Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ADDISABABA299
2010-02-13 07:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

USAU: COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA BENDS GENERAL WARD'S

Tags:  MCAP MOPS PREL PTER SO AU 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7769
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8068
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000299 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, NEA/ARP, NEA/IR AND IO/UNP
NSC FOR MGAVIN
LONDON FOR PLORD
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PTER SO AU
SUBJECT: USAU: COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA BENDS GENERAL WARD'S
EAR ON SOMALIA

Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000299

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, NEA/ARP, NEA/IR AND IO/UNP
NSC FOR MGAVIN
LONDON FOR PLORD
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PTER SO AU
SUBJECT: USAU: COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA BENDS GENERAL WARD'S
EAR ON SOMALIA

Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle


1. (C) Summary: In what has become a regular exchange during
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General Ward's
semiannual visits to Addis Ababa, African Union (AU) Peace
and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra broke with his
tradition of providing a security tour d'horizon and devoted
almost an entire hour to developments in Somalia. He warned
that decisive action must be taken in 2010 if the TFG is to
be successful before the end of its mandate 18 months from
now, including military operations to extend TFG control
throughout Mogadishu and possible seizure of Kismayo. He
lamented that the long-awaited offensive by the TFG and
AMISOM has not materialized largely because of insufficient
international support, singling out the Arab states for
particular condemnation.

The status quo is untenable
--------------


2. (C) In what has become a regular exchange during General
Ward's semiannual visits to Addis Ababa, Peace and Security
Commissioner Lamamra broke with his tradition of providing a
security tour d'horizon and instead exchanged views with his
guests on Somalia for approximately one hour on February 9.
The issue was fresh on Lamamra's mind as he had met with the
Somali Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan earlier that day.
The commissioner had also visited Mogadishu just 15 days
before, where he said one can "feel how dangerous the
situation is." He recounted how TFG President Sheikh
Sharif's chief of staff warned him to stay away from the
window of the TFG office or risk being shot by a sniper.


3. (C) Lamamra said the AU and the international community
can ill afford to have another year like 2009, all the
progress of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) notwithstanding. Something
must be done to change the dynamic, he warned, and the TFG

has only until October 2011 to tip the balance. The TFG must
demonstrate more authority than it has, alluding to a host of
capacity challenges. He credited the TFG for relaunching
some government activities. The situation in Somalia "can go
either way," he assessed.


4. (C) Lamamra identified two centers of gravity to shift the
momentum in the TFG's favor. The TFG must succeed in pushing
al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and regaining control of the
capital. Lamamra also advocated denying the port town of
Kismayo to the insurgents. Lamamra said an eventual
TFG-AMISOM offensive in Mogadishu is widely rumored, with
al-Shabaab moving reinforcements from Kismayo in
anticipation. However, he lamented that no action has been
taken yet.

"Pay stimulates patriotism"
--------------


5. (C) No longer is the number of friendly fighters the
issue, Lamamra asserted. What is needed now are salaries and
equipment. Lamamra reported that the government of Dubai
recently donated 30 four-wheel drive vehicles for the
offensive, but that the TFG lacks the heavy machine-guns to
transform them into "technicals." Lamamra lamented the lack
of support to the TFG, especially by the Arab states whom the
AU has unsuccessfully courted for months. Besides Dubai's
donation of vehicles, modest support has come from Libya in
the form of $2 million for TFG salaries, and a commitment by
Sudan to equip and transport Djibouti's AMISOM contingent.
(Note: Lamamra said the Arab League is considering convening
a meeting on Somalia by the end of March before the League
holds its Summit in Libya. End Note.) But Lamamra fears this
is too little, too late. "We are producing handicrafts,
which are beautiful, when what we really need is industrial
production." Lamamra requested high-level USG diplomacy in
pressuring the Arab and other states for support, citing
Qatar and Turkey in particular. (Note: Lamamra reported that
President Museveni is preparu)6J#QB3VZCZ

ADDIS ABAB 00000299 002 OF 003


for the TFG technicals.)


6. (C) Asked if the AU could publicly defend an
AMISOM-supported offensive, Lamamra indicated that AU
advocacy would accompany the campaign but not precede it.
Explaining that the best defense is a good offense, Lamamra
said al-Shabaab's regular attacks on AMISOM positions argues
for offensive action to create space between the insurgents
and friendly positions, if nothing else.


7. (C) Lamamra reported that al-Shabaab is recruiting and is
able to pay its fighters, some of whom are Kenyan, higher
salaries than the TFG can offer. He attributed al-Shabaab's
relative purchasing power to its control of Kismayo sea port,
and quite possibly to its connections with pirate syndicates.
Al-Shabaab is so brazen now that it has established training
camps and broadcasts graduation ceremonies as part of its
propaganda campaign. That said, Kenyan Army maneuvers along
the Somali border had caused al-Shabaab to shift its forces,
indicating that its strength is insufficient to counter
threats on multiple fronts. Lamamra also noted al-Shabaab's
links with al-Qaida and cited the recent killing in Mogadishu
of a Jordanian al-Shabaab leader by his own bodyguard. The
suicide attacks in Mogadishu further suggest al-Qaida's
influence.


8. (C) Responding to a question by USAU Ambassador Battle
about AMISOM's mandate, Lamamra was adamant that it is
flexible enough, especially given the troop-contributing
countries' willingness to take off the gloves. The Force
Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, wants to go on the
offensive. AMISOM troops would be accompanied by
approximately 6,500 Somali Security Forces, whom Mugisha has
been training and mentoring. He only needs assurance that
his fighters, Somali and AMISOM, will be remunerated, as well
as combat multipliers like rotary wing and maritime assets.

Counterpiracy tactics
--------------


9. (C) Lamamra recommended an adjustment in counterpiracy
tactics, echoing conventional wisdom that says pirates cannot
be defeated at sea. International vessels engaged in
counterpiracy should hug Somali's coastline, paying
particular attention to the harbors and coastal villages
pirates are known to frequent, and perhaps even disembarking
for limited engagements. The sea is vast, suggested Lamamra,
but the pirates all have to return to shore sooner or later.

The time for inclusion is over
--------------


10. (C) On the political front, Lamamra said that "inclusion
has its limits." The TFG is representative enough. Ahlus
Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) can be accommodated, but not
al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam. In his discussion with the
Deputy Prime Minister, Lamamra said he was told that most
Somalis are "sick and tired" of al-Shabaab.

Iran's interest in Somalia
--------------


11. (C) Lamamra reported that the Iranian foreign minister
attended the recent AU Summit and in a meeting with the
Somali president, offered to give the Somali Security Forces
3,000 military uniforms. Furthermore, if AMISOM accepts,
Iran will supply a hospital in Mogadishu. The Iranian
intent, Lamamra said, is to "show they are not supportive of
radical groups" in Somalia.

Comment:
--------------


12. (C) Most of what Lamamra said was old hat. What was
noteworthy, however, was that he clearly had a message to
deliver on Somalia and, pleasantries aside, he dedicated
almost an entire hour doing it. Lamamra is adamant that
action must be taken to change the status quo, and reminded
the international community that not only is the TFG our only
option, but it comes with an expiration date. He is also

ADDIS ABAB 00000299 003 OF 003


clearly frustrated with the lack of assistance from the
League of Arab States and seeks USG help in changing that
dynamic as well.


13. (U) General Ward has not cleared this cable.
YATES