Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ZAGREB746
2009-12-21 11:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON

Tags:  PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR 
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VZCZCXRO1729
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0746/01 3551124
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211124Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9751
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0058
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0736
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000746 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND PRM; BELGRADE FOR REFCOORD;
GENEVA FOR MULREAN AND PITOTTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR
SUBJECT: CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON
THE AGENDA FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE (CORRECTED
COPY)

REF: ZAGREB 728

Classified By: Ambassador James Foley for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000746

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND PRM; BELGRADE FOR REFCOORD;
GENEVA FOR MULREAN AND PITOTTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR
SUBJECT: CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON
THE AGENDA FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE (CORRECTED
COPY)

REF: ZAGREB 728

Classified By: Ambassador James Foley for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The expert-level meeting between Croatia and
Serbia in early December aimed at defining an agenda for a
Belgrade-sponsored conference to address the lingering
refugee issues in the region did not go well, according to
contacts in Zagreb. The only agreement the parties reached
was to meet in mid-January to try again on setting an agenda
for the conference, which is tentatively scheduled for late
winter. We judge there is little likelihood that the parties
will be able to reach agreement in the near-term on the
preparatory work that is essential to ensure the conference's
ultimate success. A poorly implemented conference that would
only result in finger pointing would be a setback, not only
for the resolution of lingering refugee issues, but also for
Croatian-Serbian relations. The best prospects for making
progress on the refugee issues may instead come from
attempting to develop a more comprehensive package of
measures to resolve a myriad of the lingering and
interconnected issues stemming from the war, which could have
appeal to all sides. Such an initiative could be a powerful
factor in normalizing the relations between Croatia and
Serbia, and help stabilize the rest of the region. The
aftermath of the inauguration of a new Croatian President in
mid-February could be a propitious period for exploring
elements of a comprehensive approach. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Expert-level delegations from Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia,
and Montenegro met in Belgrade on December 7 and 8 to discuss
the potential agenda for a regional conference proposed by
Serbia and supported by the UNHCR to seek resolution of the
remaining refugee issues in the region. The Serbian
government would like to hold the refugee conference in
Belgrade in late February or early March. The Croatian and
Serbian delegations met bilaterally on the first day.
According to Croatian participants, it was a wrangle over a
myriad of contentious issues and made very little progress on

defining a potential agenda. The core issue is the Serbian
demand that Croatia provide compensation for Croatian Serb
refugees who fled during the war and would rather remain in
Serbia or Bosnia than try to return and re-integrate into
Croatia.


3. (SBU) In the end, the Serbian delegation provided each of
the parties an extensive list of refugee-related issues that
Belgrade considers unresolved and would like to be included
in the conference agenda. The Croatian delegation made a
commitment to study the proposed topics and offered to host a
follow-on expert-level meeting in mid-January to again
attempt to define the conference agenda.


4. (C) On the second day of the experts-level meetings,
representatives from the Belgrade offices of the UNCHR and
OSCE were invited to participate. The UNCHR office in Zagreb
is now pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an
agreement on a conference agenda in January. On substance
there was reportedly little meeting of the minds in terms of
the priorities for the conference and the sides could not
even agree on a working title for the conference. The
Croatian side objects to a Serbian proposal that the
conference title refer to the region's prospects for EU
accession. The GoC believes this is an effort by Serbia to
make any commitments that emerged from the conference part of
the EU accession benchmarks for each country, which could
then threaten to delay Croatia's EU membership.


5. (C) According to UNHCR, the Serbian delegation
acknowledged it was important to find a common agreement on
the number of refugees located in each country -- the UNHCR
has noted some 10,000 refugees that are erroneously
registered in more than one country -- but appeared unwilling
to resolve this issue prior to the conference. Croatia
argues that before any discussion of the way forward on the
protracted refugee situation can be productive there needs to
be agreement on the numbers concerned. UNHCR Zagreb's
pessimism also reflects a recognition of deeply held, highly
emotive, and discordant beliefs harbored by each side.
Tellingly, the UNHCR read-out noted that at dinner on
December 7 the two heads of delegation, Serbian Commissioner
for Refugees Vladimir Cucic and Croatian Director General for
Multilateral Affairs Mario Nobilo, had a heated exchange in
which the Croat insisted Serbia must take responsibility for
the destruction of Vukovar while the Serb insisted that

ZAGREB 00000746 002 OF 002


Croatia is obliged to pay compensation to Serbs who fled
during the war (and were stripped of tenancy rights) and do
not want to return to Croatia.

COMMENT


6. (C) The deep sensitivity of this issue is further
reflected in the arguments over the pending Croatian genocide
suit and Serbian counter-suit at the ICJ. This underscores
the risk to U.S. objectives in the region of bringing the
issue of refugees who have chosen to settle in Serbia under
the penumbra of EU accession. Not only could it delay
Croatia's EU accession, it could end up complicating and
delaying Serbia's own EU bid itself.


7. (C) Who bears responsibility for the ethnic Serbs who fled
Croatia during the war is the central irritant in
Croatia-Serbia relations (reftel). In that sense, the
initiative to find a resolution to the remaining refugee
issues is welcome on more than one account. However, it is
unlikely to succeed if it aims to compel Croatia to
compensate refugees who refuse to return, in isolation from a
discussion of Serbia's own responsibility for the damage and
disruption caused by the war. The budgetary implications for
Croatia alone would make this a tough sell and the politics
of paying people who do not want to return to Croatia are
even tougher: Croatian politicians and public would
immediately object that Serbia has never paid any damages to
Croatia for the war. The GoC would likely insist additional
funds be spent on housing and re-integration of those who
have returned or are still willing to return. (An
international fund to provide compensation to both refugees
in Serbia and to victims of the war in Croatia might provide
a way out of this impasse, but our understanding is that
external donor funding for such an effort is unlikely.) END
COMMENT.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH


8. (C) The linkages among these issues argue for a
comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would
also potentially include B-H and Montenegro). The election
of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an
opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship
forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the
time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both
to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue. A
better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to
construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a
number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s,
potentially including refugees, genocide claims and
reparations. Such a comprehensive agreement would take time
and need to be guided in part by the US and key European
capitals. But success would pay long-term dividends, as it
would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's
quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration.
WALKER