ETHIOPIA: FORMER ONLF LEADER URGES U.S. MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000291

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: FORMER ONLF LEADER URGES U.S. MEDIATION
IN SOMALI REGION CONFLICT

REF: ADDIS ABABA 2977

Classified By: CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) According to a former leader from the early days of
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),Ismael Sheikh
Abdi, continued conflict between the ONLF and the Government
of Ethiopia (GoE) has resulted in the deterioration of
humanitarian conditions in Ethiopia's Somali region over the
past two years. Ismael said he believes the GoE-created
obstacles to humanitarian assistance and trade with conflict
areas has led to increased smuggling, raising additional
security risks. He criticized the current ONLF leadership
for planning and executing raids on humanitarian convoys and
concludes that the ONLF's armed struggle is now doing more
harm than good for the Somali population. Ismael speculated
that the ONLF would be willing to negotiate an end to the
conflict and urged the U.S. to mediate such negotiations with
the GoE. End summary.


2. (C) During a late 2009 trip to Jijiga, capital of
Ethiopia's Somali Regional State, PolOff met with Ismael
Sheikh Abdi, an ethnic Ogadeni and former leader in the
ONLF's political wing during the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e.,
before the ONLF split with the ruling Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). (Note: During the
Derg regime, Ismael participated in the armed struggle
against the government together with the Tigrayan People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) led by present Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi. In 1991 he was elected secretary
general of the ONLF which, in alliance with the TPLF,
effectively governed the Somali region until the adoption of
the current constitution. When the EPRDF severed its
alliance with the ONLF in favor of the Somali People's
Democratic Party (SPDP),Ismael left the government and the
ONLF. End note.)

High Expectations, Dashed Hopes
--------------


3. (C) In a 90 minute conversation, Ismael described the
early days of the EPRDF government and the ONLF's role in
governing the Somali region. He described strong cooperation
between the ethnically segregated ONLF and the TPLF and an
atmosphere of hope among Somalis that their participation in
the government would lead to increased prosperity and
security. Even at that time, Ismael recalled, divisions
within the ONLF and a lack of clarity on many policies --
particularly relating to autonomy, independence, and
relations with Somalia and ethnic Somalis throughout the Horn
of Africa -- strained party cohesion.


4. (C) Over time, Ismael said, ONLF leaders realized that
Meles had no intention of granting them greater autonomy in
any form - independence, semi-autonomy, or even greater power
within the EPRDF - leading to the eventual departure of the
ONLF from government, and its replacement with the SPDP.
Ismael candidly described the bitterness and hostility that
led many in the ONLF to return to armed conflict. He
acknowledged that the ONLF has achieved very little,
politically or militarily, after years of fighting. He said
his own frustration led him to leave political life
altogether.

Conditions Have Worsened, with Blame on Both Sides
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Turning to the present, Ismael assessed that years of
conflict, repression, and withholding of needed development
programs and funding had left Ethiopia's ethnic Somalis worse
off than they have been in many years. He claimed the GoE's
counterinsurgency tactics over the past two years in
particular had crippled the local population. He cited many
of the same GoE abuses as other regional contacts (especially
ethnic Ogadenis) cited in reftel, including warrantless
arrests, detention without trial, and extrajudicial killing.
According to Ismael, the GoE continues to utilize tactics
similar to those it used in the aftermath of violent ONLF
attacks on a Chinese oil facility in April 2007, albeit with
lesser visibility. Ismael said the only exception to the
GoE's continued use of these tactics is village burning and

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rape, which have either ended altogether or reduced to such
levels that indicate they are solitary incidents, rather than
part of a coordinated GoE policy.


6. (C) Ismael said the GoE's concern that the ONLF is
"taxing," stealing, and otherwise benefiting from
humanitarian relief supplies brought into the region by the
UN and NGOs is entirely legitimate, but he emphasized that it
is the local people who are suffering from a curtailing of
humanitarian assistance within conflict zones and the closure
of trade routes between the Somali Regional State and
neighboring Somalia. He added that with the formal closure
of these routes, cross-border smuggling has increased,
thereby raising the risk of illegal movement of people and
arms across the Ethiopia-Somalia border.

Ismael: Somalis Want Peace, Prosperity - Not Independence
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Asked to describe the current policy goals of the
ONLF, Ismael responded that he was not in direct contact with
ONLF leaders, but said he believed most Ethiopian Somalis
(including ONLF members and supporters) want to be able to
trade legally and prosper financially, improve the quality of
their lives, live in peace, and be respected by their
government and military. They want an end to extrajudicial
arrests, killings, and trade blockages. Demands for
independence made by the ONLF years ago, Ismael said, were
very different from its current agenda, and were in hindsight
highly unrealistic. He underscored that the ONLF's armed
insurgency, and the local population's support for the use of
violence, is merely a means to an end; the end being peace,
prosperity, and respect. While not optimistic that peace
could be easily achieved, Ismael said if peace is acheived
and the GoE promotes trade and development in the region,
most ethnic Somalis would abandon the idea of independence or
unification with Somalia.


8. (C) Ismael told PolOff he believed the ONLF would be
willing to talk to the GoE and negotiate an end to violent
insurgency if the situation in the Somali region improved.
The GoE would have to recognize the ONLF as a legitimate
organization, at least for the purpose of holding talks, if
not as a political body. Ismael noted such talks would
likely have to be facilitated by a third party who was
respected and viewed as neutral by both parties. He stated
that the U.S. was the ideal - and possibly only - candidate
to facilitate such discussions, and urged the U.S. to
consider taking on the role of mediator.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Despite his former affiliation with the ONLF and
strongly held views about the illegitimacy of the GoE's
counterinsurgency tactics, Ismael was candid about the
unrealistic nature of the ONLF's past demands, the ONLF's
failure to achieve any appreciable military or political
success despite years of fighting, and the negative impacts
of the ONLF's actions on the local population. It is unclear
how much contact he currently has with ONLF leadership, and
whether his assertions regarding the ONLF's agenda and desire
for mediation represent their views, rather than views he or
the local populace hold more broadly. End comment.

YATES