Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ABUJA159
2010-02-11 17:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

INEC CHAIRPERSON CALLED OUT ON DISMAL PERFORMANCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR OVIP SOCI NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1682
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0159/01 0421734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111734Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0263
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0074
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000159 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR OVIP SOCI NI
SUBJECT: INEC CHAIRPERSON CALLED OUT ON DISMAL PERFORMANCE

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

-------

SUMMARY

-------



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000159

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR OVIP SOCI NI
SUBJECT: INEC CHAIRPERSON CALLED OUT ON DISMAL PERFORMANCE

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




1. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie
Carson, the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Special Assistant,
USAID Democracy Officer, and PolOff (notetaker) met with
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Chairperson
Maurice Iwu February 10 to emphasize the importance of establishing
good election processes in Nigeria. The Assistant Secretary
described the enduring impact of poor elections on Nigerian
leadership and institutions, and the fragility of such institutions
resulting from Iwu's failure since 2007 to manage the technical,
administrative, and logistical components of Nigerian elections.
Iwu had assembled various election Commissioners for the meeting.
After a 30-minute diatribe touting INEC's small successes and
blaming others for INEC's problems, Ambassador Carson sternly
reminded Iwu that for Nigeria to move forward, he must ensure that
democracy represents the will of the people vis-a-vis the proper
management of election processes. Ambassador Carson hit Iwu hard
for blaming everyone else for INEC's continual failures rather than
assuming responsibility for them as the principal, manager of the
election process. The meeting was vocal and pointed, leaving Iwu
to understand, in no uncertain terms, that the USG expects to see
different INEC leadership no later than the expiration of his
five-year term in June 2010. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson explained to INEC Chairperson Iwu
that democracies are more important than any single person and that
a country's elections determine the credibility of its leadership
and the enduring quality of its institutions. Ambassador Carson
asserted that, although democracy writ large has been on an upward
tilt in Nigeria since the tenure of Olusegun Obasanjo, the election
process has fluctuated between small successes and catastrophic

failures, such as the 2007 elections. He added that Nigeria needs
good elections to validate its leadership in the region, retain
respect from international partners, and avoid letting down its
people. Ambassador Carson reminded Iwu of the Secretary's meeting
last August with President Yar'Adua in which Yar'Adua himself
stated that he could not understand how India, with over 1.2
billion, diverse people and regions, and Malaysia, with over three
time zones, can make elections work while Nigeria still cannot.




3. (C) Ambassador Carson told Iwu that he had failed to perform the
most essential of his responsibilities -- to make sure that the
technical, administrative, and logistical management of the
election process works. He added that the USG and international
community know that the 2007 elections were seriously flawed,
because of how and where the ballots were printed, how they got to
Nigeria, how they were counted, and how Nigerian voters were
excluded from the most fundamental right to vote. "Your process
was flawed; hence, you were responsible for this," he strongly
stated.




4. (C) Iwu countered with a 25-minute response, in which he
described elections "as a process, rather than a single event" and
insisted that INEC could not be expected to function properly
during such a "political crisis and hostile environment as exists
presently in Nigeria." He explained that, since 2007, INEC was
operating in a hostile environment as the President and Vice
President "were at each other's throats, political parties lacked
internal democracy, forcing candidates on the people." He
continued that he "had no say on the election process or mechanism
for disciplining wrong-doing; and, had no support from the law."
Iwu then blamed lack of resources and staff for INEC's
"shortcomings" and the media's obsession with "blaming INEC for
everything." He claimed that, "even if elections were flawed, we
were confident that no one could beat Yar'Adua anyway." Carson
then asked why Nigeria should hold any elections at all, if
everyone knew who would win. Iwu replied by reverting to his

ABUJA 00000159 002 OF 003


explanation of five factors that he identified as problematic but
beyond INEC control -- 1) lack of political party internal
democratic practices; 2) electoral violence; 3) the dominant role
of money in elections; 4) gender imbalance; and 5) the mindset and
behavior of "winning at all costs." Iwu claimed that "INEC is not
as important as people think" and that "INEC is only a small part
of the democratic process." He then congratulated himself and INEC
for their performance during the February 6 Anambra gubernatorial
election, allegedly working closely with the Anambra people to
"domesticate the process," stem violence, and convince people to
accept the results.




5. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson countered by scolding Iwu and
noting that nowhere in his 25-minute litany did he address INEC's
most essential responsibility -- management of the technical,
administrative, and logistical functions of elections. He told Iwu
that it was not the INEC Chairperson's job to worry about political
parties, democratic philosophy, or proper mindsets and behaviors,
but rather to make sure that, operationally, elections function
properly, and do the technical work necessary to ensure the process
is not flawed. Responding to the recent Anambra elections,
Ambassador Carson agreed that the elections in Anambra may have
been credible, free, fair, without violence, and reflecting the
will of the people, but scored low marks on the very tasks for
which INEC had responsibility -- voter registration, polling
station operations, ballot management, and overall administration
of elections. He specifically highlighted inadequate voter
registration and voter lists as significant examples of INEC's poor
preparedness. Assistant Secretary Carson told Iwu that he would
give INEC a "D" grade for preparedness in Anambra. Then he warned
Iwu that it would be a mistake to use the Anambra election as the
"gold standard" for conducting election operations, given these
deficiencies, noting the other 35 states would participate in
elections simultaneously in 2011. Many of these states, he added,
are larger and more complex than Anambra; therefore, they needed to
do better. Ambassador Carson informed Iwu that the U.S. and U.K.
recently funded an independent election assessment team to look at
INEC and other processes of the Anambra election. He recommended
that Iwu carefully read the team's report and heed its
recommendations. In parting, Ambassador Carson sought to confirm
Iwu's departure in June at the end of his five-year term, to which
Iwu replied that he did not know.



--------------

COMMENT

--------------




6. (C) INEC Chairperson Iwu devoted most of his time during the
meeting to blaming others for his failures, taking credit for small
successes, and elaborating on his grand vision for strengthening
Nigerian democracy. He expended little time, however, on what
mattered most -- managing efficient, timely, and transparent
elections. While the February 6 Anambra State election may be
considered a success -- as defined by the will of the people and
the absence of violence -- the dismal management of the process is
cause for serious concern heading towards national elections in
2011, when 35 other states will participate simultaneously in the
process. As long as Iwu remains removed from the necessary
hands-on technical, managerial, and administrative requirements of
his position, both his broader goals for Nigerian democracy and
Nigerians' overdue right to legitimate political leadership will
have little chance of becoming reality. END COMMENT.




7. (U) Participants:



United States:

ABUJA 00000159 003 OF 003


Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson

Ambassador Robin R. Sanders

Deputy Chief of Mission Dundas C. McCullough

AF Special Assistant Akunna E. Cook

Political Officer Anthony R. Eterno (notetaker)



Nigeria:



INEC Chairperson Maurice Iwu

National Commissioner Victor Chukwuani

National Commissioner Adedeji Soyebi

Commission Secretary Alhaji A. A. Kaugama

Advisor to INEC Chairman Ambassador Brownson Dede




8. (U) Assistant Secretary Carson departed from Abuja before he had
an opportunity to clear on this telegram.
SANDERS