CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000739

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND PRM; BELGRADE FOR REFCOORD;
GENEVA FOR MULREAN AND PITOTTI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PREF PREL UNHCR HR SR
SUBJECT: CROATIA AND SERBIA FIND LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON
THE AGENDA FOR A REGIONAL REFUGEE CONFERENCE

REF: ZAGREB 728

Classified By: Ambassador James Foley for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The expert-level meeting between Croatia and
Serbia in early December aimed at defining an agenda for a
Belgrade-sponsored conference to address the lingering
refugee issues in the region did not go well, according to
contacts in Zagreb. The only agreement the parties reached
was to meet in mid-January to try again on setting an agenda
for the conference, which is tentatively scheduled for late
win$GQ4nding for such an effort is unlikely.) END
COMMENT.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH
--------------


8. (C) The linkages among these issues argue for a
comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would
also potentially include B-H and Montenegro). The election
of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an
opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship
forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the
time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both
to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue. A
better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to
construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a
number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s,
potentially including refugees, genocide claims and
reparations. Such a comprehensive agreement would take time
and need to be guided in part by the US and key European
capitals. But success would pay long-term dividends, as it
would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's
quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration.
FOLEY

ZAGREB 00000739 002 OF 002


during the war (and were stripped of tenancy rights) and do
not want to return to Croatia.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (SBU) The deep sensitivity of this issue is further
reflected in the arguments over the pending Croatian genocide
suit and Serbian counter-suit at the ICJ. This underscores
the risk to U.S. objectives in the region of bringing the
issue of refugees who have chosen to settle in Serbia under
the penumbra of EU accession. Not only could it delay
Croatia's EU accession, it could end up complicating and
delaying Serbia's own EU bid itself.


7. (C) Who bears responsibility for the ethnic Serbs who fled
Croatia during the war is the central irritant in
Croatia-Serbia relations (reftel). In that sense, the
initiative to find a resolution to the remaining refugee
issues is welcome on more than one account. However, it is
unlikely to succeed if it aims to compel Croatia to
compensate refugees who refuse to return, in isolation from a
discussion of Serbia's own responsibility for the damage and
disruption caused by the war. The budgetary implications for
Croatia alone would make this a tough sell and the politics
of paying people who do not want to return to Croatia are
even tougher: Croatian politicians and public would
immediately object that Serbia has never paid any damages to
Croatia for the war. The GoC would likely insist additional
funds be spent on housing and re-integration of those who
have returned or are still willing to return. (An
international fund to provide compensation to both refugees
in Serbia and to victims of the war in Croatia might provide
a way out of this impasse, but our understanding is that
external donor funding for such an effort is unlikely.) END
COMMENT.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH
--------------


8. (C) The linkages among these issues argue for a
comprehensive package between Croatia and Serbia (that would
also potentially include B-H and Montenegro). The election
of a new Croatian president in mid-February could be an
opportunity to move the Croatian-Serbian relationship
forward; but an inadequately prepared conference around the
time of the inauguration could instead prove a setback both
to bilateral relations and to resolving the refugee issue. A
better course of action would be a well-calibrated effort to
construct a broader strategic deal that provides closure to a
number of the issues that stem from the war in 1990s,
potentially including refugees, genocide claims and
reparations. Such a comprehensive agreement would take time
and need to be guided in part by the US and key European
capitals. But success would pay long-term dividends, as it
would remove much of the burden of the past from the region's
quest for normalization and Euro-Atlantic integration.
FOLEY