(S) US-UAE FURTHER COOPERATION TO DISRUPT TALIBAN FINANCE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07
TAGS: ECON, PTER, KTFN, AE, AF, EFIN
SUBJECT: (S) US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S.
Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


(S//NF) Summary

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury
analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE's State Security
Department (SSD) and Dubai's General Department of State Security
(GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in
the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD
and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and
other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to
building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and
GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related
financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE
services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked
for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In
particular, they asked for additional passport information,
telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries
for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.

2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence
exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the
previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related
finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move
funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw
support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE.
They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of
individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the
Taliban.

3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their
respective organizations would follow up on the information
provided, and work through intelligence channels to share
information and results and submit additional requests for
information.


Taliban/Haqqani Network

4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has
taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops
to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on
combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives
significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but
noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives
significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi
Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani
Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business
interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that
the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials
from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and
weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the
movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated
that Iran's IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS
officials noted Iran's support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that
GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and
Pashtun separatists.

5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on Tayyeb Agha
and Mullah Jalil, two senior Taliban officials who have made
multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S.
intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with
either individual and asked for additional identifying information,
including current passport information used by the individuals to
enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE:
Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange
included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport
information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases
on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE
immigration systems based on the passport information provided and
found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared
names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates
known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials
stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel
documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple
passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan
who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials
said this system should help prevent a single individual from using
different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue
their investigations and share further results.

6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large
Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they
commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan
businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved
in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based
family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for
Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted
to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of
being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or
Pakistan.

7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually
unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban.
They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to
transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize
suspicion.

8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani
Network's suspected use of front companies to raise and move money.
They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani
Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not
able to provide any details on him.

9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with Haji Abdul Bari, a
Dubai-based Afghan businessman, who reportedly provides funding to
the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The
GDSS officials stated that they do not believe Bari is loyal to the
Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani
authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed
out Bari's past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah
Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in
financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor Bari,
although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban
financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a
pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities,
but the USG has current information that suggests he is still
involved with the Taliban.

10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis.
They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani's success in
exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for
fundraising purposes.


(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based
extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security
services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT
members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on
the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as
an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with
the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.


OLSON