Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ZAGREB731
2009-12-16 10:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

GOC SAYS ALL LEADS ON ICTY DOCUMENTS POINT TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV ICTY HR 
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VZCZCXRO7577
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0731/01 3501038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161038Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9735
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000731 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI; THE HAGUE FOR OLC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ICTY HR
SUBJECT: GOC SAYS ALL LEADS ON ICTY DOCUMENTS POINT TO
GOTOVINA DEFENSE TEAM; WANTS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT BY ICTY

REF: A. ZAGREB 727

B. ZAGREB 726 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolEcon Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b)
& (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000731

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI; THE HAGUE FOR OLC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ICTY HR
SUBJECT: GOC SAYS ALL LEADS ON ICTY DOCUMENTS POINT TO
GOTOVINA DEFENSE TEAM; WANTS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT BY ICTY

REF: A. ZAGREB 727

B. ZAGREB 726 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolEcon Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b)
& (d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Davor Stier, foreign policy advisor to PM
Kosor, briefed the Ambassador on December 14 regarding the
latest developments in the GoC's search for the artillery
documents sought by ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz. Stier
said that the searches conducted by the special Task Force on
December 9 were "aggressive, but in accordance with Croatian
law." The GoC would respect the ICTY-ordered freeze on the
investigation. However, the GoC was concerned that the Task
Force investigation was now stymied at a moment when there
still had been no positive movement in assessments of
Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY by either Brammertz or
key EU states. Given domestic political pressures, PM Kosor
needs to see some positive response to the latest Croatian
efforts, and hoped that the US might weigh in with the
British or Dutch. The Ambassador noted that Brammertz,
London and The Hague were still digesting the latest
developments, and that we needed to wait a few weeks to
assess their reactions. A key indicator might come at the
December 16 ICTY hearing on Croatia's cooperation. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) Stier stressed that the December 9 searches of
eleven suspects' properties, which had turned up some 10,000
pages of potentially suspect documents, had been initiated by
Croatian state prosecutors, and performed with valid search
warrants issued by the county courts. Underlining the
legality of the procedure, he noted that the Task Force had
requested warrants to search property belonging to one
additional suspect, a lawyer of an ICTY indictee, but that
the court denied the request. The mere fact that such a
large volume of suspect material had been found "justified
such a broad police action," according to Stier.


3. (C/NF) Stier noted that the ICTY Trial Chamber had ordered
a freeze on Dec. 11 of inspection of documents and computers

seized from three key suspects who are or were members of the
Gotovina defense team. He said analysis of the findings
prior to the freeze indicated that the documents wanted by
the ICTY were not among the 10,000 pages seized, although
many documents were official, classified state archives
materials that were apparently illegally in the possession of
the individuals searched. The seized computers had not yet
been investigated, as police were awaiting the local court's
order when the ICTY injunction was issued.


4. (C/NF) The Task Force's investigation so far had
established the following scenario. In 1998, Croatian CHOD
Pavao Miljavac ordered that all copies of documents related
to Operation "Storm" be destroyed, and the originals
transferred to the central Archives. In direct contravention
of that order, Gen. Rahim Ademi, who was then in Knin, held a
certain number of documents back, even as he claimed all
files were transferred. (Investigators presume that these
include documents demanded by the ICTY.) Later, probably in
2000, when Gotovina was Inspector General and Ademi was his
deputy, Ademi had ordered another officer close to Gotovina,
Zeljko Hucic, to go to Knin, retrieve the documents, and
bring them back to Zagreb. Hucic had apparently done so, and
the Task Force believes that he then gave them either to
Ademi or to Gotovina. That is where the investigative trail
ends.


5. (C/NF) The GoC would fully respect the ICTY's injunction,
Stier said. But it left the GoC investigation in a difficult
spot. All leads from the Task Force's work to date suggest
that any missing documents that still exist are in the
possession of Gotovina's lawyers. But now the Croatian
police have been blocked from pursuing that avenue of
investigation. Stier admitted that the documents were
unlikely to be in the offices or homes searched in Croatia.
But the hope was that investigation of the computers could
turn up additional leads or information perhaps confirming
whether the defense team had the documents, who might have
them now, or what had been done with them. (Note: Dutch
authorities earlier rejected a GoC request to search the
Gotovina defense team's office in The Hague.)


6. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked what was new about the Task
Force's conclusions, given that the GoC had previously
theorized that the missing documents had been stolen or
destroyed by persons associated with General Gotovina. Stier
replied that the Task Force had been able to connect the dots
and to prove what had heretofore been merely affirmed or

ZAGREB 00000731 002 OF 002


surmised. He attributed this to searching and even hostile
questioning of military witnesses, which he noted could not
have been easy for police investigators. Stier also freely
admitted, when pressed by the Ambassador, that a
professional, police-led investigation could have been
mounted earlier by the GoC. He explained that GoC
seriousness was principally the result of Kosor's accession
as Prime Minister and her willingness to take tough decisions.


7. (C/NF) Stier acknowledged that, from a legal standpoint,
and in relation to the Gotovina case, it was not a problem
for Croatia to wait for the Trial Chamber's decision about
how to handle the seized documents and computers. But the
politics of the issue were more complicated. Stier said that
Kosor's opponents within the ruling HDZ led by ex-Prime
Minister Sanader, already resistant to her effort to allow
damaging anti-corruption cases to move forward, were now
using complaints (including accusations of treason) from
veterans' groups about the searches to weaken her position.
Kosor's message to the investigators was clear: go to the
end and do everything you legally can to find the documents.
But Kosor needed to be able to show that this newly
aggressive approach was being recognized in an improved
assessment of Croatia's cooperation by Brammertz or in
unblocking Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) of
the EU negotiations. So far no such signal had been
received. The only response had been an order from ICTY to
freeze the investigation, which some were portraying as a
"humiliation" of both Brammertz and the GoC. Stier said that
PM Kosor was hoping that the USG might weigh in with the UK
to explain that the GoC effort was credible, noting that a
positive response to the investigation would help ensure it
is sustained.


8. (C/NF) The Ambassador urged patience, noting that the US
had already, in the UNSC and in the Secretary's meeting with
FM Jandrokovic, praised the GoC's improved efforts in
searching for the documents, and called on Croatia to
continue. Both Brammertz and the EU FMs had signaled an
increasing readiness to accept that a credible investigation
could establish that the documents were truly beyond the
reach of the GoC. Moreover, the Ambassador continued, less
than a week had passed since the GoC's raids. Observers,
including Brammertz and the British, were still considering
what these events signified. The hearing called by the Trial
Chamber for December 16 to discuss the request for documents,
and its subsequent ruling (likely to be issued in January),
will also influence Croatia's chances for opening Chapter 23.
We intend to follow these events closely and review where
the issue stands by mid-January.


9. (C/NF) COMMENT: We understand a debate is currently going
on in London regarding whether the GoC is doing enough to
merit opening of Chapter 23. Clearly, this issue would be
easier to resolve if the Prosecution came to the view that
Croatia's increased efforts since late September represent a
credible investigation, and that Croatia is fully cooperating
with the ICTY, even though it has been unable to locate all
of the 23 documents in question. There is a chance, even if
the Prosecutor does not express this view, that the Trial
Chamber could find that Croatia is responding adequately. In
any case, we believe that parties will be more open to
re-evaluating their positions only after the Dec. 16 hearing
and its aftermath at the ICTY. In the interim, we are urging
the GoC to continue its investigations, although the
injunction against searching further among Gotovina's defense
team circumscribes what additional efforts the Task Force can
undertake. END COMMENT.
FOLEY