Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ABUJA197
2010-02-22 17:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIAN SECURITY CHIEF BRIEFS FOREIGN PARTNERS ON MUTUAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC SOCI KPAO NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0017
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0197/01 0531720
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221720Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0116
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000197 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/22
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC SOCI KPAO NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN SECURITY CHIEF BRIEFS FOREIGN PARTNERS ON MUTUAL
CONCERNS

REF: ABUJA 0181

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

-------

SUMMARY

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000197

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/22
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC SOCI KPAO NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN SECURITY CHIEF BRIEFS FOREIGN PARTNERS ON MUTUAL
CONCERNS

REF: ABUJA 0181

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




1. (S) Director General Afas Gadzama, Intelligence Director Yusuf
Bichi, and Operations Director Mathew Seiyefa of the Nigerian State
Security Service (SSS) briefed foreign diplomats and intelligence
officials on security issues February 18. Gadzama welcomed the
opportunity to correct what he characterized as
"misrepresentations" about Nigeria from informal, unofficial, and
open sources. Yet, he candidly criticized mismanagement of the
current political situation and Niger Delta amnesty program. He
discussed violence in Jos, the Anambra gubernatorial election,
kidnappings, "Boko Haram," and foreign extremist links to Nigeria.
END SUMMARY.




2. (S) Director General Gadzama, Intelligence Director Bichi, and
Operations Director Seiyefa briefed representatives of the
diplomatic corps and intelligence community on security issues at
SSS headquarters in Abuja February 18. U.S. Mission attendees
included representatives from Regional Affairs, Regional Security,
and the Political Section. Gadzama welcomed the opportunity to
correct what he described as "misrepresentations" from informal,
unofficial, and open sources. Operations Director Seiyefa admitted
that the security service had been "stressed" by the mismanagement
of the political situation, and that Nigeria's constitutional
democracy had been "sorely tested." He acknowledged the December
25 bombing attempt by Nigerian Abdulmutallab as an "opportunity for
enhanced cooperation," and insisted that foreign security liaison
officers could attest to the "renewed vitality" of security
consultations. Gadzama observed that "the Constitution has just
been tried" and that said he remained mindful of those "overheating

the polity" to achieve what they could not through the political
processes. He applauded a "positive" outcome, in which "democracy
and the rule of law prevailed."




3. (S) DG Gadzama remarked that his organization closely followed
developments in Niger, Mali, and Chad, adding that "persons of
security interest" were "straying" into Nigeria from neighboring
countries. He said the SSS has responded by stepping up
surveillance on Nigeria's borders, instituting "100 percent
checks," and strengthening its "watch-list process" for nationals
from particular "countries of interest." The DG revealed that the
SSS is monitoring the movements and activities of elements of
extremist groups in cooperation with the securities services of
other nations. Gadzama stated that "no one country or service can
deal with the transnational security challenges" and called for
greater intelligence sharing.



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NIGER DELTA

--------------




4. (S) Despite what they described as "discordant" signals from the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),SSS
officials welcomed the "marked improvement" and "dramatic
stabilization of the security situation" in the Niger Delta,
particularly around oil and gas installations, resulting in
increased oil production. Gadzama mildly criticized "avoidable
problems" in management of the rehabilitation and reintegration
phases of the amnesty program, but asserted that the GON was
correcting earlier missteps. He related that the disbursement of
funds for the rehabilitation phase would commence within the next
couple of weeks, now that the supplementary budget had been passed.

ABUJA 00000197 002 OF 004


Gadzama applauded communities that addressed criminality in their
localities, and acknowledged the current political reality when he
pointedly described Goodluck Jonathan as "the Acting President"
while echoing his commitment to the amnesty program.




5. (S) Director Bichi identified Henry Okah as the only major
militant leader not to have embraced amnesty, and disclosed efforts
by Okah, currently in South Africa, to call his commanders in the
Delta with orders to suspend the ceasefire, resulting in sporadic
attacks. Nevertheless, according to Director Seiyefa, key leaders
have been "cooperative and useful" in providing intelligence and
logistics for effective management of these situations. The
security chiefs admitted to being "anxious" that the GON "does
something quickly" on amnesty, but maintained that the government
is not underestimating the restlessness of the former militants and
the time-sensitivity of the reintegration program. They related
that the SSS focused mainly on removing weapons from circulation,
while also noting the "strong nexus between politics and
militancy." They applauded press reports of 80 million dollars in
pledges by international oil companies (IOCs) earlier in the week
towards the reorientation and reintegration of militants. (N.B.:
Embassy sources later confided that the 80 million amount had been
miscalculated and was closer to 30 million dollars. END NOTE.)



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VOLATILE JOS

--------------




6. (S) The security chiefs described the current situation
following violence in Jos (reftel) as "calm," but susceptible to
erupting "at any time," given underlying tensions. They
characterized the conflict as a "minor crisis which started as a
misunderstanding," primarily economically and politically
motivated, with religion used as an excuse by "mischievous" persons
to inflame tensions. According to the Intelligence Director, the
SSS detected no foreign involvement from their intelligence or
investigations into the most recent violence. He noted that,
during the 2008 outbreak of violence, authorities had arrested some
"minors" from Niger, whom they determined not to have been
combatants after further inquiry.




