Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ABUDHABI39
2010-01-27 12:39:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE Illicit Finance Strategy 2010

Tags:  EFIN PTER PGOV PINR AF AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAD #0039/01 0271239
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271239Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0203
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0017
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0014
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000039 

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP (SHY),S/CT (NOVIS, BLOHM),NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP, SCA AND INL (SILENSKY)
DHS FOR WARRICK
OSD FOR WECHSLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/27
TAGS: EFIN PTER PGOV PINR AF AE
SUBJECT: UAE Illicit Finance Strategy 2010

REF: 09 ABU DHABI 1159 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000039

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP (SHY),S/CT (NOVIS, BLOHM),NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP, SCA AND INL (SILENSKY)
DHS FOR WARRICK
OSD FOR WECHSLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/27
TAGS: EFIN PTER PGOV PINR AF AE
SUBJECT: UAE Illicit Finance Strategy 2010

REF: 09 ABU DHABI 1159 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (S/NF) This is a country team assessment.



CONTEXT

--------------


I.

II. 2. (S/NF) Given the UAE's open financial
system, sizeable expatriate community and role as an regional
financial hub, some Taliban, al-Qaeda and other illicit financing
may originate in and more may transit the UAE to Afghanistan and
third countries. Afghan drug proceeds, including laundered funds,
both transit the UAE and are invested here. Cash couriers are
believed a primary transit mechanism for illicit funds to and from
countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.




3. (S/NF) The UAE is less than 40 years old, so while in many ways
the country appears to enjoy a modern and globalized economy, human
capacity and expertise in the field of finance, law enforcement and
intelligence is still nascent. In recent years, UAE authorities
have revised the AML/CFT legal framework and expanded intelligence
and law enforcement capacity in an attempt to identify and disrupt
illicit finance.




4. (S/NF) Cooperation with the UAE is complicated by its loose
federal structure. While federal decision making is strongly
influenced by Abu Dhabi, the largest and wealthiest emirate, Dubai
is of greatest concern on threat finance issues. The UAE's legal
framework gives all emirates significant sovereignty over almost
all law enforcement efforts, including customs, and this is
especially true in Dubai. Therefore, some government-to-government
programs and agreements may have limited applicability to
day-to-day law enforcement cooperation, as federal entities tend to
focus on policy not enforcement.



III. 2009 EFFORTS

IV. --------------




5. (S/NF) Following multiple and ongoing senior USG officials'
engagement over the past year, the UAE demonstrated strong

commitment to combating Taliban financial flows in 2009 (building
on the successful model built over many years combating Iranian
proliferation supporting financial flows). The UAE views its
cooperation on these issues through the prism of its significant
military deployment to Afghanistan and its efforts to contribute to
Afghanistan's security, stability and reconstruction.




6. (S/NF) In mid-2009, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed designated the State Security Directorate (SSD) to serve as
the primary POC on Taliban finance cooperation with the USG. SSD is
an independent intelligence organization with a federal mandate, it
theoretically directs its Dubai counterpart, the General
Directorate of State Security (GDSS),although in practice GDSS
responds to Dubai's political leadership. Designating SSD ensures

this high-profile national security issue is handled by appropriate
officials and does not attract undue public attention. UAEG
officials have reiterated that SSD is the primary conduit for
US-UAE Taliban finance cooperation and reminded USG officials not
to approach other UAE entities directly, demonstrating the
importance of handling this relationship with care.




7. (S/NF) At the UAEG's suggestion, we established a joint Cash
Courier Task Force in September 2009 that includes
State/DHS/Treasury/Justice and GRPO, is coordinated by SSD and
involves UAE federal and local intelligence, law enforcement and
policy entities. This group, which is led by SSD, has met multiple
times to discuss UAE cash courier procedures and authorities and
coordinate a Feb/Mar 2010 bulk cash smuggling training and
operation. The UAE has also recently drafted new legislation for an
outbound cash declaration system in an effort to better track
financial outflows and enforce outbound cash smuggling.




V. 2010 OBJECTIVE

VI. --------------

VII.

VIII. 8. (S/NF) The Mission's objectives for the coming
year are (1) to build on cooperation already established; (2) to
expand cooperation through the existing SSD-led mechanism to
include all relevant USG and UAEG entities once the US Whole of
Government approach generates increased information flows, and (3)
build UAE capacity to disrupt illicit finance and (4) intensify
efforts to expand bilateral law enforcement cooperation.



IX. NEEDS

--------------



a. 9. (S/NF) Information Sharing: In order to most quickly
disrupt Taliban related illicit finance activity, or best identify
UAE policy and enforcement weaknesses, the USG should aim to
produce detailed information (including law enforcement
information) about Taliban and other illicit finance activities
touching the UAE through the SSD channel. Whenever possible, we
should seek to share this information with the UAE in real time,
utilizing SSD as the lead point of contact. In addition to adhering
to the Crown Prince's direct instruction, focusing on SSD and GDSS
will allow the USG to concentrate our Taliban resources on the most
effective proven enforcement body in the UAE and create a single
point of accountability within the UAEG.



Senior Emirati officials have expressed concerns that the US has
shared scant actionable intelligence on Taliban financing pertinent
to the UAE. In December 2009, a Treasury-led analytical team met
with key UAE intelligence entities to pass relevant Taliban finance
information. Solidifying and institutionalizing UAE cooperation
will require an expanded USG effort to identify and share Taliban
finance information. Appropriate USG agencies will be included in
our existing bilateral working group as information becomes
available.



b. 10. (S/NF) Bilateral Agreements: In order to facilitate

information sharing, concluding a US-UAE MLAT and CMAA/MOU should
be priorities in 2010.



c. 11. (S/NF) High Level Visits: USG officials should
continue to encourage ongoing cooperation with UAEG officials to
reiterate President Obama's strong interest in disrupting Taliban
finance.




X. STRATEGY

XI. --------------



a. 12. (S/NF) Capacity Building: Through the existing Cash
Courier Working Group, Mission UAE will deliver a Feb/Mar 2010 bulk
cash smuggling training and operation. This event will be followed
by an exercise review that UAEG officials say should outline
additional training and operational activities in 2010.



b. 13. (S/NF) Law Enforcement Cooperation: We will also
continue to maximize broader US-UAE law enforcement cooperation
through existing partnerships and relationships. We will continue
to pass DHS/ICE, DEA and FBI law enforcement information on illicit
financial activities to counterparts and offer appropriate capacity
building support.



XII. NOTES

XIII. --------------



a) 14. (S/NF) TDY: To fully provide the strategy outlined
above, the Mission may require appropriate USG personnel to support
scheduled training, subject to Chief of Mission approval and
meeting specific milestones. (Ambassador's Note: The most
pressing need for this mission is for additional administrative
support. Absent addition of support personnel it will not be
possible to expand the mission in ways that various agencies
desire.)



b) 15. (S/NF) Review: This strategy will be reviewed
throughout the year, particularly after the cash courier practical
exercise in March, to refine and enhance effectiveness.
OLSON