explained rather unconvincingly. The only
clashes in the Kivus these days are more police in nature,
Thambwe claimed. (Comment: Non-GDRC sources separately told
the American delegation of a FARDC offensive in Minembwe
during the period January 23 to February 4 in which at least
13 villages were attacked and pillaged by government troops
under the overall command of Colonel Gifaru, a former Hutu
militia Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO)
officer now integrated in the FARDC. The second in command
is reportedly Colonel Manga. There were reportedly 4,000
government troops participating in the offensive, comprised
of a brigade commanded by Colonel Kazungu, the 112th
Integrated Brigade commanded by Colonel Santos who was
injured in the course of the fighting and replaced by a
Mai-Mai named Mwilambwe wa Mwilambwe Brown, and two separate
battalions from Kalehe. End Comment.)

The Western Front
--------------


13. (C) Thambwe stated that the GDRC's sole preoccupation in
the west is Congo's continental shelf. Both DRC and Angola
have petitioned the UN regarding their dispute over offshore
petroleum reserves in the Cabinda area. Angola is a friendly
neighbor, said Thambwe, and shares ethnic groups with Congo.
The GDRC seeks a peaceful resolution to the dispute but,
regardless of the outcome, Thambwe warned that the Congolese
people would accuse their government of selling out to the
Angolans. Thambwe suggested that a bilateral resolution was
out of the question, despite the fact that the two
governments had exchanged diplomatic notes on the dispute.
Thambwe beseeched Carson for USG mediation, suggesting that
the Congolese people would distrust the outcome of any other
mechanism. We are seeking your "good offices," said Thambwe.
This will help our president explain the eventual outcome to
his constituency. Without USG intervention, the only
alternative is international court which would take years and
risk growing violence between the oil-producing neighbors.


14. (C) Carson recommended the International Arbitration
Court, saying the best way to damage the USG's good relations
with both the GDRC and the Angolan government is to get mixed
up in an oil dispute between the two. Carson mentioned that
DRC faces similar challenges in other places, namely Lake
Albert and Lake Kivu. Thambwe added that there is also
potential for conflict over Lake Tanganyika's natural
resources.


15. (C) Thambwe insisted that the USG use its good offices
before the GDRC resorts to jurisprudence, warning that it
might be in U.S. interest to settle out of court or risk
having American oil companies operating in Angola brought
before an international court and accused of stealing
Congolese oil.

National Command Training Initiative
--------------


16. (SBU) In a sidebar with Wolpe, Thambwe indicated that the
GDRC wants to move forward on the National Command Training
Initiative previously proposed by Wolpe. Thambwe said that
he had spoken with President Kabila who was in complete
agreement.

Comment:
--------------


17. (C) Thambwe was amiable, if not mendacious at times. In
what is a Congolese national pastime, he blamed everybody
else for Congo's woes, with particular condemnation for
MONUC. MONUC probably would have been more helpful in
anti-FDLR operations had FARDC consulted during the planning
phase, and had the FARDC's behavior not been so
objectionable. Thambwe's gave an overly optimistic
assessment of the security situation in Congo, at the same
time probably overstating the threat from the Mbororo. He
also underestimated (and arguably seemed undisturbed by) the
prevalence and severity of sexual and gender-based vilolence.
Thambwe appeared to be extremely disingenuous regarding the
FARDC's offensive against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu's
high plains of Minembwe.


18. (U) U/S Otero and A/S Carson have cleared this cable.
S/A Wolpe has not cleared this cable.
YATES