Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ABUJA157
2010-02-11 15:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KPAO NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000157 

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KPAO NI
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION
WITH SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION AND FORMER
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

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SUMMARY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000157

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KPAO NI
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION
WITH SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION AND FORMER
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

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SUMMARY

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1. (C) Nigerian Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF)
Mahmud Yayale Ahmed discussed the current "very abnormal" political
situation, President Yar'Adua's health, concerns about the 2011
elections, and what he considers an Algerian-Chadian axis of
support for extremists February 9 in a meeting with Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. Ahmed acknowledged
that, given Yar'Adua's health condition and the rapid way he
departed, "he was hardly in any position to transmit power" when he
left Nigeria. He also criticized the handling of the situation by
the President's close associates, as well as the "excesses" of the
Governors. He suggested that, since no one has heard from the
President, there was no way to say whether he was fit or in a coma.
In a separate meeting later February 9 with former National
Security Adviser (NSA) and retired General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau,
the Assistant Secretary heard about the North's conditional support
for Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to serve out Yar'Adua's term,
but predicted that Jonathan would be criticized either as overly
ambitious or aloof and lacking ambition. Gusau also expressed
support for enacting electoral reforms before the 2011 elections
and noted widespread lack of faith in Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) Chairperson Maurice Iwu. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) In a February 9 meeting, SGF Ahmed spoke frankly about the
current political situation and President Yar'adua's health with
Assistant Secretary Carson. Ambassador, Special Assistant Cook,
and PolOff (notetaker) also attended. Ahmed seemingly confirmed
reports that Yar'Adua was unconscious when he left Nigeria for
Saudi Arabia, declaring that "the President was hardly in any

position to transmit power" when he departed. Ahmed further
acknowledged the "very abnormal situation" in which the country
found itself, pointedly observing that "the President can suddenly
fall into a coma, but not be dead" and noted the constitutional
dilemma of such a situation.




3. (C) Ahmed opined that the military recognized that its
intervention was "no longer acceptable or practical" for Nigeria.
As a former Defense Minister, however, he noted that it was always
necessary to keep an eye on junior military officers. Ahmed
admitted to holding private meetings with "junior military
officers" on highlighting the importance of the democratic process.
He also said he had met with other "senior public servants," whom
he further described as former Permanent Secretaries who served
from 1966 to 1970 to develop a strategy on a way forward in
accordance with democratic processes and the rule of law. He
emphasized his personal concern that the situation not be
"dichotomized" (i.e., North versus South, or Muslim versus
Christian).




4. (C) Additionally, Ahmed seemed somewhat critical of the way
events had been handled and that they had "still not reached the
kind of sincerity" he would prefer. He remarked that, "subsequent
events have shown that we didn't handle this situation well."
Ahmed criticized the unchecked power of Governors "to spend,
embezzle, and do anything they like with the electoral process," as
well as the Governors' recent efforts to use the National Assembly,
particularly the Senate, to explore impeachment of the President.
Ahmed pointed out that this would be unsuccessful, since the
President must be given an opportunity to defend himself, which,
Ahmed said, "he clearly cannot do." Per Section 144 of the
Constitution, he added, the Federal Executive Committee (FEC) may,
with a two-thirds majority, declare the President "incapable" of

ABUJA 00000157 002 OF 004


doing his job. According to Ahmed, any such efforts would be based
on circumstantial evidence and involve the "telling of lies,"
because "no member of the FEC has either seen or heard from the
president or seen his medical reports." He noted that the FEC
would be reluctant to do so, as most members had been appointed or
supported by Yar'Adua, and would view such an action as appearing
disloyal. (COMMENT: Ahmed's remarks confirmed information from the
media and contacts regarding his testimony before the Senate, in
which he reportedly admitted that he had not seen or spoken with
President Yar'Adua since the November 23 departure for Saudi
Arabia. END COMMENT.)



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HURDLES TO OVERCOME FOR CREDIBLE 2011 ELECTIONS

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5. (C) Ahmed questioned whether Nigeria was "really ready for
credible national elections in 2011," given shortcomings
highlighted by the Anambra gubernatorial poll which would
presumably be exponentially worse in a nationwide election. Ahmed
delineated four main challenges to the holding of free and fair
elections in 2011, based partly on the outcome of the Anambra
polls. He cited the need for compilation of a credible voter
register, clear delineation of constituencies, a transparent umpire
"not dented" by prior accusations of interference, and
gubernatorial leaders who agreed to play by the rules. Ahmed
expressed doubt that Nigeria could overcome such obstacles in time
for 2011 absent "strong, courageous transitional leadership"
uninterested in running for reelection. Ahmed claimed to have been
responsible for conducting elections in 1979 and 1983, and to have
visited the U.S. to study American electoral processes at the time.




6. (C) Ambassador Carson expressed USG willingness to provide
electoral technical and financial assistance, as long as political
will for improvement existed among leaders and INEC demonstrated a
willingness to accept such help and use monetary assistance wisely.
The Assistant Secretary emphasized that INEC must be willing to
implement recommendations of the U.S. and U.K.-funded election
assessment mission conducted last month and headed by Ghanaian Dr.
Afari-Gyan. Carson pointed out that President Yar'Adua had
informed Secretary Clinton that free, fair, and credible elections
were his highest priority, and remarked what a wonderful legacy
that would be.