7. (S) Director Seiyefa lamented that violence in Jos had become a
regular, albeit unfortunate, occurrence between mostly Christian
indigenes who have political power and largely Muslim settlers with
the economic power. Violence erupted there in 1991, 1994, 2001,
2004, and 2008 before the latest round of violence began January
17, 2010. Director Bichi opined that state creation had made
tribalism worse, and that cell phone technology helped "fan the
flames" after an outbreak of violence. He prescribed improved
governance, economic development, and empowerment of the youth, so
they would not "fall back on the primordial sentiments of religion
or ethnicity." Director Bichi projected that foreign groups may
exploit ethnic tensions and other vulnerabilities to conduct their
activities. He insisted that authorities were investigating
purported extrajudicial killings during the most recent violence.



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"BOKO HARAM" AND FOREIGN LINKS

--------------




8. (S) SSS officials indicated that followers of "Boko Haram" may
have escaped to Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, where they claimed that
sister intelligence agencies of these countries have continued to
track them. Some members allegedly tried to rendezvous in Kano,

ABUJA 00000197 003 OF 004


Jigawa, Yobe, and Borno States, and some may have "melted into"
Shiites communities. SSS officials characterized cooperation
between the "Nigerian Taliban" or "Shiites" and Sunni Al-Qaeda as
unlikely, given long-standing enmity between the two rival Muslim
factions, and downplayed reports of an alleged meeting in Algeria
by "Boko Haram" adherents. Furthermore, SSS personnel had
determined that conflicts occurred within and among the different
extremist groups in the North, and did not (yet, at least) target
foreigners. "Protests against Mid-East policies," they noted,"end
up as demonstrations on the street."




9. (C) Director General Gadzama declared that, of the extremists
groups in Nigeria, "only a few have strong linkages with external
groups," although he did not specify which ones. In his
estimation, these groups "lack organizational capacity, and are not
structured to undertake operations which would threaten foreign
interests." Nevertheless, Gadzama described poverty, poor
governance, the presence of many children in Islamic schools, and
an increase in radical itinerant preachers as factors of concern.
"Given these predisposing factors," he concluded, "it is only a
question of time before foreign groups exploit these factors in the
country." The Operations Director described a more proactive
approach, acknowledging the deportation last week of an itinerant
preacher in Taraba State.



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"VERY SUCCESSFUL" ANAMBRA ELECTION

--------------




10. (C) Gadzama characterized the recent Anambra gubernatorial
election as "very successful" in that it transpired "in an
environment free of violence, massive rigging, and other processes
which would render the outcome untenable." He acknowledged,
however, problems with faulty Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) voter registers and late deployment of election
materials and personnel. He described the SSS as in the middle of
a "post-mortem" on elections held during the past year. He
expressed appreciation to Embassies that sent independent
observers, and described their presence as "necessary for giving
the process the credibility it deserves." He assessed the election
as "reasonably fair and free."



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BEWARE THE CHARLATANS

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11. (C) Gadzama, noting that he maintained an "open door policy,"
cautioned foreign missions about individuals whom he described as
peddling "distortions and fabrications" to foreign Embassies about
supposed specific threats to their Missions. He maintained that
some foreign officials had gone to the Defense Headquarters, SSS,
Office of the National Security Adviser, and police with purported
information on plans to target particular Embassies, that the SSS
had already thoroughly investigated and determined to be false.
The Director General also praised Abuja-based foreign liaison
officers and (somewhat uncharacteristically) the rival National
Intelligence Agency (NIA) for helping to investigate extremist
connections.



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CRIME AND KIDNAPPINGS

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ABUJA 00000197 004 OF 004



12. (C) SSS officials claimed a recent decrease of 35 to 40 percent
in kidnappings, but lamented that this level still represented an
average of nine per month over the past two months. They noted
that most kidnappings now occurred outside the Niger Delta,
particularly in the Southeast, and less frequently in the
South-South. They described many as apparent "insider jobs,"
including instances in which relatives from less affluent branches
of the same family were implicated. They attributed the decline,
in part, to police and SSS raids on criminal hideouts during the
past three months, especially in Lagos and throughout the
Southeast. Moreover, various state legislatures had enacted mew
criminal statutes that directly addressed kidnapping. They noted
that, with the release of the most recent kidnap victim, an Indian
national released about 12 hours before the briefing, no foreigners
remained captive against their will. The Operations Director wryly
added, however, "if your national has been kidnapped in the last
twelve hours, come see us."



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EXPAND THE GUEST LIST

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13. (C) At the end, a participant suggested inviting Yemen and
Saudi Arabia to future briefings, given their importance in the
fight against extremism. SSS leaders expressed optimism that the
National Assembly would soon pass counter-terrorism legislation.
They also expressed appreciation for inputs from foreign
intelligence agencies which helped to disrupt extremist activities.
During the meeting, SSS leadership twice singled out assistance by
the U.S. and United Kingdom to the SSS as particularly appreciated,
in addition to support from Germany and Israel.



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COMMENT

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14. (C) The SSS last conducted a briefing of this type September
18, 2009. The Nigerian Government likely wanted to show that it
was responding broadly to the Abdulmutallab case. The SSS appears
to remain, unfortunately, "in denial" that Nigerians are
participating in foreign-inspired plots against Western interests
in Nigeria. END COMMENT.
SANDERS