7. (C) The SGF commented that Vice President Jonathan appeared
"duly committed" to accurate counting of votes, and emphasized the
need to nominate credible candidates as INEC commissioners. Ahmed
noted the role Nigerian pride has played in the debate over
electoral reform, citing commentators' observations that "even
Ghana has completed good elections."




8. (C) Ahmed resolved that it was time to "start clipping the wings
of the governors" and mentioned that he had told INEC Chairperson
that he must stop accepting nominations for Commissioners from
Governors. He described the incumbent as "a necessary evil" who
requires transformation, but whom he thought would bend to the
political winds of change. Ahmed encouraged the U.S. and U.K. to
show more concern over the excesses of the Governors.



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U.S. EXPECTATIONS OF NIGERIA

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9. (C) The Assistant Secretary identified U.S. hopes that the GON
would 1) clearly and officially acknowledge that extremists and
potential terrorists exist everywhere, including in Nigeria, 2)
allow U.S. air marshals on flights to the United States, 3) improve
port security, and 4) approve the counter-terrorism bill in the
National Assembly. Such steps would not only assist the
international community collectively, but potentially show that
Nigeria merited removal from the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) watch list. Carson noted that Nigerians died
during the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. and nationals
from more over a dozen countries would have died had the December
25 attack succeeded.




10. (C) In response, the SGF said he expected approval soon of
counter-terrorism legislation and expressed concern about the
influence of Algeria over groups like Boko Haram, whom he judged to
be "much more dangerous than the Shiites." Ahmed alleged that
external forces were helping Nigerian extremists and expressed an
interest in greater information sharing about what he described as
an Algerian-Chadian axis of support for extremists. Ahmed related
that he had conferred with Arab and Israeli intelligence officials
whom he knew from his time as Minister of Defense. He expressed
hope that the GON would use the Abdulmutallab incident to "expose
our inadequacies" and pledged to fight terror both locally and
internationally.




11. (C) Lastly, the Ambassador informed the SGF that insistence by
the Aviation Minister on prohibiting flights by United and
Continental Airlines into Nigeria after stopping in Accra, Ghana,
violated provisions of the Open Skies agreement.



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EX-NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

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12. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson and the Ambassador met
separately February 9 with former NSA Gusau, who asserted that a
stable, constitutional, and democratic transition remained
important to the North. Gusau added that "a mature solution to
Yar'Adua's absence is fundamental to Nigeria's survival." When
asked to describe Northern reactions, Gusau downplayed any
contention over power succession, asserting that "no matter who you
talk to in the North, all agree that Goodluck Jonathan will serve
out Yar'Adua's term until 2011, then step down, and allow the North
to rule for one more term." Gusau also told the Assistant
Secretary that this scenario may change, if for example Jonathan
rallies support for a second term, puts his own people in
government, and removes those not loyal to him. Gusau suggested
that whichever route he chose, he will most likely be labeled
either as "aloof" should he maintain the status quo, or as
"ambitious" if he tries to exert power. When asked how a new Vice
President will be chosen if Jonathan becomes President, Gusau
intimated that Yar'Adua's Chief of Staff or someone else close to
Yar'Adua would likely receive the nod.




13. (C) Commenting on the 2011 elections, Gusau said that "everyone
has lost faith" in INEC Chairperson Maurice Iwu. He also commented

ABUJA 00000157 004 OF 004


that many people look forward to approval of the electoral reform
bill, concluding, that the success of the 2011 election will depend
upon it.



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COMMENT

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14 (C) SGF Ahmed spoke refreshingly frankly about the condition of
the President and the uncharted political waters in which Nigeria
found itself as a result of his failing health and absence.
Remarkably, the few members of Yar'Adua's family and inner circle
who reportedly know the reality successfully kept such information
from senior Nigerian officials. Thus far, most in the Nigerian
military have recognized their proper role, avoiding the temptation
to initiate a coup. However, it is good that the SGF has used his
past role as Minister of Defense to engage military rank and file
on the importance of the democratic process and the proper role of
the military in a democracy. He retains respect at the Ministry of
Defense.




15. (C) The SGF, while previously a close adviser to Yar'Adua, is
definitely "on the outs" with the Yar'Adua inner circle, which no
longer trusts him. The SGF seemed to admit as much during the
meeting. Meanwhile, the SGF remains a good interlocutor for the
U.S. Mission and one of the most practical persons with whom to
engage. He proved extremely helpful in overcoming road blocks
erected by INEC on meeting with the Election Assessment Team. He
supports election reform, and Mission will likely need his good
offices to encourage a faster pace for enacting reforms, as the
country remains only nine to twelve months away from the next
national election. As for General Gusau, he supports election
reform but continues to entertain political ambitions for 2011.
His views, therefore, should be viewed in the context of such
ambitions. END COMMENT.




16. (U) Assistant Secretary Carson departed from Abuja before
having the opportunity to clear on this telegram.
SANDERS